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ABSTRACT: When Apartheid ended in South Africa, so did many barriers to entry for 
other Africans who wished to migrate there. They came with business skills that locals 
lacked, having previously been barred from much of civic life, and quickly dominated in 
street trading. Two decades later, the lure of opportunity is still drawing millions of 
Africans to South Africa. The purpose of this study is to examine the obstacles and 
threats to livelihood that migrants encounter in South Africa, to understand the survival 
strategies they employ to combat these, along with the pressures from home, and to 
analyze the effects these strategies have on space at differing scales. This study utilized 
qualitative research methods and focused on migrant street traders in Greenmarket 
Square in the heart of Cape Town, South Africa. Migrants conveyed that they struggled 
with locals who exhibited high levels of xenophobia. They also struggled to understand 
and negotiate the South African Immigration bureaucr cy, which is notoriously 
inefficient and sometimes corrupt. Lastly, migrants portrayed their relationships to home 
in complex terms, outlining both the benefits and costs, financial and emotional, of being 
linked transnationally to their home communities. Migrants are fond of home, but 
routinely feel negatively pressured to remit finances and struggle to maintain a place in 
the social order from afar. I conclude that migrants are exposed and at-risk, caught in 
between a context of poverty in the Global South and  tide of resentment, fear and stern 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
I. Introduction 
A. Migration to South Africa   
Migrants are coming to South Africa in large numbers, from several African 
countries. This critical issue is the core of this re earch project. The majority of 
scholarship on migration to South Africa has focused on three topics. The first is the 
study of South Africa’s rich history of migration. The second is the study of 
contemporary South Africa’s high levels of xenophobia, which often has placed sole 
emphasis on the experiences and viewpoints of citizens. The third is research geared 
toward arguing the merits or demerits of migration and its corresponding state policies.  
 In these studies, migration in South Africa is largely taken as a given. 
Increasingly though, researchers have begun opening up the migration discussion to the 
understanding of how and why migrants act, rather tan merely demographic information 
about them. These authors are largely anthropologists, but are increasingly joined by 
geographers. Many studies have also been largely quantitative in nature. The vast 
amounts of quantitative data are insufficient on their own to answer the multitude of 
questions that are still to be answered about migration in the South African context. The 
statistical and survey data that have dominated the tool kit of migration studies are now 
acting as a base from which scholars encourage one another to pursue research questions 
that are qualitative in nature and weighted on the perspectives and experiences of actual 
migrants. 
 Migration Studies hold certain assumptions about the strategies migrants employ 
to survive. The South African context often renders these assumptions problematic at 
 2
best. What motivates migrants to come specifically to South Africa and how they 
accomplish their unique goals once they arrive has not been sufficiently explored. This 
understanding is critical to answering questions about the state of contemporary South 
Africa, Africa, and global transaction.  
  
B. Historical Research Context  
 To say that South Africa’s history has been shaped by migration is a major 
understatement. The movements of African and European oples have had a great 
impact on the social make-up of South Africa for hundreds or thousands of years. The 
migration streams that most shaped contemporary migration to South Africa, however, 
began in 1870 when diamonds were discovered near Kimberley, and in 1886, when gold 
was found on the Witwatersrand (Wentzel and Thlabela 2006). Migrants were actively 
recruited from other parts of southern Africa and their labor became a central feature of 
the industrialization of South Africa (Modi 2003). The operation of these mines 
demanded huge numbers of cheap, unskilled, and, most i portantly, disposable laborers 
(Wentzel and Thlabela 2006; Modi 2003; Crush and Tshitereke 2001). Mining served to 
economically integrate Southern Africa, albeit in a very skewed manner where South 
Africa controlled the flow of labor, enabling it toexternalize the costs of the health and 
social welfare of its workers (Oucho 2006; Solomon 2005; Wentzel and Thlabela 2006). 
Labor migration remained a dominant feature of the South African economy under 
Apartheid (Adepoju 2003). However, as other countries in Africa emerged from their 
own independence struggles, most took issue with South Africa’s Apartheid-era policies. 
Countries like Zambia and Tanzania enforced a sort of labor embargo, not allowing their 
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citizens to seek work in South Africa (Wentzel and Thlabela 2006; Adepoju 2003). Many 
African countries also supported, armed and harbored freedom fighters and rebels driven 
from South Africa (Adepoju 2003; Modi 2003). In response, South Africa actively sought 
to destabilize its neighbors by supporting or aiding their own rebel elements and 
fracturing the already precarious post-colonial political and economic conditions (Modi 
2003). This destabilization campaign left many countries functionally dependent to a 
further extent on South Africa (Modi 2003). 
 
C. Post-Apartheid Migration Issues 
 When Apartheid ended, so did its fortification of South African borders. Before 
1994, migrants did not perceive South Africa as a desirable migration destination (Shea 
2008). The advent of majority rule ended many African countries’ labor embargoes on 
South Africa (Adepoju 2003). Contractual migrants from Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Mozambique, and Malawi were joined by Africans from a plethora of countries (Adepoju 
2003). The democratization encouraged an increase in all types of migration: skilled and 
unskilled, legal and illegal (Wentzel and Thlabela 2006; Adepoju 2003). However, most 
new migrants came illegally (Adepoju 2003).   
 The post-Apartheid African influx to South Africa h s been multifaceted (Crush 
&McDonald 2002). Not only was there an influx of urban-bound foreign migrants in 
South Africa, there was now increasing internal migration amongst South Africans, 
especially blacks (Western 2001). Due to Apartheid, f w blacks grew up in the cities. 
Apartheid fell and so did the barrier to the city centers (Ballard & Popke 2004; Landau 
2006). South Africa’s cities are now growing rapidly, putting increasing pressure on an 
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increasingly diverse set of migrants, settled inhabitants, and the public officials tasked 
with providing service, safety and support (Western 2001).  
 
D. Policy response 
 Post-1994 policy was ambiguous at best. Many policy makers chose to delay the 
complex issue and many chose to simply ignore it. Alack of any apparent policies or 
their translation to a confused civil service resulted in ad hoc procedure (Solomon 2005). 
This indecision or preference to ignore immigration permeated all levels of government. 
According to Sinclair (2001, 208), the local authorities in Johannesburg and Cape Town 
also refused to adapt to the changing urban social environment of the 1990s, preferring to 
“turn a blind eye to the level of conflict between urban groups, believing, no doubt, that 
this is beyond both their responsibility and their r ach.”  
 Nelson Mandela, the first post-apartheid president, did not care to address 
immigration legislation, favoring to regard immigrants as brothers and sisters whose 
countries had aided in the struggle against Apartheid (Western 2001). Many other ANC 
members shared the same filial feelings with African ountries that had harbored them 
under Apartheid. This sentiment was increasingly countered by more conservative 
policy-makers concerned with securing South Africa’s fragile peace and prosperity for 
those only within its borders. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the first government’s minister for 
Home Affairs, argued that migrants would threaten the resources of the government’s 
new economic program for Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Modi 
2003). Thus, ironically to meet progressive goals in South Africa, policy makers have 
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chosen increasingly to take a hard stance on migration. Deportations began in 1995 and 
quickly rose to hundreds of thousands per year. 
 Draconian measures in South Africa have done littl to halt immigration 
violations. Sinclair claims that South Africa’s control measures are built on realist 
fictions that the State dominates society and that immigration is fundamentally a security 
risk (Sinclair 1998). It is an impossible task to police the 4973 kilometers of land border, 
65 check points on land, 9 harbors, 35 international airports and the 400 secondary 
airports (Solomon 2005). South Africa does not have the capacity to stop furtive 
migration, which is only increasing (Solomon 2005; Sinclair 1998; Sinclair 1999). South 
Africa, despite its challenges for migrants, is a very welcoming target. Its porous borders, 
relative economic advancement, and long history as a source of labor for migrants 
combine to overwhelm South Africa’s poorly funded and managed control regime. 
 Additionally, many South African businesses have a sted interest in helping 
immigrants come to South Africa for work. Immigrants play a key role for the many 
businesses that prefer to hire them. The South African labor market craves skilled 
workers and cheap exploitable labor (Crush &McDonald 2002; Maharaj & Rajkumar 
1997). South Africa is experiencing a large outmigration of skilled workers, and their 
educational system is not producing anywhere near fast enough to meet the demand 
(Stern & Szalontai 2006; Solomon 2005). Immigration c trol laws, while potentially 
making it more dangerous for businesses to hire immigrants, ironically decrease the labor 
costs for businesses by making immigrants more desperate. South Africa’s economy has 
a one hundred and fifty year history of relying on disposable labor. Migration has been a 
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fundamental feature of the South African social landscape since before the state was 
formed, and it is unlikely that the state will now stop it (Sinclair 1998). 
 There are many contradictions within South Africa’s immigration stance. The first 
and most technically vexing contradiction is how South Africa seeks integration with 
world politics and economy, but is becoming more exclusive with its immigration policy 
(Maharaj 2001). Second, many public figures, especially Thabo Mbeki, “chose to 
promote South Africa as a site of a new African Renaissance and perhaps also a home for 
all Africans, at least symbolically” (Hansen et al. 2009, 189). This type of rhetoric was 
also being advanced in the lead up to “Africa’s World Cup,” hosted by South Africa in 
2010 (Landau 2009). Third, South Africa’s constitution preserves freedom of movement 
as a civil right (Western 2001) and promises constitutional protections to all who live 
within South Africa’s borders, not to citizens per s  (Sinclair 2001).  
 Sinclair believes that a new Apartheid has been crated where people are denied 
their constitutional, civil and human rights due to being made illegal residents (Sinclair 
2001). Fourth, there is the issue of the incalculable debt owed to African countries that 
played vital roles in the support, harboring and supplying of the ANC and other 
resistance groups. Some claim there is at least a mor l debt to repay in kind the past help 
of countries that allowed South Africans to come and go at will (Anderson 2006). 
Moreover, many other Africans of neighboring countries hold the Republic of South 
Africa criminally responsible for the “Total Strategy” destabilization campaigns that 
contributed to the great economic and political instability Southern Africa experiences 
today (Adepoju 2003). With a free and prosperous yet intransigent South Africa, many 
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countries that took in South African refugees now feel their openhandedness was 
misplaced (Oucho 2006). 
 Contrasts and contradictions like these are simply conditions of life in modern 
South Africa. By the numbers, the average per capita income of a South African is 36 
times that of a Mozambican (Solomon 2005), but the av rage South African does not 
receive an equitable share of South Africa’s wealth. In fact, South Africa experiences one 
of the greatest income disparities in the world (Adepoju 2003; Oucho 2006; Steenkamp 
2009). Thabo Mbeki accurately described South Africa as “two nations,” one in the first 
world and another in the third (Adepoju 2003). An estimated 18-21 million of its 
inhabitants live in abject poverty (Solomon 2005). In this context of crushing poverty, 
upwards of 40% unemployment, and vast social inequity, the social and political integrity 
of the country is precarious (Adepoju 2003). That millions of Africans have been 
compelled to immigrate, despite the difficulty that even South African citizens face in 
South Africa, speaks to the sadder disparity between South Africa and its African 
neighbors (Adepoju 2003). This research is aimed at answering some of the plethora of 
questions raised by such a vast movement of people und r such circumstances. The first 
task is to ask what is known or suspected of the make-up of contemporary migrants to 
South Africa. 
 
E. South Africa’s “New” Migrants 
 Obtaining demographic data on migrants is incredibly difficult. Much of the data 
collected through large-scale survey projects has been problematic (Crush &McDonald 
2002). But small and medium scale studies organized largely through the South African 
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Migration Programme, using mixed methods, have accumulated data and yielded some 
insight into the makeup of African migration to South Africa.  
  Immigration to South Africa is overwhelmingly young, male and unattached (De 
Jong & Steinmetz 2006; Oucho 2006; Pendleton 2006). However, numbers of women are 
increasing, especially in non-economic migration, and informal trading in the urban 
setting (Crush &McDonald 2002; Oucho 2006; Pendleton 2006). Immigrants are now 
increasingly older with many more middle-aged migrants and heads of household 
(Pendleton 2006). Though average migrants in South Africa have long been better 
educated than locals, this level of education is rising (Pendleton 2006). The more 
educated migrants often find employment in the highest skilled jobs that locals are not 
able to do (Adepoju 2003). 
 Most often, however, migrants find employment in menial, unskilled occupations 
where there is less competition from local populations (Adepoju 2003). As mentioned 
before, employers value immigrants for their willingness to work harder, for less pay, 
under harsh circumstances and especially for their av sion to unionization for fear of 
visibility (Adepoju 2003; Modi 2003). Historically, mining has dominated migrant 
employment. Though mine employment has declined preci itously, mine work is still the 
most reported occupation (Pendleton 2006).  
 A large number of immigrants choose to self-employ due to state restrictions and 
the lack of employment protections (Maharaj & Rajkumar 1997). These small, medium 
and micro enterprises (SMMEs) can take a variety of forms, such as auto repair, 
hairdressing, construction and street trading (Modi 2003). Street trading has seen 
particular growth, with more participation by West or Central Africans from further 
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afield (Adepoju 2003; Crush &McDonald 2002; Oucho 2006; Dierwechter 2002). 
Somalis in particular are known for a high capacity for entrepreneurship and a proactive 
approach towards survival (Sadouni 2009).   
 Street trading often involves working illegally and on the informal side of the 
economy. Many street traders maintain legal status, b t many do not (Western 2001). The 
vast majority of immigrants enter legally through border posts (Crush &McDonald 2002). 
Thus, being “illegal” mainly occurs through clandestine entry and overstay (Maharaj 
2001), but also can happen though amnesty defaulting, or losing a claim for refugee 
status (Oucho 2006). The majority of specifically illegal migrants are men (Oucho 2006). 
Illegal immigration figures vary widely and are inaccurate, many coming from some 
famously flawed studies (Crush &McDonald 2002), butthey are still quoted by 
politicians, government and media (Maharaj 2001).  
 Migrants to South Africa rarely express a desire to remain indefinitely (Adepoju 
2003; Crush 1997; Hansen et al. 2009; Modi 2003; Oucho 2006). Migrants report a 
strong preference for life in their home country and desire to return from South Africa 
(Crush &McDonald 2002; Modi 2003). Families rarely join migrants in South Africa, 
instead remaining at home (Adepoju 2003). Researchers agree on this note without 
exception. However, regarding the subject of migrant’s drives and motivations that may 
explain these patterns (or the lack thereof), large rifts divide researchers’ conclusions. 
Most commonly the topic of motivation and strategy is neatly avoided. My research seeks 
to fill these voids with a nuanced understanding of what drives and motivates the act of 
immigration to South Africa and the behaviors exhibited there by immigrants. I have 
summarized the historical and spatial conditions of contemporary migrant spaces in 
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South Africa and the relatively little that is known of the make-up of the actors in these 
spaces. I now introduce the theoretical deliberations n the causes and unfolding nature 
of contemporary migration as they impact this project.  
 
II. Theoretical and Research Themes  
A. Migration Studies in Context 
 The study of migration is an interdisciplinary field (Horevitz 2009), relying 
heavily on anthropology, political science, sociology, history, geography, economics, 
psychology and demography (Castles and Miller 2009). This broad base is useful for 
gaining a variety of perspectives, but also signifies a great deal of theoretical approaches. 
Quite a bit of debate exists over what factors drive migration. Is migration a family 
survival strategy (Cliggett 2003)? Is migration an individual strategy (De Jong & 
Steinmetz 2006)? Theorizing the factors that primarly d ive migration is a bed of 
contention. 
 Most modern migration studies have operated from the Neoclassical theory of 
migration, which claims that wage differentials areth  chief determinant of migration 
(Stern & Szalontai 2006; Todaro 1981). Such theories utilize a “push-pull” model 
whereby factors create undesirable conditions in the home country and create other 
desirable conditions in the destination country (Lee 1966). They focus heavily on human 
maximization of economic utility (Castles and Miller 2009). Many researchers of Africa 
view the migration dynamic as a push from home countries due to political and economic 
instability, with South Africa simply being the most readily available source of 
employment, or infrastructure to support small busine s (Maharaj 2001, Modi 2003; 
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Sadouni 2009; Solomon 2005; Western 2001). The increasing number of critics of 
Neoclassical theory, however, point out that it is too individualistic and is ahistorical. Its 
market focus dismissively categorizes factors such as state intervention as free-market 
distortions (Gray 2009). Finally, economic utility alone does not account for where 
people decide to migrate, as people do not always move to the places of highest wages, 
say when an Algerian migrates to France, as opposed t  Germany (Castles and Miller 
2009). 
 Researchers have historically focused on migration as an aggregate phenomenon 
but most now recognize the importance of family andindividual strategies to explaining 
the aggregate (De Jong and Steinmetz 2006; Gray 2009). Commonly referred to as the 
New Economic Migration Theory, it stresses that households and not only individuals 
maximize utility (De Jong & Steinmetz 2006). These strategies are not solely focused on 
gaining higher wages, but can be aimed at diversifying streams of income and gaining 
capital for investment in cottage industry and farming.  
 Then come a collection of theories that address linkages on a global scale, such as 
the demand for cheap labor by owning classes, the historical linkages between colonial 
powers and former colonies and how these linkages play a factor in migration strategy 
(Schinkel 2009). They often utilize structural concepts to help explain the factors at work, 
i.e. the relationship between the spatial accumulation of capital and the labor that moves 
internationally to support it (Castles and Miller 2009). These theories see international 
labor systems as keeping third world dependent on the first world (Castles and Miller 
2009). 
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 Because many theories focus on economics, they fail to consider the diverse 
motivations for movement (Kothari 2008). There are multiple explanations for what 
moves people to migrate, and the most common theories ften paint too simple a picture 
(Castles and Miller 2009). I fully appreciate the economic context around most migration 
decisions, and I find the push-pull dialectic very helpful and appealing. However I also 
recognize that motivation is layered. We must “let the complex texture of human 
practices call into question traditional academic divisions between “moves” motivated 
by, on the one hand, financial interest or survival and, on the other, emotional 
attachments” (Burman 2002, 49). I hope to take this idea a step further and explore how 
emotional attachments also play into survival strategies of migrant informal street traders.  
 
B. Case Studies 
 I have pulled from a diverse group of authors to build this foundation of literature, 
as migration studies are by their nature interdisciplinary (Horevitz 2009). This base 
includes a number of geographers. Belinda Dodson and Catherine Oelofse (2002) did a 
study of Mizamoyethu in the Hout Bay area near Cape Town that displays well the 
strengths that geographers can bring to migration sudies. Their study was historically 
grounded, and spatially sensitive. Instead of retrenching discourses of difference, they 
offer an interpretation of contemporary xenophobia as niche competition for resources. 
They contend that it is not the differences that drive citizens and foreigners apart, but 
their similarities (Dodson & Oelofse 2002). I appreciated that they were among the few 
researchers who discussed migrants’ motivations for coming to South Africa, as I plan to 
focus heavily upon these. They assessed migration motivations mainly in light of survey 
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data, whereas I hope to do so with ethnographic methods. Also, where this study rightly 
focuses on migrant connections to home and other migrants, I hope to continue along 
these lines, seeking to understand migrants’ experiences and perceptions of connections 
in the light of larger strategies. Most of all, I find it helpful that their study dealt 
specifically with theories of transnationalism in the context of their rich treatment of 
African migration to South Africa. 
 In recent years, more geographers have called for more place-based and 
ethnographic research on migration in South Africa (Crush 2001; Crush & McDonald 
2002; Maharaj 2001; Oucho 2006). I hope to build on the rich geographic analyses of 
migrant space epitomized by Dodson and Oelofse with more of a focus on ethnographic 
investigation. Dodson and Oelofse themselves called for studies that display “…a 
sensitivity to the particularity of place” (2002, 127). “This is not to argue against 
generalization,” they continue, “nor against structuralist explanation, but to call for 
detailed micro-level case studies of the diverse experiences of foreign migrants living in 
different places in South Africa” (Dodson and Oelofse 2002, 127). By focusing my 
project on a small subset of the African migrant population, and seeking to connect it to 
larger questions of migrant perspectives and transntio alism, I will am helping to 
accomplish this vision.  
 Another study from which I would specifically like to build, Shea (2008), is an 
anthropology dissertation that gave one of the most textured and place-sensitive analyses 
of African migrancy in South Africa that I have yet come across. Shea’s use of qualitative 
methods was a confirmation that in-depth interviews have the ability to reveal rich 
narratives of migration. Her narrative analyses added a great deal to the discussion of the 
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roles of xenophobia, migrant networks and identity in the South African and transnational 
context. She was also quite concerned with how or if senses of identity and belonging 
transcend boundaries and/or are linked to specific pla es (Shea 2008). I hope to run with 
these questions and add to them a focus on the spatiality of migrant relationships with the 
state, the citizenry, home, other migrants and tourists/tourism. My study will differ 
further in two major ways. Her qualitative interview sample was only a dozen or so, and I 
extended this to 36 formal interviewees, along with the dozens of others I encountered 
with participant observation. Also, where her study participants were professionals, my 
participants were artists and street traders. Dodson & Oelofse (2002) and Shea (2008) 
combine nicely to summarize the theoretical outlook I took into my study, the theoretical 
ramifications involved and the themes I expected to encounter.  
 
C. Theoretical Outlook 
There is no single grand explanatory theoretical concept that is being tested in this 
project. Rather there are a number of meso-level theoretical concepts, policy positions 
and research findings with which my findings either conflict and question or support and 
defend. These fall generally into three categories, as does the analytical body of this 
dissertation: Migrants’ Relationships with the State, Xenophobia, and Home Relations 
and Remittance. I will reserve these theoretical discussions for the chapters in which they 
are applicable.  
 The greatest theoretical influence on this project, as expected, was transnational 
theory. In hindsight however, calling transnational thoughts a “theory” is quite a 
misnomer, as the closer one comes to them, the moreone finds that it is a mélange of 
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ideas ranging from activist’s desires for a future outcome that subverts the nation-state to 
an assemblage of pragmatic, research-focused ideas reg rding how we as migration 
researchers might want to think about contemporary migration. There are a multitude of 
facets in between, as well. If transnationalism has one tenet that can be called prescriptive 
to research (and that has heavily impacted this project) it is that scholars must identify the 
immaterial and unseen linkages that humans create and m intain, not only across national 
borders, but across any distance in space. This element of transnational thought does 
stand behind all three main analytical themes of this project, and is thus important to state 
here. I discuss the more nuanced ways that transnationalism has influenced this project, 
and the ways in which my research results speak bac to transnationalism and migration 
studies in the last analytical section, the chapters “Migrants and Home” and “Cultures of 
Exile.” 
 
III. Summary of Research Goals  
 I set out to focus my inquiry on the population of migrants who operate in the 
informal street trade economy. However, upon starting fieldwork, I found it most 
interesting to focus on the semi-formal trading taking place in Cape Town’s central 
tourist markets. What makes this space “semi-formal” I explain in the chapter on “Market 
Dynamics.” This focus allowed me access to a wider cross section of socio-economic 
conditions, nationalities and livelihood strategies.  
 These migrants’ methods of survival drew several large question marks on the 
South African landscape and within the understanding of prevailing migration theories. 
My primary research goal was to investigate the strategies African migrant peddlers 
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develop to cope with the circumstances of life and work in a foreign country. To attain 
this goal I set out to ask the following questions: 
 How are African migrants able to maintain livelihood in South Africa despite 
prolific xenophobia, state control regimes and respon ibilities to home?  
 a) What sorts of long term and short term goals are formed by migrants? 
 1) What part do these goals play in the formation of strategies of 
economic, cultural, or emotional/identity survival? 
 b) How do state control and xenophobia (specifically exclusion from formal  
  banking) shape remittance and communication forms in South Africa? 
 c) What are the impacts (benefits and costs) of remittances in the short term on      
       migrants’ livelihoods? 
 d) In what ways do migrant networks contribute to strategies of survival and self-   
        advancement? 
 e) What role do market activities play in migrant strategies?  
 
IV. Hypotheses   
 I encountered and befriended a number of African immigrants during my travels 
and studies in South Africa, May to August of 2009. These experiences caused me to ask 
a number of questions about their lives. I decided to pursue a few of them as a formal 
research project. My personal experiences, combined with a comprehensive literature 
review, compelled me to hypothesize the following before fieldwork: 
1. Migrants will maintain strong financial, social, emotional and identity linkages to  
 home. 
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 a. these linkages will be experienced as obstacles t times, but most often as  
 resources. 
 b. these linkages will help shape strategies of self-advancement and survival. 
2. Migrants will participate in networks based on countries of origin, despite risks 
 a. these networks may not always be expressed as such by migrants. 
 b. these networks may serve diverse purposes. 
 c. migrants will be largely self-sufficient and utilize these networks sparingly. 
3. Migrant strategies may not be conscious or particularly well thought out. They may 
range from being more makeshift and ad hoc to being multi-phase strategies developed 
years in advance of anticipated situations. Migrants will express frustration with the 
South African state and civil society. I expect that these frustrations will be reflected in 
migrant’s strategies of survival. 
4. Transnational theory will be useful in interpreting migrant narratives 
 a. simultaneous embeddedness in more than one spacwill be a factor. 
 
These hypotheses were tested via the use of largely qualitative methods to be 
discussed in the next section. 
 18
Chapter 2. Research Methods 
I. Qualitative Methods 
Migration studies, especially in South Africa, have most often been quantitative. 
This approach, though very appropriate for the study of migration, lacks the ability to 
gain nuanced understanding of migrant experiences relating to strategies of survival and 
self-advancement. “[L]arge sample sizes and structued questionnaire instruments 
necessarily sacrifice the more nuanced information that can be gleaned only from local 
case studies of an ethnographic, participatory and place-based nature” (Crush 
&McDonald 2002, 3). Crush and McDonald could not offer a clearer call for 
ethnographic inquiry to balance the relatively high amount of existing quantitative data 
on South African immigration (Crush 2001; Maharaj 2001; Oucho 2006). This nuanced 
research can be accomplished specifically through the use of interviews, participant 
observation and focus groups. My research was carried out in Cape Town, South Africa, 
a city that literature and personal, pre-dissertation experience showed to host very high 
numbers of African immigrants working as informal tr ders, selling artwork, hand crafts 
and curios (Peberdy 2000).  
 I primarily used interviews to gather my data, as it was vital to my study to 
understand migration phenomena with the migrants’ pers ective in mind. Much like 
Eileen Moyer’s dissertation research in Dar-es-Salaam with at-risk youth, my methods 
were highly dialectic (2003). The interviews of my primary sample of African artist 
migrants took an open-ended and semi-structured form. Starting the interview process 
with open-ended questions allowed respondents to help set the agenda for the discussion 
and helped me, the researcher, formulate more specific questions (Sinclair 1999). I 
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valued the opportunity to access respondents’ viewpoints “in their own words” and with 
as little leading as possible (Sadouni 2009, 239). I also utilized open-ended respon es to 
formulate more pointed and specific questions to probe deeper into topics of interest, 
along with reformulating and improving my existing open-ended questions. Topics 
discussed in interviews were the migrant’s reasons f r migrating, their experiences of 
travelling to South Africa, entering the country, arriving and establishing themselves in 
their trade, their future plans and aspirations, their experiences with the State, civil 
society, home linkages, migrant networks, market activities, and relationships with 
tourists/their customer base.   
I set out to take a sample from 30 interviewees one-on-one, and finished with 32 
from 10 different countries: Swaziland (1), Zimbabwe (8), Malawi (8), Angola (1), DRC 
(4), Congo (1), Kenya (3), Sudan (1), Senegal (4), Uganda (1). I audio recorded each 
interview, save one because the participant asked not to be recorded. I transcribed all 
interview and focus group recordings myself. Originally, I had hoped to do more than one 
recorded interview with each participant, hopefully gaining deeper insights as levels of 
comfort and trust increased. However, apart from focus groups, it proved to be most 
advantageous to conduct further interviews in a conversational manner, without the aid of 
a recording device. This allowed participants to pause easily and conduct their business in 
the market when necessary, while the informal tone of the conversations also encouraged 
deeper insights.  
 Focus groups have been especially useful in studies such as this that seek better 
understanding of the interplay between meaning and theoretical concepts, in this case 
migrant livelihood and transnationalism (Cameron 2000; Lint and Livingstone 1996). I 
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facilitated three such focus groups at intervals toward the end of my fieldwork to help 
reformulate interview and research questions, to draw out a wider range or depth of 
topics discussed (Myers 1998), and to witness elements of social dynamics between 
participants (Arksey & Knight 1999). In other applicable studies, focus groups have 
proven especially helpful in creating synergistic effects in qualitative research resulting 
from increased collaboration and communication amongst research participants (Wang & 
Burris 1994). This was certainly the outcome with my focus groups.  
I decided to organize focus groups around some of the principle social groups I 
found in the market: one for assistants, one for stall owners and one specifically for 
Senegalese migrants (for reasons discussed later). I wanted to have 4-6 participants in 
each group. I achieved this for the assistants and the Senegalese groups, but last minute 
cancellations turned my owner focus group into a dul interview. Regardless it was very 
instructive. 
Once the participants were assembled, I moderated the group, asking a variety of 
closed and open-ended questions. Sessions were audio recorded and I took notes as well, 
to record the aspects of the session not fully captured by the audio recording and to 
identify the order of those speaking on the tape. Focus groups lasted one to two hours.  
I arrived in the field somewhat concerned that migrants might have been reluctant 
to gather in public, due to the perceived or real danger of public or police harassment. 
This was not the case, as the market, being such a highly foreign space, was a relative 
safe haven (to be discussed more in “Market Dynamics”). However it was helpful to 
remove the assistants from the market so they could speak freely without fear of being 
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overheard by their bosses. Otherwise, simply finding a time when multiple participants 
could be assembled was the most difficult task.  
For both focus groups and individual interviews, I had hoped to be able to 
compensate my respondents financially for their time, however I did not receive grant 
money to cover that expense. I was fortunate to arrive in the Southern Hemisphere 
Winter, which causes a noticeable downturn in tourism and therefore market activity. 
Participants were largely quite happy to share their experiences and stories. Receiving 
anything in return was not expected or obligatory in the social context. Still, I found ways 
to repay kindness with kindness during our interviews by providing refreshment.  
 Participant observation is the final research method I employed. This 
ethnographic tool is useful to researchers as a way of piecing together relationships that 
are not explicitly mentioned or fully explained through interviews and focus groups. I 
spent hours each day with migrants in the markets, socializing, learning about their 
trades, and observing them and other actors living and working in real time, within the 
context of South African space. Indeed, this time was highly effective in building rapport 
and relationship with numerous respondents. This increased comfort yielded better, 
deeper interviews and conversations. As previously mentioned, I used participant 
observation to engage participants in casual conversation about topics of thematic interest 
to my study and any other topic participants wished to iscuss. Participant observation 
was a great aid in understanding the elements of South African space that shape migrant 
strategies: the State (most often in the form of police and the migration bureaucracy), 
xenophobia, the condition of migrant networks, and market exchange with tourists. 
Additionally, participant observation allowed me to informally interview many market 
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workers, easily doubling the number of individuals from which I was able to glean 
insights, large and small. 
 Note* When referencing and citing respondents, I utilize only the first name, 
followed by the year the interview was conducted. 
 Overall, the principle obstacles I foresaw in my research methods were trust 
building and communication. I feared that the issue of visibility that I have already 
discussed in the focus groups section would impact migrants’ willingness to participate. 
However, as I have mentioned, this was largely not the case. My regular presence in the 
market was the single largest trust builder. After a short while, everyone had seen me, 
and word had spread that I was doing research. While in any group, some individuals will 
be more reticent to open up about their lives, few in the market showed resistance to 
participating when asked. The only person I had to give up on including was a man from 
Kenya who always was available “later.” The rest were willing. Some were even excited 
that I finally had come around to talk to them more in depth. When I made my goodbyes 
and thank-yous at the end of fieldwork, I was surprised at the number of participants who 
not only wished me well on my project, but who actully thanked me for hearing their 
stories and learning about their lives.  
As a final note, this project rested on my ability to communicate with Africans 
from a variety of cultures, languages and backgrounds. Loren Landau, also concerned 
about the obstacles language could present was surprised to find that “almost everyone 
living in the inner city [Johannesburg] (close to 90% of both South Africans and 
foreigners) reported that English was required for participation in the city’s economic and 
social life” (Landau 2006, 130). English is widely spoken in most of the countries 
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neighboring South Africa, the origin of the majority of South Africa’s immigrants. 
Additionally, English is widely used as a lingua frnca in South Africa. Indeed, my target 
sample had to have high rates of English speaking facility in order to staff and run 
businesses that sold art and curios to tourists. Thus, while English fluency was variable, it 
did not present a problem. As I mentioned regarding organizing focus groups, finding 
times when workers and owners felt comfortable taking the time to sit down with me was 
the greatest encumbrance. Much participant observation was carried out in these long 
interstices.  
 Immigrants in South Africa, especially those with precarious legal status, have 
developed strategies to survive in the face of state surveillance and control. One of these 
myriad strategies is a level of opaqueness and of suspicion to inquiry that many 
researchers attest to (McDonald 2002; Shea 2008; Sinclair 1999). “As could be expected, 
one of the most critical aspects of doing research on cross-border migration is gaining the 
confidence of the migrants to be interviewed” (McDonald 2002, 119). However, 
McDonald, who did an ethnographic study of immigrants i  Cape Town, maintains that if 
positive rapport and trust can be built with only one individual, this can open doors to 
other individuals in their social circle. William Foote Whyte demonstrates that if a 
particularly influential member of a community can be won over, then the entire 
community becomes more easily accessible (1943). For this reason, my sampling came 
primarily by way of the snowball or chain sampling method. For some researchers this 
can create the risk of having too homogenous a sample (Mazzucato 2009). However, for 
my purposes this aspect of snowball sampling actually he ped me locate and gain access 
to the rather specific types of migrants I wished to study (McDonald 2002; Sinclair 
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1999). Early on I began to see distinct social groups emerging in the market, some 
regarding class, some nationality, religion or langua e. Gaining trust with one member of 
these groups led to more enthusiastic interaction with other members.  
As mentioned before, the method of the inquiry can increase the chances of 
making immigrants in South Africa comfortable with the idea of talking to a stranger and 
letting them record their answers (McDonald 2002; Sinclair 1999). For instance, open-
ended questions are more helpful in establishing comfort than pointed, or closed-ended 
questions (Sinclair 1999). In this vein, I like Sinclair, avoided meeting in homes, and did 
not ask for last names or addresses (Sinclair 1999). This was wise planning, but means 
that the methods used to attain narratives prevent m  from being able to disseminate my 
research easily. For this reason, I utilized the focus group process and casual conversation 
during participant observation toward the end of fieldwork to discuss and disseminate 
findings verbally.  
 
II. Post-Colonialism and Methodology 
I believe my project in certain respects takes a post-c lonial approach. This has 
been defined as research that “is a reaction to and rejection of colonial research” that 
“reflects and reinforces domination and exploitation through the attitudes and differential 
power embodied in its research relationships with ‘o ers’” (Howitt & Stevens 2000, 32). 
Postcolonial research conversely values participants’ “rights, knowledge, perspectives, 
concerns, and desires and [is] based on open and more egalitarian relationships” (Howitt 
& Stevens 2000, 32). Invariably, researchers bring elements of subjectivity and 
“positionality” to their pursuit of data and the analysis of its significance (Mullings 
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1999). Nevertheless, I have the opportunity as a researcher to counterbalance this bias by 
infusing my study with the postcolonial values of respect, equality and honesty towards 
the groups and individuals I wish to study (Myers 2010). I have attempted to do this in 
the following ways: A) My project is focused on a literature that is largely sensitive to the 
historical inequities that help shape contemporary migrant spaces in South Africa. B). My 
project’s goal is to bring into focus the ways that migrants have negotiated the 
historically entrenched social, political obstacles that face them today. This will ideally 
bring forth immigrant discourses or meta-narratives that may form a measure of 
resistance to dominant discourses of a state control regime and a xenophobic civil 
society. C) I have taken precautions not to enlist state-centric discourse whenever 
possible. For instance, I faced a decision on whether or not to focus my study on illegal 
immigrants in South Africa, as the topic of illegality is rather fascinating to me and 
theoretically important. I was persuaded not to focus my study on “illegality” in order to 
avoid state centrism. Nicolas de Genova (2002) makes  distinction that “illegality” is a 
problematic term for a post-colonial researcher because its meaning is derived only from 
the state. I originally considered this in the light of other terms I employ, like the 
citizen/foreigner binary. However, I realized that the important distinction would be how 
migrants themselves perceive their situation. Migrants will not consider themselves to be 
citizens of South Africa, nor do they wish to be (Landau 2006; Sinclair 1999). They are 
often proud of their foreigner status (Sinclair 1999). However the status of “illegality” is 
met with harsh criticism by many migrants who feel, for a variety of reasons, that they 
are entitled to share in South African space, withou  having their very being made illegal 
(Landau 2006; Maharaj & Rajkumar 1997; Sinclair 1999). Another careful distinction is 
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that I refer to research “participants” rather than “subjects”. This was a conscious 
decision, not made to merely avoid criticism, but to genuinely shape the frame of my 
research.  
Webster (2005, 57) says that one way researchers can avoid making research 
participants into colonial subjects is to understand the worlds they inhabit “from below” 
and to root studies in understandings of place in ways that allow participants to inhabit 
the “same moral or political universe as the researcher[s]”. I believe I have appropriately 
centered my inquiry on the issues of power in which immigrants find themselves. He also 
asks that researchers pay heed to their research participants’ agency, and not see them as 
passive and merely acted upon, simply byproducts of institutional, systemic or structural 
forces (Webster 2005). Webster advises the use of “intensive fieldwork, in-depth 
interviews, and non-participant observation” to achieve this perspective (Webster 2005, 
57). I was compelled by this argument and tailored my theoretical framework and 
methods accordingly.  
 
III. Ethics 
 The ironic ethical problem in this study was the small potential it had to act 
detrimentally to the very migrant survival strategies t investigated. By releasing 
information about how migrants negotiate state controls and xenophobia, in particular, I 
hope to inform the discourse surrounding migration in South Africa. However, I may also 
be putting knowledge and therefore power in the hands of those who may harm my study 
participants or people like them. In deciding how t negotiate this issue before 
conduction research, I went to the website of the Association of American Geographers 
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and read through the ethics statement. Regarding ths issue, the AAG makes clear that the 
ethical responsibility of the researcher is to fully inform participants of the potential 
impacts of the research so that they may make an informed decision to participate or not. 
Thus, research that potentially endangers participants is not in itself unethical, but hiding 
that danger would be. I also discussed this matter with Ebenezer Obadare, on May 11th, 
2010. He is a KU Sociology professor who researches many aspects of migration, even 
the illegal. He voiced the same ethical stance as the AAG. He added that social scientists 
often run into this issue, because it is central to the ethic of the Social Sciences to pursue 
understanding of all social strata, including the marginalized, the poor and even those 
operating outside of the law. Whenever such groups are researched, there always exists 
the possibility of the data somehow being used to harm the participants. However, 
Professor Obadare affirmed that the proper ethical stance was to fully disclose to 
informants the purpose of the research and the possible results. This is a solution I liked 
very much, as it allowed the study participant to weigh for themselves the costs and 
benefits of participation, and make a decision thatey felt would empower their future. I 
do not think this absolves the researcher of all responsibility for impacts, but it does make 
the process ethically balanced. Additionally, I usep udonyms for every migrant 




Chapter 3. Market Dynamics and Place Context 
 
 
Fig. 1: Cape Town 
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I.  The physical geography of Cape Town is unique, dramatic and beautiful, 
hauntingly so at times. But its human geography is cla sically South African, admittedly 
with a local flair. Other major cities like Durban d Johannesburg have somewhat 
different ethnic make-ups, but residence is often dmarcated by wealth, race, religion and 
nationality.  
The city center rests in a u-shaped valley whose open end points northeast. This 
area is commonly referred to as the City Bowl. The City Bowl is separated roughly from 
the rest of the metro area by Table Mountain and its siblings. It is a well-managed city 
despite its struggles. But the tide of crime is only rising, and many in the Cape fear the 
danger of becoming as unsafe as Johannesburg.  
 I lived in a neighborhood called Bo Kaap on the northwestern edge of the City 
Bowl, where the ground climbs quickly upward. This area was settled by Cape Malays, 
people of Indonesian and Malay descent brought to South Africa as indentured servants 
or slaves. The Cape Malays brought their religion, Islam, to Cape Town and other 
cultural elements. This is reflected most immediately by the architecture in Bo Kaap. The 
swooping eves and lintels of the Dutch colonial designs give way to squat, geometric 
structures painted in pastels. Not all of Cape Town’s neighborhoods are so colorfully 
delineated, but the divisions are still stark. For instance, going into a shop at the rear end 
of the City Bowl, one might be hard-pressed to hear English, but Afrikaans instead, 
spoken by whites and coloureds alike. (Note: “Coloured” in the South African parlance 
has a historically different and less pejorative conn tation that the term has in the United 
States and is widely used in scholarly works. While t ere are many variations of 
“coloureds,” it is the term that generally denotes racially mixed peoples in South Africa.) 
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The reverse is true if one walks even a mile north toward the oceanfront, where suddenly 
English-speaking blacks, whites and foreigners staff and frequent the shops. Furthermore, 
in the street along the way, you are more likely to hear French than English or Afrikaans, 




Fig. 2: Cape Town Metro Area 
 31
The roads leading east out of the Bowl squeeze throug  the northern end of Table 
mountain and the shore of the Atlantic, then blossom outward onto the Cape Flats, a 
sprawling assortment of shanty towns and humbly functio al neighborhoods. If one were 
to make a hard right and drive south along the eastern edge of Table mountain all the way 
to the sea, you would find largely white settlement. But from there, all the way to the 
R102 highway, is hemmed in an area of primarily black residence, including the homes 
of most of this study’s participants. 
 
Fig. 3: Greenmarket Square 
II.   In the center of Cape Town’s City Bowl, a block-sized, cobble stone, open air 
market sits amidst a church, some office buildings, a café or two and traditional retail 
space. Greenmarket Square can no longer be accused of b ing very “green” but it is most 
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certainly a market. Over the three and a half centuries of European residence, the square 
has seen a variety of uses, some civic, including the location of the city hall for a time 
and location of a number of anti-apartheid protests, and some commercial, including the 
sales of slaves, vegetables and souvenirs. Today it is perhaps the most important hearth of 
tourism in the city, certainly in good company with staple sites such as Robben Island 
and Table Mountain. What the market may lack in histor cal or panoramic significance 
compared to the other two, it more than makes up for in accessibility and the ability for 
tourists to buy things that prove they went to Africa. I cannot be too skeptical, though - 
because what did I have to do on my last day of field work? You guessed it, collect little 
pieces of the action for those at home. The power of trinkets is indeed as powerful as the 
majesty of Table Mountain or the legacy of Nelson Mandela. After all, what good is it to 
have been to South Africa without a keychain proclaiming, “Amandla!”? 
 On any given day, Greenmarket Square is full of foreigners. But what may escape 
the attention of the British, German, Indian, or Canadian tourists browsing through the 
wooden spoons, stone sculptures and leather goods is that they are heavily outnumbered 
by the foreigners who own and staff the vast majority of the stalls. Greenmarket Square 
has been overrun at worst and boxed out at best by African business owners and salesmen 
ever since the country was opened more freely to foreigners at the end of Apartheid. 
Those who had been in the market since the beginning of this shift can recall to you the 
days when food and clothing dominated the market, which functioned not for tourists, but 
for locals. And as such, stalls were owned and run by locals. One of the only vestiges left 
of this arrangement is a spot a block or two south f t e market where white locals can be 
found selling jewelry of the European style.  
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 Eventually, a man named Badih Chaaban received a lase from the City of Cape 
Town to operate the market space more efficiently. He did not set out to make it into a 
foreign or tourist-focused space, only a most profitable one. Chaaban’s story is one 
worthy of another dissertation. But in broad strokes, the Lebanese man oversaw the 
changing of the guard to foreign traders who were more business savvy, and therefore 
more profitable to him than locals, specifically as souvenir sellers. He engaged in an epic 
struggle with the Cape Town City Council over contrl of the space after it became so 
profitable. Helen Zille, being a city councilor and then mayor of Cape Town, became his 
arch enemy, prompting Badih Chaaban to enter politics, f rst representing an Islamic 
political party and then the ANC, who could better support him in his Zille war. At the 
end of the struggle, Chaaban had been through numero s legal battles, accusations of 
corruption and a very controversial political life. He was given the mayorship of Paarl as 
a sort of consolation prize by the ANC, but even they couldn’t stem the tide of the 
Democratic Alliance’s advance in the Western Cape and Cape Town in particular, 
spearheaded by none other than Helen Zille. Chaaban may have won battles, but Zille 
most determinedly won the war.  
 In 2004 the market was taken back by the City Council. This had the effect of 
cementing the arrangement of ownership in the market. Where Chaaban had been able to 
lease space to whomever he pleased, for whatever sum he pleased, under the city council 
regime, spaces were set, along with their rent, roughly 400R per month. This paled in 
comparison to the rents Chaaban charged, which led many to think it would invigorate 
the businesses of the individual sellers and therefore the tourist economy. But in 
hindsight, the veteran stall owners see Chaaban’s departure as the day the market began 
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to die (Mamadou 2011). The willingness of tourists to come to the market by their own 
devices had been grossly overestimated and Chaaban’s co tributions to the market and 
therefore the tourist economy were grossly underestimated. In the end, he was decried as 
a glorified slumlord, when he was actually one of the best things to ever happen to the 
Cape Town tourist economy. Badih Chaaban, very much be ause he loved money, 
worked very hard to bring tourists to the market, especially those with money to spend.  
 Ibrahim claims to be the first foreigner ever granted a refugee status in post-
apartheid South Africa. He is one of the few who have seen the market change from even 
before apartheid was fully over. Being a fellow Muslim, foreigner (Sudan) and 
businessman, Ibrahim knew Chaaban. He was not a great fan of his ethics, but he 
explained to me in great detail one afternoon, as we toured the square and its environs, 
how Chaaban made links with local business partners. He brought busloads of tourists to 
the square, not from backpacker hostels, but from the city’s hotels. The Cape Town City 
Council, Ibrahim claimed, had taken no such measures. This was compounded by the fact 
that now the market membership was frozen, where before it had been competitive. If a 
trader did not show up by a certain time in the morning, alternates, literally lined up 
waiting, were brought in to keep the market running at full capacity. In this way, Badih 
was able to select only the most motivated traders. Many traders I spoke to recalled their 
own time waiting on the sidelines for a chance at a spot. Others were more circumspect, 
implying that there were more immediate ways into the market, often financial in nature. 
But in 2004, the spaces were locked in, providing rent was paid regularly to the City 
Council. The previously high and dogged levels of competition lessened considerably. 
Tourists were not being brought into the square in as high number and the cost of doing 
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business was lessened. Over the intervening years, however, the lowered overhead 
became steadily eclipsed by the diminishing number of tourists, specifically those with 
much to spend.  
 
Fig. 4: St. George’s Mall 
One must also note the number of other souvenir stand  nd shops that have 
popped up in Cape Town as a possible contributor to the turndown. The establishment 
and growth of the Victoria and Albert Waterfront Mall has helped draw away the more 
monied tourists as well. This is part of a wider trnd for migrant traders and other 
workers in public space attempting to contend with global advancement of neoliberalism 
and urban change, of which Cape Town is fully enmeshed (Houssay-Holzschuch & 
Teppo 2007). 
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 Then of course the global economic crisis and resulting down turn had exactly the 
impact one would expect. Tourism diminished and the disposable income of tourists 
lessened. The 2010 World Cup was expected to be a reinvigoration of just about every 
service industry in South Africa, but apparently after receiving that figurative memo, 
opportunists came out of the woodwork to take advantage of this influx of cash, which 
spread out the profits. No participant in this study, when the topic arose, referenced the 
World Cup as a significant improvement in the generally declining sales.  
 It was especially helpful for me to have spent the w ole of the South African 
winter in the market. There were fewer tourists to distract my participants from our 
interviews and socialization, which was helpful. More importantly, the southern 
hemisphere winter is also the worst time of year for sales. From the sound of it, sales 
closely followed the relative temperatures. That meant that while I saw a lot more 
depression, anxiety and sadness than in the fat times, I was offered a valuable insight into 
the marketplace’s dynamics. Only when the boat is raised out of the water can one see the 
rust and barnacles and shoddy patched spots holding the hulk together. Because of the 
steady decline in total market revenues, the market was running as of 2011 with the sort 
of tension is may have back in the days of Badih Chaaban - except that almost no one 
was profiting as much. 
 
III.   There were roughly 220 stalls in the market, of which, a handful usually went 
unused on any given day, something that would never be seen under Chaaban. The stalls 
were staffed with a mix of owners and assistants that some owners have hired to run their 
stalls. Competition is fierce in the market for a number of reasons. Stalls rarely sell 
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anything unseen somewhere else in the market. Becaus  of the close proximity of 
vendors, it is impossible to create a niche for oneself. Antonio from Cabinda, Angola 
claims to have gone to great lengths to bring batik pa ntings (waxy images drawn on 
cloth) from Mozambique. They sold well, but then two eeks later, he said, he began 
seeing them in other stalls (2011). So it goes withany new item that draws the interest of 
tourists. Others get it and the niche becomes more standard fare.  
 Adele from DRC makes her own jewelry and has a secret contact in DRC that 
sends it to her. But their designs are plainly displayed. One while we were talking, she 
began shouting at a European woman trying to take a picture of some of her necklaces. I 
asked Adele if it was smart to be mean to the tourists. Adele explained that as an 
innovator in the market, she had to be vigilant against anyone other than her customers, 
especially other stall owners or assistants, taking even a lingering glance at her wares. 
This vigilance is held in contrast to her otherwise ch erful, kind and welcoming nature.  
 It is easy to see why the Adeles, the innovators in the market, are few. Most have 
given up on the largely useless race to novelty, and have settled into a détente whereby 
market workers can only compete by outselling other stalls that are selling the same 
things. This often means settling for lower selling prices. 
 This is a large reason that nationality does not affect market strategies, by and 
large. The stakes are simply too high to sacrifice on ’s own profit for that of a 
countryman. With the possible exception of the Senegalese, and then only in some cases, 
sellers and workers in the market operate as individuals. They may prefer to eat lunch at 
times with people who speak their native language, but camaraderie ends there. In this 
way information is sometimes exchanged more along ethnic or national lines. But this is 
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rarely the sort of information that might help someon  in business, and more practical 
issues like where to find the cheapest phone or rent or how to send money home safely. 
 In this way, the owners who hire assistants do not seem to prefer hiring from their 
own nationality, but rather by personality and talent. Pardon from Zimbabwe hired 
Thomas from Malawi. Erik from Senegal hired Emmanuel from Zimbabwe. Florence 
from DRC hired Robert from Malawi. Most owners preferred not to hire locals, though. I 
heard a number of reasons for this, but it generally c me down to perceptions of 
unreliability and theft.  
 “You can’t trust these people,” Issa said of everyone in the market. He expected 
others from his native Senegal to be of some help to him in a time of trouble. No other 
nationalities seemed to have this level of culturally inspired intra-benevolence. Yet, Issa 
still did not trust other Senegalese. Life in the market is an individual affair, which means 
that, even though the market holds dozens or hundreds of people at any given time, 
working there is often a lonely affair. In Paul Stoller’s book Money Has No Smell, one of 
the central premises is that from many West African viewpoints, money is inert, exerting 
little influence on social bonds outside the family and visa versa (2002).  
 There is very little possibility for self-advancemnt within the market. An 
assistant will likely never be able to work their way up to owning a spot in the market as 
it is controlled bureaucratically, not by “market forces”. The waiting list to receive a spot 
in the market is reportedly of obscene length, and l rgely unaltered since the City Council 
takeover. The only possibility for advancement would be for a porter to become an 
assistant. Porters are hired to help breakdown the stalls at the end of the day and put them 
up the next morning. The stalls are usually cube-shaped frames of 1-1.5” thick metal 
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bars, 6-9’ in length. They are attached at the corners by cotter pins and sockets. Canvas 
sheeting is lashed to the sides and/or roof to protect goods and sellers from the elements 
when necessary. Still, in the winter months, both sellers and souvenirs take a good 
amount of punishment, especially from the rain and winds that come seemingly from all 
angles at the same time. Porters most importantly are p id to move stall owners’ goods 
from the market to whichever nearby storage space they lease, anywhere from a block to 
four or five blocks away.  
 While Cape Town has struggled to find a peaceful and prosperous balance in 
post-Apartheid South Africa, and while the world economy has tumbled, little has 
changed outwardly in Greenmarket Square. But there are tensions in the market, 
increasing by the day. Some of these are particular to the trading life or to Greenmarket. 
But most are remarkably global. This group of migrant traders had much to teach me 
about the contemporary state of migration and the global south. A new class is arising in 
the world. Though migration has always existed in human history, there are new ways 
that it is coming to characterize the livelihoods and life ways of large swathes of the 
human race, of which the occupants of Greenmarket Square are useful examples. This 
project now turns to the peripheries of the migrant class, where Government, Society, and 
Family have and are converging with glacial pressure to force people into the role of 
migrants’ indelible mark on their lives, their psyches and their collective futures.  
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Chapter 4. Migrants and the State 
 
 
I.  This chapter deals with the relationship between African migrants and the South 
African state. My pre-dissertation research and literature review clearly indicated that, for 
African immigrants to South Africa, the South African state would be a major actor 
influencing the quality of their life and the manner in which they live it. That is to say, 
the decisions made by policy executives at the highest levels and by bureaucrats at the 
lowest levels have the capacity to drastically alter th  conditions of an immigrant’s life. It 
is key to the successful state enterprise to effectiv ly control its territory and maintain 
control over who is given the access and benefits of residing within that space (Landau 
and Monson 2008). For this reason, I focus specifically on the relationship between 
African immigrants and the Department of Home Affairs, which administers access to 
South Africa and its services. For many immigrants, the only contact with a government 
representative will be through the Department of Home Affairs (Gebre et al. 2011). For 
many immigrants to South Africa, the Department of H me Affairs is perceived as the 
single biggest obstacle to realizing self-actualization (Palmary 2002). I anticipated, 
therefore, that this relationship with the state, and the Department of Home Affairs in 
particular, would need to be addressed if I wanted to understand the circumstances of life 
and work for immigrants to South Africa, especially that of highly visible workers in 
tourist markets. This examination illuminates key features of both the nature of the South 
African state and the quotidian experience of immigrant life there.  
 The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) holds enormous sway over the 
eligibility of migrants to hold legal status in South Africa and to access the most basic 
services (Kihato 2009). The DHA is also notoriously inefficient, disorganized and 
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difficult for migrants to fully understand or predict. As a key component of the erstwhile 
Apartheid enterprise, the DHA maintains a sad legacy of using its immense power to 
actively disenfranchise and spatially control millions of South Africans (Breckenridge 
2005). After Apartheid, many of its most experienced functionaries were encouraged to 
take early retirement to make way for black South Africans. The post-Apartheid DHA 
was given a complicated array of tasks with a severely diminished institutional 
knowledge (Breckenridge 2005). In addition, the leadership of the department was 
conceded by the ANC to the ultra-conservative Inkatha Freedom Party chief, 
Mongosuthu Buthelezi. His notorious anti-immigrant stance halted progressive 
legislation on migration for a decade and infused the DHA’s institutions with a severe 
protectionist and xenophobic bent (Crush 1999; Crush and McDonald 2001; Landau and 
Freemantle 2010).   
 Before collecting data, I thus hypothesized that te state would be an obstacle to 
immigrants’ survival in South Africa. I hypothesized further that the mechanisms for this 
hindrance would be A) vacillation on the part of bureaucrats and civil servants due to 
their ineptitude or anti-foreigner sentiment, B) Contr l mechanisms designed at policy 
levels to reduce immigrant numbers and/or their freedom of movement, and C) prolific 
corruption.  
  The qualitative data I retrieved largely supported these hypotheses, yet also 
added nuances for which the literature review had not prepared me, and which may 
contribute to existing literature. The South African state does indeed act as a hindrance to 
migrant livelihood in South Africa for all the hypothesized reasons. However, migrant 
experiences conveyed additional key themes including the ways immigrants can turn 
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unwanted and perhaps unjust state interference in the r lives to their own benefit and the 
effects that negative personal interactions with Home Affairs have vs. the effects of 
related stories of abuse. Other themes also arose that informed my analyses. These 
include A) The unique position of Cape Town in South Africa’s spectrum of governance 
approaches and the effect this has on state-migrant interactions and B) The changing 
local government relationship to tourist markets and the effects this has on geographic 
distribution of documented vs. undocumented workers. These themes will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter regarding migrant interactions with local forms of 
government and state power.    
 
II. “Papers”  
 I usually began semi-structured interviews by talking with participants about how 
and why they came to South Africa. These stories related the participants’ background 
and reasons for coming to South Africa, as well as other insights into their lives and 
personalities. This opening was also an easy segue into my first question set regarding 
interactions with the South African state. I never used the word “state” even once to my 
recollection. We instead discussed terms like “papers”, “status”, and “city council.” I 
found discussions about these relatable terms provided me more than a sufficient window 
into the line migrants try to walk regarding the state, both at key times in their lives and 
in their everyday experience.     
 Inevitably upon arrival in South Africa, each migrant interviewed was bound to 
deal with the Department of Home Affairs. This government body is tasked with a 
variety of bureaucratic tasks: issuing or denying everything from resident’s driving 
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permits to refugee asylum papers (Hoag 2010). These exp riences with Home Affairs are 
important for me because they are, by far, the most c mmon form of direct contact that 
participants have with the South African State. It is at once a tangible institution and a 
more ethereal body, shrouded in confusion, myth and the apocryphal. To know the real 
impact of the relationship between migrants and the Department of Home Affairs, I 
attend to the combination of tangible and intangible elements that create a body with 
immense power and reach to affect daily life for many African migrants. 
 The power of the DHA in administering immigration status lies in the various 
benefits bestowed by legal status. Landau sums the ituation up nicely: “Documentation 
cannot prevent discrimination or ensure social inclusion, but official identity papers are 
invaluable in finding work, accessing social services and preventing arbitrary arrest and 
deportation. Conversely, without documentation, almost any act, from petty trade to 
walking in the street becomes illegal in the state’s eyes” (Landau 2005, 1121-22). For my 
participants who work in highly visible street trade in Cape Town’s busiest tourist 
markets, there is more pressure to attain legal status.  
 
III. Asylum 
 The process of obtaining papers to live and work in South Africa was surprisingly 
consistent hroughout my study group. The majority of migrants had papers qualifying 
them as having status as refugees or asylum seekers. I found this quite shocking at first. It 
took me a week or two of interviews to piece together t e reason why migrants so often 
referred to their visas as a “status,” which seemed an odd distinction to me. When asked 
about this, people from countries like Malawi were honest about the peaceful 
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circumstances of their country, but did also point ut that poverty is a major push factor 
(Paul 2011; Azibo 2011; Bomani 2011). Thus, migrants from relatively peaceful places 
did not mind the distinction “refugee” as it fairly accurately described their difficult and 
somewhat desperate position. Also, the distinction legally allows them access to some 
basic services like being able to go to a health clinic (though as I discuss later this is not 
always true in practice). “It was a very, very difficult experience [not having a refugee 
paper], because wherever you are going, maybe you want to go for medical to hospital, 
they are going to ask for the paper. If you go for the passport they say no you are staying 
here illegally” (Matthew 2011).  
 Refugee papers allow one a measure of access in South Africa, but do not convey 
other basic rights. Handling money was a very difficult task for many as they lack the 
ability to get bank accounts. Matthew, who had a post office savings account, was even 
denied access to his savings after his papers expired (2011). I will describe the banking 
issue in much greater depth in chapters eight and nine. Migrants have creative ways of 
dealing with the lack of access to banking in South Africa, though they are often more 
costly and dangerous than official banking channels.  
 Refugee papers are also quite temporary compared to work or resident visas. The 
first refugee paper someone is awarded can be good for as little as a month (Simon 2011; 
Emmanuel 2011). Most often it must be renewed every three months (Simon 2011; Paul 
2011; Gabriel 2011; Emmanuel 2011; Oliver 2011). After multiple shorter renewal 
periods (though possibly as few as just one or even none), the paper can be given for six 
months before renewal (Robert 2011; Paul 2011; Oliver 2011). Brenda, an older woman 
from Swaziland, said that she had a refugee permit that she had not been obliged to renew 
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for many years (2011). Participants were largely unable to see that there existed clear 
guidelines for the different decisions in their own experiences, nor could I detect hardly 
any discernable patterns explaining why, when and under what circumstances different 
papers are awarded. For instance, being granted a six-month refugee paper does not mean 
that you can’t be given three months at your next interview, or one month or nothing at 
all (Edmund 2011; Matthew 2011).  
 One pattern was very clear though: In 2011 Malawians were in a very a 
precarious situation. The rumor in the market was th t South Africa was in the midst of 
reevaluating Malawi’s economy as justification for asylum (Azibo 2011; Bomani 2011; 
Robert 2011). At the time of my interviews, Edmund, Robert and Bomani had already 
been denied renewal of their refugee status on their last visits (in Edmund’s case multiple 
times) and were in South Africa without legal status to breathe South African air, let 
alone work in the market. “…[they] say they don’t need anyone in Malawi to get the 
papers now. Because they say there is no war. There’s no refugees from Malawi, 
especially like Zimbabwe. So they can’t give the paper. [It’s] difficult now for Malawis 
to get the paper” (Edmund 2011). Robert from Malawi had been denied three months 
ago. His opinion was that having an elapsed paper might at least make the police more 
lenient if he was caught, though he could not rely it. His lack of evident concern was 
normal for the tranquil Robert, an open and dedicated marijuana aficionado. Matthew 
also was having difficulty renewing his rapidly elapsing refugee paper. By the time I left 
South Africa in August, 2011, he had also been unable to resolve the issue and had 
become an illegal alien. In the final weeks before my departure I asked him if he would 
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be able to get “the paper” in time. He related to me that he felt powerless to do so and had 
given up on Home Affairs to solve his problem. 
 Malawi lacks the domestic violence that justifies the refugee status of Senegalese 
(though that even is rather isolated, low level vioence that at the time of this writing has 
stopped) and especially Congolese immigrants who comprise the largest group of asylum 
seekers (Baruti and Ballard 2005). Malawi also lacks the large-scale economic collapse 
of Zimbabwe, which has caused South African officials to give special dispensations to 
Zimbabweans. They are able to work for up to ninety da s per year in South Africa with 
nothing more than a passport (Rutherford 2011). My conjecture is that Malawi’s long-
standing good relationship and cooperation with South Africa -- dating back from the 
days when Malawian workers supplied a substantial portion of mining labor in South 
Africa and up through Apartheid – may have softened th  bureaucratic stance toward 
them. Either this policy is being reversed or it has been transmitted very inconsistently. 
Most likely, there is some combination of both.  
 
IV. Long-Term Visas 
 The most cherished form of visa is the resident/work or permanent resident visa. 
Most immigrants to South Africa do not intend to stay for life, nor wish to. Citizenship 
does not convey benefits of much interest to migrants that a residency visa would not 
already give them. Only two participants out of nearly 40, Ibrahim from Sudan and Adele 
from a rural region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were South African 
citizens and neither had the ability to go back to their homes. All those who expressed a 
dim hope of ever returning home clung tightly to their resident permits, or their dreams of 
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attaining them, but never spoke of ambitions to become naturalized (for instance: Samba 
2011; Bakary 2011; Mamadou 2011; Thomas 2011; Blessing 2011; Simon 2011).  
 Resident/work permits are usually given for a period of 3-5 years, during which 
the migrant gets a blessed respite from dealing with Home Affairs. However, residency 
permits of any kind are rarer to see in the market, and as I will elaborate later, the market 
is not reflective of general migrant populations. One of the numerous ways the market 
skews is toward those who do have some level of legal status (Azibo 2011; Matthew 
2011). Therefore, it stands to reason that, in the wid r immigrant population of South 
Africa, residency permits are somewhat rarer. Making that statement definitively is 
impossible given that it would require a large scale demographic statistical study with 
easy access to all South African immigrants combined with accurate and well-kept 
government records. Sadly, that is certainly not possible in South Africa (Crush 2001).  
 According to participant accounts, a residency/work permit requires a large sum 
of money (around 5000R) and a favorable history in the country (Simon 2011; Blessing 
2011). That means that one must most likely endure refugee status for many years, while 
also managing to save thousands of rand. This incredibly difficult task can be related to 
the section on self-advancement in chapter four. I will not elaborate here on the difficulty 
this presents to residency seekers, other than to say that it prevents most who want 
residency from ever attaining it. Marrying a South African is a quicker path to receiving 
resident status, at least mid-term, though it is argu bly not any cheaper. Mamadou from 
Senegal, Pascal from the DRC and Ibrahim had all married South Africans. Mamadou 
was separated, but still supporting his wife. Ibrahim was divorced (but had already 
progressed to citizenship). Pascal’s wife had passed away. Mamadou expressed that he 
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would not wish a South African wife on an African migrant. “That South African woman 
is a lot of problem…Be careful for SA women… Some of us you see they got married 
here. But they buy house. You know, those house you give, those credit you take [for] 
them, like a TV, flat TV. The salon. Everything to make the house beautiful. South 
African women want all the stuff from the foreigners…They know the foreigner work 
more here” (Mamadou 2011). Despite his stern warning about the dangers of marrying 
South African women, he is still happy to have a three-year resident status. 
 
V. The Department of Home Affairs 
 Visiting Home Affairs is a daunting task. Merely getting in the front door is a  
battle, with hundreds or thousands of petitioners vying for entrance most days. Shana, a 
stall owner from Kenya, affirms that many people avoid Home Affairs simply because of 
the agony of forming the queue (2011). The incredibly slow pace with which the DHA 
processes applications for asylum and residency causes massive backlogs which create 
incredibly long lines, but also leave applicants in a state of “limbo” where they are in the 
country illegally and cannot seek work or access basic services (Landau 2006; Palmary 
2002). Additionally, “…DHA officials not only apply irrational standards but actively 
‘make people illegal’ through refusal of access to building, endless lines, and failure to 
provide proper documentation” (Klaaren and Ramji 2001, 43). Amos from Kenya 
estimates that he has seen up to twenty thousand people trying to get in at one time 
(2011). He stood behind this large figure when I asked if he meant it. “…you go in there 
you can’t see number one or who is the last” (2011). At the very least, his approximation 
conveys the sense of hopelessness one feels when queuing for entrance to Home Affairs. 
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It is mandatory for petitioners to begin lining up in the wee hours of the morning (Oliver 
2011; Paul 2011).  
When you go there, it was a place that you feel that I don’t belong here. You felt like you 
outside of somewhere you know, cause just to get there you queue, you are fighting just 
to get there. Not even fighting to get it, just fighting to get there to be asked questions, 
you know. And now you get it again, they’ll give you like three months. You have to go 
that time again. And you know what go? We go like 4 o’clock in the morning. Some they 
sleep there…It’s a miserable life we’re living (Paul 2011). 
 
Petitioners can return repeatedly to Home Affairs, waiting in line from before 
dawn until closing time, only to be turned away time and again. 
What I felt that it was difficult in the beginning to get, even to renew your permit. People 
had to wake up very early in the morning, some 4 o’clock in the morning. And queuing 
up. Queuing up so you can have space. So people coming from corners of Cape Town, to 
fight, to strive for that. I myself, I remember around 5 o’clock, I was there queuing 
myself with other people and it was very difficult. Could stay for two days and then third 
day you have the paper. Difficult. (Antonio 2011). 
 
Many decide to merely stay the night outside to hold their hard-won position in line for 
the next day. “Yeah sometimes you can sleep there five days” (Gilbert 2011). This may 
seem extreme, but truly can be a major time-saving maneuver. Mawadza reports that 
some petitioners have slept outside DHA offices for as long as three months before being 
able to apply for asylum. While waiting in lines, migrants often lack access to toilets and 
food (Mawadza 2008). Because of these harsh conditis, t is not unheard of for tensions 
to boil over into riots. One day in Cape Town, a riot erupted that tore through the fences 
penning in the lines of petitioners. Migrants stormed the DHA offices and destroyed 
equipment in a fit of indignant rage. The incident was so frightening to the DHA that for 





VI. Getting to the DHA Office 
 Merely getting in the front door of the DHA office an be the biggest challenge in 
dealing with the State. However, getting to the office and making time for it are two other 
seemingly mundane but very challenging complications. Seemingly less important than a 
successful interview at Home Affairs, merely finding the time to leave work during 
business hours is not only inconvenient but potentially disastrous. Owners in the market 
were far more likely to have been in South Africa for many years. This longer tenure 
afforded them the opportunity at some point to get either a resident visa or a long-term 
asylum status. Owners are not immune and must still interact with Home Affairs from 
time to time. “So if you have to go five six seven times it cost money because you can’t 
work!” said Amos, a stall owner from Kenya (2011). 
 However, it is the assistants who bear the brunt of the Home Affairs experience. 
As mentioned in chapter four, assistants work in a very precarious environment. They can 
be replaced in a heartbeat by someone equally or even more desperate for any kind of 
work, let alone a somewhat prized position in the tourist market.  
Amos: Yeah the one who employ you he don’t like that [missing work for Home Affairs]. 
He tell you if you don’t work he don’t pay you.  
Me: Or he’ll fire you  
Amos: Yeah exactly. Mostly that’s what they do. (Amos 2011) 
 
Most assistants work seven days a week from dawn until dusk. Some, like Robert (who 
works for Florence), get a Sunday off here and there. For most, however, a day off is 
unlikely. When free time comes, it certainly does not come on weekdays, which are the 
busiest days in the market.  
 The stress of losing one’s job or complicating one’s r lationship to their boss only 
serves to magnify the stress of the Home Affairs experience. Not only can missing work 
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for a day cost you your job, but migrants most likely have to return at least two or three 
more times before a meeting with a functionary is secured. Matthew related to me how 
difficult it is to make time for visits to Home Affairs. 
I dunno it’s like time. Maybe they get a job. You get a job, maybe they are working in a 
construction company. They say no, if I go to the boss and say ‘Boss, I want to go to 
Home Affairs to organize my papers’, definitely they will lose their job, because, ‘I can’t 
wait for you to sort out all your affairs. So go to h me affairs. I will hire somebody to do 
the job.’ (Matthew 2011). 
 
 To combat this problem, participants related to me that they or their boss are 
sometimes able to arrange a friend to cover the gap for a day, though finding 
experienced, trustworthy people is difficult on short notice. Most often the owners must 
simply do without help and try to run the stall themselves, as Dr. Nijem did when Paul 
went (unsuccessfully) to Home Affairs in June to renew his refugee paper. Meanwhile, 
the assistant is forced to pray they get to Home Affairs and all goes off well, preventing 
the need to return another day and endure the ire of their boss. It is no wonder that people 
sleep outside in winter in order to assure themselve  of success, hopefully on the first 
day.  
 The location of the Home Affairs office that deals with immigration papers has 
moved around over the years. It was downtown, and then moved to Nyanga. Now it is 
located in Maitland, roughly five miles from Greenmarket Square. Most participants 
prefer Maitland to Nyanga, but not to downtown. Formost petitioners, travelling to 
Maitland means not only money, but the precious time that is needed to travel both ways. 
As I will discuss more fully in the next chapter, it is dangerous to travel at night 
anywhere in Cape Town, but especially so in the neighborhoods where most migrants 
live. Yet, to join the queue after 5:00 am almost assures one a failed visit to Home 
Affairs, because of the long lines. Only two participants, Florence and Mamadou, own a 
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vehicle, so in order to reach Maitland by five, one must necessarily leave home before 
dawn and travel in darkness by taxi van or train, risking harm to themselves or their 
property. It is a mundane but important aspect of the overall struggle to relate to the 
South African state. 
 Participants reported that getting their first refugee status was usually a daunting 
task. Florence from DRC said about visiting Home Affairs, “Yeah is difficult because we 
must wake up early in the morning and go make the queue. Sometimes they are fighting 
there, but if you go inside, to get the paper, no problem. To go in, that is the problem” 
(2011). Oliver relates, “‘Cause, in order for you t get just a stamp, you have to wake up 
as early as 5 o’clock, sometimes sleep for the night there. Too much chaos” (2011). 
Andrew from Kenya reported that they have had to go five times over th  course of a 
month to be seen by an official just once so he could interview for his refugee status 
(2011). Azibo returned repeatedly for six months (2011). Robert told me “You know it’s 
tough for everyone first time in the foreign land eh? It’s tough for everyone, but for me I 
manage. But you see I came and I sleep there for two days. They give me but it was 
already rejected!” (Robert 2011). “And I spend three months looking for the paper and 
they say no, say no. It was difficult…It was like every Wednesday and Thursday of the 
week, I was going there. It was like 32 times” (Emmanuel 2011). It is easy to surmise 
from these accounts and their consistency that simply getting in the front door of the 
Department of Home Affairs can be the hardest part about managing one’s relationship 




VII. Incompetence and Caprice 
 The Department of Home Affairs is, by most participants’ accounts, characterized 
by a climate of caprice or incompetence. This results in what Hoag calls a general 
“illegibility,” which sets the DHA amidst a fog of disorder unintelligible to migrants 
(Hoag 2010). If Home Affairs functionaries are purposefully enacting directed policy, 
then it may be a matter of incompetence and disorganized inconsistency (Baruti and 
Ballard 2005). Regardless, most patrons of Home Affairs, not just Malawians, find the 
inconsistency very troubling and confusing. Antonio came as a political refugee from 
Cabinda. “I came as a real refugee. Not just for ecnomical survival. Took me two years 
to get status. I never understood why it took so long for me to have a status” (Antonio 
2011). Legally, the DHA must settle a request for asylum within six months, but these 
decisions can go years unresolved, if ever. While tese asylum requests are being 
processed, migrants are in danger of arrest and find it difficult to work (Palmary 2003). 
Oliver from Zimbabwe showed me an email he had receiv d from Home Affairs that 
informed him his application had been received but tha he needed to get fingerprinted. “I 
already did the fingerprints for this application. It is very confusing” (Oliver 2011). 
Because of problems like Oliver is experiencing, South Africa has failed to process more 
than half of its applications (Baruti and Ballard 2005). 
 Participants who had been in South Africa for a fewy ars often expressed 
exasperation about the issuing of resident visas. “They told us originally that they would 
give residence IDs after five years as refugees. But still hasn’t happened” (Shana 2011). 
“But after five years in the country you are entitled to resident visa but it doesn’t happen” 
(Antonio 2011). Despite the glaring problems with Antonio’s situation vis-à-vis Home 
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Affairs’ treatment of Cabindan refugees, Antonio’s wife, Helena, thinks that Home 
Affairs is already giving trouble and will try in the future to give her trouble as well 
because she did her application jointly with Antonio as Cabindan refugees, regardless of 
the fact that she is from DRC where they met and lived for many years. She sees people 
from Congo getting permanent residence after only three years of asylum and finds the 
arbitrary distinctions emplaced on her condition endl ssly exasperating (Helena 2011).  
 When migrants are able to win refugee status, problems with the DHA do not end. 
Even getting quality documentation can be difficult. Li erally the material the refugee 
status is printed on is often of cheap quality with hand-written content and addendums. 
This contributes further to the susceptibility of migrants in South Africa. The Section 22 
refugee permit which fortunate refugees are awarded is routinely disregarded by many 
possible employers, health care officials, police and even DHA functionaries themselves 
(Landau 2005; Baruti and Ballard 2005). 
 I told Amos in a focus group that my tentative conclusion was that Home Affairs 
was a big problem for immigrants in South Africa. His response was that they were a big 
problem indeed. His biggest complaint was that if you have been in South Africa for 
fifteen years, no matter your level of status, you are treated as if you had just arrived 
yesterday. “So imagine the people who are here ten years or fifteen years ago. They are 
still going to Home Affairs. And the newcomers are lso still going there. That way we 
have big big problem, big queue” (Amos 2011). Migrants’ lack of trust in Home Affairs 
for adequate procedural explanations, or lack of explanations offered, forces confused 
migrants to turn to one another and seek information fr m those more experienced. I have 
already discussed this flow of information in the pr vious chapter, but at the end of this 
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section I will discuss how this flow of information particularly impacts migrants’ 
experiences of the South African state. 
 
VIII. Rights and Information  
 Apart from a lack of clarity for migrants about how to attain documents, 
confusion and misinformation persist about the rights refugee documents convey.  
According to South African laws, petitioners for asylum and documented refugees are to 
be granted access to child education and health services. These legal rights are often 
misunderstood by service providers or blatantly ignored (Groot 2004; Klotz 2000) 
Foreigners are often forced to wait longer for or ba red access to services like health care 
or banking, arguably unconstitutionally (Crush 2000; Landau 2006). Palmary’s study 
reported that “Refugees cited continuous examples of how they had been denied access to 
schools, clinics, housing and many other services” (Palmary 2002, 7). For her participants 
and those of Landau (2005 and 2006), not only were s vices denied, but there was no 
system by which they felt they could find recourse. The DHA after all is seen by refugee 
groups as very unsympathetic and few South African groups are lining up to protest the 
delays that cause asylum seekers to live exposed to police harassment and unable to 
access work and basic services (Landau 2005). Thus, as Landau concludes, “refugees and 
asylum seekers are effectively unable to convert thse legal entitlements into effective 
protection” (Landau 2006, 308). 
 The reasons for the chronic inability of the DHA to keep up with the number of 
petitions each day are explained by some participants s originating mainly from the 
crush of people petitioning for papers. Others point to corruption or poor management. 
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Gilbert from Malawi maintained that he had been tured away many times because of 
computer crashes and other malfunctions in the Home Affairs office. “They say ‘come 
tomorrow.’ Then you go there again, same problem. ‘Yeah today the machines they are 
not working properly, so you need to come back again tomorrow.’ For days you are still 
going, going, going” (Gilbert 2011). Landau reports that in Port Elizabeth dozens of 
legally recognized refugees “went weeks without valid documents in mid-2004 because 
the office failed to procure the printer cartridge needed to produce identity documents” 
(Landau 2005, 1123). Other migrants have conveyed to researchers that they feel DHA 
staff were simply not properly trained to deal with refugees (Palmary 2003). Hoag related 
the following from his research into the DHA.  
The Inspectorate office where I conducted fieldwork, for example, had not a single 
functioning printer, photocopier, or fax machine – and only one of the few functioning 
computers was connected to the Movement Control System (the primary database with 
which officials interact in their day-to-day activies). At the time of my research, the 
office was staffed by only 28 immigration officers, later augmented by 6 trainees. With 
these new trainees, the office was still 23 short of the 57 total approved posts. The 
Temporary Residence Permitting office, as well, was28 short of the total 45 approved 
positions (Hoag 2010). 
 
 Hoag’s research unveils some of the enigmatic inner-workings of the DHA. 
Amongst his findings is an assertion that DHA functionaries are indeed confused by 
contradictory directives brought by political changes in upper echelons of the 
administration. Likewise, upper management is ineffective in effectively communicating 
policy and implementation strategies to its lower-lever bureaucrats. One such clerk 
accidentally came across a circular in a pile of papers that informed her that, due to a 
policy change, she had been improperly denying refugee status to a number of applicants 
for weeks or months (Hoag 2010).  
 Sadly, though, institutional capacity and bureaucrati  incompetence may not be 
the largest factor limiting the proper treatment of migrants by the South African state via 
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the DHA. Baruti and Ballard claim that corruption ad laziness of DHA officials are the 
primary causes of inefficiencies and are brought on by anti-foreigner sentiment (2005). 
The racial and ethnic tone of South Africa’s active xenophobia extends to all levels of 
society. I explore this topic fully in a later chapter, but suffice it to say that South Africa’s 
centuries-long history of racialized policies has bitterly infected its struggle to come to 
grips with migration. This struggle not only transforms commonplace fears related to 
immigration into some of the most vehement anti-foreigner sentiment on earth, but also 
allows these sentiments to infect wide segments of society. The result is motivation for 
bureaucrats err on the side of conservativism in order to protect their jobs in their own 
climate of policy confusion (Hoag 2010). 
 
IX. Harassment 
  Many participants related feeling harassed and belittled by Home Affairs 
officials. This harassment is one of the more consistent elements of what an African 
migrant petitioner can expect from a visit to Home Affairs.  
--“Some are very helpful. But some are very rude. Like in Nyanga, we had to be treated badly. 
Sometimes we are beaten…But they are not Home Affairs officials who do that. Security guards 
who are conducted by the Home Affairs, [a] private company hired by them” (Oliver 2011).  
--“Like before we used to go there to Nyanga. There was too much police. When you go there 
early in the morning they gonna grab you, take your phone what what. Now it’s in Maitland 
there…Maitland is better” (Edmund 2011).  
  
 Amos referenced a more institutional kind of abuse.  
 
…when you stay three days, go back, go back, go back again, you have to pay 2500 fine. 
Because now you are late. So where you gonna get all this fuckin money? No way you 
can get that…Yeah they charge you 2500 [rand]. If you don’t pay the 2500 they lock you 
in the jail, maybe two years, or they send you back. After two years they send you back. 
It’s harassment! (Amos 2011). 
 
 Most participants simply accept the struggle with the DHA as a given component 
of migrant existence in South Africa. For most migrants, the best advice can be boiled 
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down to persistence and disregard for the intentions or ability of Home Affairs 
functionaries. My focus group with the Malawian assistants agreed unanimously that 
persistence alone largely determines one’s outcome, which is never guaranteed, for better 
or worse.  
“By that time I struggled. I go there and I spend three times there without getting it. I go 
there and I didn’t get it, you see? Then, after, I get it. But I get it in an honest way. 
Because I struggle, always on the line. I be there maybe 4am. Struggle for a paper you 
see. They don’t wanna give it” (Thomas 2011).  
 
“You can go and get it the first day or you can go for months and not get it” (Matthew-b 
2011). Matthew tried for eight years and eventually enlisted a pro bono legal service un 
by University of Cape Town School of Law which took the matter to the High Court. The 
case finally won him recognition as a refugee by Home Affairs, at least until recently 
when he was denied again (2011). 
 No matter the reason, it is a grueling process, drea ed by all. It is no small wonder 
that many people elect to forgo legal status and live in the shadow of deportation in 
exchange for a reprieve from interactions with South African bureaucracy.   
Bomani: You have to go. But if you can, if you don’t want to go you stay here now, but illegally. 
Me: Could you still work in the market? 
Bomani: Yes we can still work here, but the problem, if you have a problem, if they catch you, 
then you be in shit because they send you home. 
  
 However, not every one of my participants had a bad experience with the visa 
process. “It wasn’t really difficult. I queued for Home Affairs and got a refugee permit. 
Then interviewed later and got full asylum status after 1 year and 2 months” said Patrice 
(2011). Patrice, like some other migrants from the DRC, received asylum without much 
ado. Pascal, also from DRC, originally came to South Africa in the early 1990s because 
his brother was working in the Zaire embassy in South Africa at the time. His brother 
helped him get a visa sorted, but he maintains that he still could have come if his brother 
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had not been working at the embassy. “There were already Congolese here. Relations 
were fine between Mobutu and South Africa” (Pascal 2011). Samba from Senegal also 
said he did not mind the experience but tried, as wusual for him, to convey his position 
above the fray. 
No for me is actually nothing. Is the same like the moment I use my refugee papers. I use 
my Senegalese papers. For me is nothing. Is a papers lik  all papers. Because I have my 
Senegalese passport. I have my bank account in Senegal. Somewhere else is the same 
sure. South Africa is the same. But you know just follow the rules. What you want. And 
what you do you get. You know? (Samba 2011).  
 
 It is not uncommon for Senegalese to have an easier tim  working with Home 
affairs. However, Samba has a seemingly unshakable confidence in himself and is often 
making comments that reveal his extremely self-aware, but also self-gratifying thought 
processes. Samba’s personal philosophy reflects a stoicism even more pronounced than 
that of his compatriots and fellow Murids in the market. By appearing unaffected by the 
normal worries of the hoi polloi, Bas elevates himself above the fray, but also the 
unwashed masses. He best embodies this aloof personality trait that is common to the 
Senegalese in the market, but so much to an extreme that others in the market find him 
comical more than intimidating.  
 One day in my first month in the market, I was hanging out with Simon and 
Blessing at their stall, and Samba came up in conversation. I asked if they knew him and 
after we agreed we were talking about the same person Simon said unceremoniously 
“Yes. This one is full of shit.” Blessing looked in the direction of Samba’s stall and said 
“Yes. Full of shit.” It is not uncommon for non-Senegalese migrants to criticize the 
Senegalese in the market, but it was rare to hear any criticisms, especially such resolute 
ones, from the usually kind Zimbabweans, Simon and Blessing. Personality traits that set 
Senegalese vendors apart were most often reflected in heir clothing and outward 
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confidence. These traits are connected to deeper cultural elements that have contributed 
greatly to Senegalese success in the marketplace, from Cape Town to Paris to New York. 
Perhaps this success is the Senegalese’s ultimate sin in the market.  
 
X. Corruption  
 Corruption is an inevitable topic in a discussion of South African bureaucracy, 
specifically the DHA. Bureaucracy relating to immigration and naturalization in South 
Africa is notoriously inefficient and corrupt (Klaaren and Ramji 2001).  Customs officials 
are also known to wield power over migrant activity by inconsistently and arbitrarily 
extracting high tariffs and additional fees or by eliciting outright bribes for documents 
(Maharaj 2001; Peberdy 2000; Klotz 2000; Landau 2005). Baruti and Ballard show that, 
amongst their participants, bribes solicited by DHA officials ranged from R100 to R1000 
(2005). The United Nations High Commission on Refuges reports that a fifth of refugees 
have given bribes to DHA officials (Groot 2004). Accordingly, few participants in my 
study related to me any marked experiences with corrupt officials at Home Affairs. As 
was the case with police corruption, most of the stories shared with me were about a third 
party and not from my participant’s personal experience. When personal experience was 
referenced, allusions were made more than straight explanation.  
Me: Can you describe your process for getting a work permit? 
Pardon: I don’t want to go into the process because it will be like I am denouncing 
corruption. So it’s better to just say it was hard.  
Me: So you don’t want to talk about the corruption? 
Pardon: Ah no. I don’t want to be the victim of that thing.  
Me: My project specifically focuses on that so I do want to hear about it. 
Pardon: What I can say, it is there. How it is and…it’s up to how you find out about it. 
But it is there. You fork a lot of thousands to geta work permit by that time. But how I 
get it, it was according to me. But I don’t think it’s right to discuss about it. Because it 
was the hard way. And I don’t want to think about it. Because it was hard for me by 




 Pardon clearly had some sort of very troubling experience with the visa process 
when he attempted to get his residency permit. The topic was clearly off-limits so I did 
not press the issue. It would have been fascinating to know more details of his 
experience, but his words convey the point that corruption does happen, even in Cape 
Town.  
Andrew: Obviously there is the corruption and everything you see. It is difficult to get it. 
It is not easy. 
Me: How is there corruption? 
Andrew: Most of the time, to make it work out for you, you have to pay money you see.  
Me: To an official?  
Andrew: Maybe, it depends. Cause me, I just went and queued for me. If you are lucky, 
like me I was lucky one day and I got it. (Andrew 2011) 
 
 Bomani referenced the possibility of Malawians going “back door” in order to 
escape the noose tightening around their necks. 
Bomani: Will be harder now to get it from Malawi. There was no problem before, but 
when we came to find greener pastures, there was no hunger or war, just lack of 
opportunity. But now the government is figuring out that nothing is wrong in 
Malawi…But you know there is some other ways. There is still people you know. You 
know. 
 Me: What other ways?  
Bomani: You go back door. You can go there. You can talk to people you know. Then 
maybe like you can pay. Like the corruption. When the law is too tight there are some 
other ways also. People, they get what they want. Ad they pay something. That’s why 
you can see people, they have, the new ones. But if you go there and you want to get it’s 
not easy for you to get a paper (Bomani 2011)  
 
 Utilizing “back door” channels or paying “unofficial fees” are strategies for 
obtaining papers that many participants have considered if not enacted. The market 
inhabitants who must work most often with Home Affairs are the assistants, i.e. those 
with the least resources. This makes “back door” channels less appealing to them. If 
paying some sort of “unofficial” fee to a clerk could get them a more desirable legal 
status, they would likely never be able to afford it (see also Gebre et al. 2011). There 
were a few times where I saw assistants like Paul and Thomas trying to borrow ten rand 
from others just to get transport home. To go malnourished for lack of money is not an 
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uncommon phenomenon amongst assistants either. Amassing a large savings that could 
open doors for a better future, legally or otherwise,  extremely difficult for even owners 
to do, and more so for assistants (Matthew-b 2011).  
 Corruption is, by and large, a well-known and widely accepted phenomenon for 
my study group. African migrants in South Africa, like my participants, come from 
countries where corruption in bureaucracy is not unheard of or just as often is business-
as-usual. Thus, the corruption present in The Department of Home Affairs, if it exists in a 
significant way, might not be eliciting an affective response in my participants, at least 
partially, because it is an anticipated element of the landscape for them. Additionally, for 
some, corruption seems relatively light in South Africa in comparison to their home 
countries. Some migrants and DHA officials place th responsibility for the presence of 
corruption on the migrants who foster the process by giving into bribery to make dealings 
with the DHA go smoothly (Hoag 2010; Gebre et al. 2011). Perhaps, this helps explains 
Pardon’s reticence to discuss his experience. He may feel victimized, yet also partly 
responsible and ashamed. Neocosmos would respond to Pard n’s shame with the 
assertion that the onus for corruption falls on South Africa’s migration legislation which 
assumes that migrants produce a net loss to society. Thus in presenting migrants as 
inimical to the State, the state encourages and justifies the defense of ‘Fortress South 
Africa’ using illiberal means. “To do this, police officers and officials from the 
Department of Home Affairs are given such excessive powers over extremely vulnerable 
people that the bribery, extortion and corruption become not only possible but regular 
practices” (Neocosmos 2008, 590). Those who give bribes do participate in the 
proliferation of the abuse. However, they do so in a context of power relations which 
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 Myth shrouds much of the experience of migrant life in South Africa, and the 
interaction with the state is no exception. The Department of Home Affairs retains an 
ominous and numinous quality to many migrants for reasons that go beyond the great 
power the institution has over a migrant’s future wll-being and freedom. Rumor and 
discussion about how to move from asylum seeker, to refugee, to resident status are 
commonplace amongst migrants in Cape Town’s public markets. The other major topic is 
how to navigate the DHA process for those seeking to attain or renew their refugee 
papers. The stories circulated amongst migrants about the DHA have much to do with the 
shaping of the contact between migrants and the stat . The looming future interactions 
with the DHA make it a common topic of conversation amongst migrants in the market, 
as I have already mentioned. The impetus for much of t is conversation is that so little is 
known amongst migrants in the market. At the same ti , stakes are high, thus 
compelling people to seek information.   
 The Department of Home Affairs does not go to great l ngths to adequately 
inform migrants of their rights and responsibilities. Great confusion abounds amongst my 
participants on issues like health care or housing assistance. The visa-granting 
mechanism of Home Affairs may be organized and consistent, but from the outside 
perspective of petitioners it appears erratic and capri ious. With no clear path to 
obtaining a refugee status, or to advancing that statu  to a long-term asylum visa or a 
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resident visa, migrants are left to glean what they can from the experiences related to 
them by others who have gone before. This is extremely problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, the experiences of individuals from different countries should differ based 
on the South African government’s recognition or lack thereof of a substantive push 
factor at home justifying the granting of asylum. Thus, information passed through the 
grapevine may lack critical contextual details. Second, in the same way, verbal exchanges 
of subjective experience can lack context or be misunderstood by the hearer, especially 
when there is no corroborating information. Third, not only is there often a lack of 
corroboration, the opposite is often present. Differing opinions abound on the regulations 
and rules pertaining to migrant life in South Africa, including the appropriate or optimal 
way to petition Home Affairs for legal status.  
 A lack of consensus on institutional bureaucratic knowledge amongst migrants in 
Cape Town’s central markets leads to misinformation caused by conversing in climates 
of anxiety. This of course limits a migrant’s ability to negotiate their relationship to the 
South African state in a satisfactory or optimal way. Thus, a sense of despondency 
suffuses the relationship between migrants and the stat . It is one thing to feel weak and 
alone in the throng of thousands hoping to be admitted to the visa office. It is quite 
another to feel powerless to advance your interests effectively and reliably once you have 
gained entrance to the building. The Department of Home Affairs is the migrant’s sole 
vehicle to the most basic approbation of the South African state: legal status. This pivotal 
role combines with its exclusivity, abject power and perceived caprice to hold a 




 The state is clearly an obstacle to migrant survival in South Africa by means of 
vacillation, control mechanisms and prolific corruption. The DHA lacks the funding, 
manpower and the will to process refugee and residency applications efficiently and 
ethically (Mawadza 2008). Migrants who came legally, but became illegal, or were even 
arguably “made illegal” live under a constant threat of deportation. This “ever-present 
vulnerability” shapes migrant experience by making immigrants more easily exploitable 
and reducing their access to basic services. Some scholars have pointed out that state 
controls are not always aimed at eliminating immigration. “It is deportability and not 
deportation per se that has historically rendered undocumented migrant labor a distinctly 
disposable commodity” (De Genova 2002, 438). This critical view lands squarely on 
South Africa with its combined histories of labor abuses and racial prejudice.  
 Illegality is a very important concept to this study because it “is a spatialized 
social condition that is frequently central to the particular ways that migrants are 
racialized as “illegal aliens” within nation-state spaces” (De Genova 2002, 439). I 
conclude that the poor functioning of the DHA (and therefore the bad relationship 
between migrants and the state) presents an inherently spatial obstacle to the survival of 
my study group. Shea, who studied professional African migrants in Cape Town, 
explains that “[T]he real power of such a culture [of exclusion] is contained in the unique 
blend of state sanctioned rules of belonging (citizenship) and the interpretation of these 
rules based on history and culture, by legitimate citizens” (2008, 127). The state’s ability 
to act as an obstacle to migrant aspirations is related directly to the will and assent of its 
citizenry (Modi 2003). South Africa’s citizenry happens to display unbelievably high 
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levels of racist disdain for foreigners, an inexhaustible hatred most often referred to in 
literature as “xenophobia.” 
  For those who work from dawn until dusk, seven days  week, the only thing 
worse than the work life is to be told by the government that they are no longer legally 
allowed to do that work. Migrants see the state as an institution that disregards their well-
being, or directly seeks to harm them. This unfortuna e relationship is often structural, 
being based off of the shape and style, policy and format of the institutions of permitting 
and police control that South Africa has enacted and that the City of Cape Town has 
enacted at the local level. When migrants interact with these institutional embodiments of 
South African political will, they do not do so impersonally. There is always a clerk, a 
functionary, a police officer -- human beings all. These living, breathing entities make up 
the facade of the state enterprise and have personal experiences as well as social, cultural 
and political outlooks that inform how they interpret institutional directives. Perhaps 
more importantly, their humanity informs how they choose to act in the spaces of 
discretion where no clear rule or regulation exists for them to follow, or where ignorance 
of rules persist. For this reason, in the following chapters, I continue this exploration with 
a focus on migrants’ relationship to police and loca  government in South Africa and then 










Chapter 5. Migrants and Local Government 
I.  The relationship of migrants to the state via The Department of Home Affairs is a 
keystone to understanding the lived experience of migrancy in South Africa. In addition 
to national institutions, the migrant relationship to the state must be examined at the local 
level. The influential role that local executive institutions, like the police forces and city 
councils, play in daily migrant life has only increased since Apartheid as more city and 
municipal governments in South Africa take increased control of policing. Particularly 
important for my study group, local policing has largely taken responsibility for 
overseeing urban informal trade (Palmary 2002).  
 Local branches of executive power in South Africa, like the police, have been 
reported to be a large-scale nuisance to both law-abiding and undocumented foreigners in 
South Africa. South African police forces of all stripes often take advantage of the 
“spatialized social condition” created by State policies and apparatuses like The 
Department of Home Affairs (Klaaren and Ramji 2001; Landau 2006a; Maharaj 2001; 
Peberdy 2000; Samara 2011; Sinclair 1998; Western 2001). The police are well-known to 
be corrupt, violent and antagonistic (Peberdy 2000; Sadouni 2009; Western 2001). 
Levine defines corruption as the “unsanctioned or unscheduled use of public resources 
for private ends” (1975). Corruption can also be viewed as the “misperformance or 
neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of 
gaining some advantage more or less directly personal” (Brooks 1970). By both of these 
normative definitions, police in South Africa operate in a corrupt manner. A 2002 
Immigration Act promised to humanely reform immigration controls, but only a couple 
of reports were produced with no substantial changes made (Crush 2008). Since then, 
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South African policy has instead moved increasingly towards strategies of control. 
Wherever legislation leaves gaps, ad hoc local governance in South Africa usually 
amounts to anti-migrant stances. Moreover, the South African State emboldens extra-
legal corruption by providing a larger governmental template of civil and human rights 
abuses that defy South Africa’s laws and foundationl principles. 
 Before coming to South Africa to do field work, I hypothesized based on a review 
of literature, that police interaction would be a negative impact on the everyday life of 
African migrants. My data collection indicated that this was certainly the case. Many 
participants had been extorted personally, and many more had been harassed or abused in 
some form or another. Participants related a severe lack of trust in the police to treat them 
fairly and to protect them from harm by others, especially South Africans. It seems also 
that feelings toward the police are heavily shaped by what migrants witness first hand in 
interactions between the police and other migrants. Sentiments and strategies of 
negotiation are furthermore shaped by hearsay accounts related about negative migrant 
encounters with police. Lastly, I found that many migrants’ views and experiences of 
police in Cape Town have been heavily affected by previous experiences in other major 
South African cities.  
 
II. Extortion 
 I asked each of my participants to relate to me what t e police were like in South 
Africa and to tell me about any interactions they had with them. Numerous participants 
related that they had indeed been extorted of cash or valuables.  For instance: 
Paul: They [the police] are too much corrupt  
Me: To you specifically? 
Paul: Yes, a number of times. 
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Me: Do they ever try to get money from you? 
Paul: Yeah, Yeah that’s their game! Yeah. (Paul 2011) 
 
 Most participants, like Paul, did not hesitate in their affirmation that police in 
South Africa and Cape Town, in particular, had extorted money from migrants. Pascal, 
for instance said, “They stealing! They just coming to disturb the people, to look at the 
papers, and talk. But they can see at that time you are selling, that you are busy. The 
customer can go because the customer don’t want to see police” (2011). When asked if he 
had personally been harassed, Pascal responded,  
Yes! You see maybe you are three standing there. Thy come to you. Once it was us 
three, here on the corner. The police they come and arrest us. For what? They must 
search. Ok search. We go inside, they are searching us. Nothing. But we must go to the 
police. For what? Asking for what!? ‘You talk too much. You must just go’. We go in the 
police station, we go there inside. They say they must take us a picture, charting and 
check us. The time we go inside there, the woman was there she said ‘No, you are just 
wasting your time. Just go’. 2010 that happens. Those new police that are here now [since 
World Cup]. they are just disturbing the people. They are not doing their job. They just 
looking for money. If they come, they see a new face on the town, they go to you. Maybe 
you leave your permit at home. They take you. You give them 50 [rand]. They let you go 
(Pascal 2011). 
 
 My literature review clearly indicated that harassment, extortion and theft are 
common in interactions with police (Peberdy 2000). Various discussions like the above 
with Paul and Pascal confirmed that police corruption is an obstacle to daily life for 
migrants in South Africa and in Cape Town’s public markets. South Africa has a sad 
history of police corruption that goes back long befor  the post-Apartheid influx of 
African migrants. “In the 1970s, black policemen were commonly believed to refrain 
from charging pass offenders in exchange for bribes” (Lodge 1998). As I later conclude, 
the repeal of Apartheid era laws like those restricting spirits and free movement created a 





 Participants also related that they had been harassed by police without necessarily 
being extorted for cash or valuables. When asked if he had ever been verbally harassed 
by police, Paul said that friends of his had been. “Even during that xenophobia time. 
They will come and they tell you ‘Why don’t you just go home!’ (Paul 2011). Asked 
about harassment and extortion, Mamadou responded, “Y ah you gonna have problem 
for that. Because sometime they think like you selldrugs” (Mamadou 2011). Gabriel 
from Uganda responded, “Yes yes. I hear so many storie . I always hear they have 
attacked some other people whereby they have gotten n cases, they have beaten, they 
have attacked. That’s what I am hearing. Because I’m always reading the newspapers. So 
all the people complain, ‘oh the police they are beating us!’” (Gabriel 2011). Targets for 
police harassment are commonly profiled by looks or peech, allowing even citizens to be 
harassed based on phenotype (Landau 2009). Mamadou agreed that the police do target 
black Africans, though he blames that more on Nigerian criminality than on the police 
racism. Adele made and interesting point that when she came to Cape Town from DRC, 
all of her clothes were stolen. She credits dressing in the South African fashion for 
helping her avoid being profiled as a foreigner and target for harassment (Adele 2011).  
 Participants painted a picture of what services th police had rendered them, if 
any, in their time in South Africa. Largely this amounted to being told to “get lost” in 
some form or another when participants had requested police aid (Bomani-b 2011; 
Matthew-b 2011; Edmund-b 2011; Robert-b 2011).  
Paul: The police, sometimes they become a problem.  
Me: How so?  
Paul: You know why? Police, over here, they favor too much South Africans. Like for 
example, if a South African does wrong to you, they cannot go for him. They leave him 
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sometimes. I’ve seen that. But if you just do wrong to a South African, they force you. 
Me: What do they do? 
Paul: If you are arguing with a South African, they come. They are not fair-minded you 
know. They are not fair. I’ll be straight on that. (Paul 2011) 
 
 Oliver said “There is another guy. He is in Khayelitsha. He is from 
Cameroon…He has this container that he use as store. S me people broke into his 
container and stole some items. So he went to the Kay litsha police station to report to 
the police. So they told him you must go back to your country” (Oliver 2011). Emmanuel 
related, “Me I can say, it’s not the same like their people in South Africa. They do treat 
you differently. They don’t handle you nicely. You know, someone from far away, they 
just say ‘Ah, I don’t care about you’. It’s only like they don’t do their job when they are 
treating someone from far” (Emmanuel 2011). The feeling amongst participants was 
nearly unanimous that when the police were not actively preying upon migrants, they 
were disregarding their duty to protect them from harm to their person or property.  
 Gaining police assistance is especially hopeless for undocumented immigrants 
who already have a hard enough time avoiding suspicion, harassment and brutality from 
police (Klotz 2000). Azibo maintained, in a focus group, that interactions with police 
tend to go even worse if you have no documentation. If you lack a paper from Home 
Affairs, he said, the police will not advocate for you or protect you (2011). Thus, for 
migrants who lack legal status, the police present even more difficulty.  
Me: Any experiences with police? 
Emmanuel: I just thank God that I am not meeting those guys. 
Me: Why do you thank God? Are they difficult? 
Emmanuel: Yeah, they are difficult. They like the papers. If you don’t have them they 
will put you in holding cell and then send you back home. 
 
 Having legal status in South Africa, however, does not exempt migrants from 
police harassment, as in Pascal’s account above. Migrants’ legitimizing documents are 
often disregarded or destroyed, which aids in extortion or helps to boost arrest numbers 
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(Klaaren and Ramji 2001; Landau 2005; Landau 2006b; Pe erdy 2000). “ I have a friend. 
He was arrested here. Just for papers. He had the paper. But he just forget it home. They 
just took him up the corner. My friend, he’s just working right here (points down St. 
George’s Mall). [The police said] “You have a hundre  rand. Just gimme money then we 
let it go” (Paul 2011). Klotz claims that “Securing proper status and paperwork does not 
protect foreign Africans from harassment, imprisonme t and/or deportation” (2000) and 
that these infractions relate directly to the role police play in enforcing migration 
regulations.  
 Robert related a personal experience to me where he was extorted by police even 
though he had a refugee paper. When I asked him why that would happen if he had 
documents, he responded, “It’s their life there in Jo’burg [Johannesburg]. When there is 
foreigner, you must just take something. Yeah even if you have a paper, they just want 
something. Just want to get something from you.” Matthew said in his interview, “The 
thing is even if you do have papers they do harass you. They just want to take advantage 
because they know you are a foreign immigrant” (Matthew 2011). Even the South 
African Human Resources Commission wrote: 
In the majority of cases there were no reasonable grounds for an apprehending officer to 
suspect that a person was a non-national. A significant number of persons interviewed 
had identification documents which were either destroyed or ignored or which they were 
prevented from fetching from home. Apprehended persons were often not told or did not 
understand the reason for their arrest. Extortion and bribery are practices extremely 
widespread among apprehending officers (SAHRC 1999, quoted in Landau 2005).  
 
IV. Survival Strategies 
 Even if migrants have never experienced this sort of treatment personally, the vast 
majority still regard police as dangerous (Sinclair 1998). Given that participants’ lives 
seem deeply impacted by their negative experiences with or their fears of police, I asked 
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them to describe their strategies of negotiation and avoidance. Paul said, “You just have 
to play on your luck and try to plead with them, you know. You just have to plead with 
them and not try to be smart over them” (Paul 2011). Mamadou extolled the importance 
of having nothing to hide so that one can be confide t and still respectful. “When you are 
honest you never have problem for yourself” (Mamadou 2011). Some police have dealt 
with him respectfully. When they are nice, he goes along with searches and road blocks, 
but they never are able to extort money from him. “From me you can’t get nothing! For 
Sure! Haha!” He is certain that if one has nothing to hide, they have less to fear from the 
police. When people look scared, he said, the police think you have a reason to be scared 
and then try to take advantage. Also, Mamadou prefers for friends to come to his house. 
“But me anyway I don’t like to go out…I go home watch TV, stay there inside. If I get 
invited, I can drive somewhere. I don’t even take a taxi” (2011). Adele echoed 
Mamadou’s sentiment about seeming afraid. She always tries to keep quiet around police 
and always avoids looking afraid. “I think police can sense fear” (2011). Adele probably 
also avoids police attention by dressing in South African clothing, as mentioned earlier 
(Adele 2011).  
 Samba, with his characteristic bravado (more even tha his Senegalese 
compatriot, Mamadou, who himself is considerably sef-aggrandizing), insists that when 
it comes to the police, the best policy is to demand respect. 
Samba: No. Actually it’s not about lucky. I’m a person. I use my mind about everything. 
Sometimes I get stopped from the police and [we] talk and they let me go.  
Me: What do you say to them? 
Samba: Yeah actually some time you get stopped. They say they want to check you. I say 
no you don’t check me about…you must let me know the reason why you check me. You 
know because I’m a person, I’m working and you see m . What respect you have for me 
to check me? You know what I mean? I want to know the reason first. I can allow 
policeman to check me no problem, cause I don’t have anything to hide. 
Me: So you actually stand up for yourself? 
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Samba: Yeah I actually want to know the reason. Before you check me you must let me 
know the reason why you check me. You know what I mean. So you tell me respect 
about something, ok, I say no problem. Then check me. If you wanna bring me 
somewhere I say no. I’m free. You check me where I am. Check me and let me go, cause 
you not gonna find anything wrong with me (2011).  
 
 Samba’s approach was very interesting to me becaus so many other participants 
told me that their strategy was to just avoid the police and be as amenable as possible. 
Samba, however, chooses to fight fire with fire. In a sense, his strategy relies on the 
playground principle of standing one’s ground and punching the bully instead of 
cowering and curling up into a ball. I would wager that his calm, righteous defiance often 
psychologically deflates the police’s potential interest in abusing their power.  
 The diffident Oliver, who is more the curl-into-a-b ll type, adds that apart from 
merely being innocent, migrants should travel in groups and not draw attention. “Don’t 
imitate what the locals do. Like partying overnight, like…don’t play music loudly. If I 
can see these locals [doing this], there is no problem. If they are a foreigner, they will get 
trouble” (2011). Azibo also claims to have avoided many problems with police by not 
getting side tracked in to the night life, avoiding people who do, and focusing only on his 
work. Oliver said also that “being in the right place at the right time” is very important, I 
think from the context referring to avoiding townships at night. Andrew claims that there 
is another side to that wisdom. “I walk at night, but in specific locations.” He too avoids 
townships, but also avoids predominantly white neighborhoods and the city center. 
“Yeah, because...they see a tall guy, a black guy…you see?” (2011). Andrew fears 
getting profiled as a black criminal as much as an immigrant target. Antonio recommends 
keeping one’s refugee identification at home in order to protect it from loss or wear and 
tear. Sometimes he keeps a photocopy, just in case,but ither way, he says, it is far more 
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desirable to avoid police (Antonio 2011). He best summarized all the survival strategies: 
One has to stay alert at all times to avoid police int raction at all costs. 
 These avoidance strategies show tangible examples of how participants have 
altered their behavior, their dress, and their daily patterns of travel, work and recreation 
in order to continue their lives in South Africa unmolested. The illegitimate behavior of 
the police and the power they wield are a fixture in the migrant psyche and the countless 
decisions made each day about how to negotiate the human and material landscape of the 
city. Avoidance is the most desirable policy because of the abject powerlessness the 
majority feel when they either imagine or encounter th  police arm of the State. This 
sentiment is similar to participants’ wish to avoid the Department of Home Affairs at all 
costs as well. These strategies of avoidance imply that the state acts a mobile, 
unpredictable and omnipresent push factor in everyday migrant life. 
 This context of powerlessness helps explain why so many participants related that 
the only reason they have not been confronted or are not harassed more often is due to 
luck or spiritual protection (Bakary 2011; Helena 2011). “That is why I say I just thank 
God I am not meeting those ones yet. Because God is the only one who protect you. It’s 
like if you pray every day you don’t want to meet these kinds of things. Sometimes it can 
happen” (Emmanuel 2011). Adele and Oliver feel “lucky” that they have had few 
interactions with Police. “…to be quite honest I met some police officers a number of 
times, searching people, checking IDs, they just let m  pass…maybe I’m lucky” (Oliver 
2011). 
 The police are perceived by migrants as threatening almost unanimously. 
Exceptions like Thomas and Samba have avoided bad interactions with the police in 
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Cape Town and do not view them as a threat. As for Th mas, I have seen many 
inconsistencies in Thomas’ statements over key issues d ring the time I spent in the 
market talking with him. I also noticed that he was once or twice vehemently 
contradicted and rebuffed by all the other Malawians during our focus group. Thomas 
may be at the very least eccentric and sometimes plainly untruthful in his statements. 
Despite my suspicions as to his reliability, however, h  actually illuminates an important 
pattern in my findings. Thomas is in a miniscule minor ty probably because he has not 
lived in South Africa more than a year or so, nor ever lived in Johannesburg.  
 Migrants are far more likely to run into these issue  the longer they reside in Cape 
Town or other cities in South Africa. Participant accounts clearly indicate that Cape 
Town has unacceptable issues with police preying upon migrants. However, they also 
indicate that Cape Town does not seem to have the sam  degree of police harassment and 
corruption that exists in other major urban centers of South Africa. This could be for a 
variety of reasons. Western Cape Province has a healthy t x base and relatively high per 
capita income for South Africa. Cape Town city managers are lauded as some of the best 
in the world, let alone in South Africa. For these reasons, at least in part, the management 
of police is somewhat more effective and direct in Cape Town, thus decreasing police 
officers’ ability or desire to abuse their power, though clearly not removing it. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note how much regional differences in South Africa can 





V. Impacts of Local Governance  
 While the Department of Home Affairs represents the countrywide keystone of 
migrant interaction with the national government of S uth Africa, some migrants must 
also interact with local government bodies. In the case of souvenir sellers in Greenmarket 
Square and St. George’s Mall, this is especially the case. As mentioned in “Market 
Dynamics,” the Cape Town City Council has taken increased control of these two 
markets in recent years. Now instead of paying rent to a businessperson, stall owners 
must pay their rent to the city. The change of governance over these public spaces of 
private enterprise has had profound impacts on the relationship between migrant souvenir 
vendors and the South African state.  
 As discussed in the “Market Dynamics” chapter, the removal of Badih Chaaban 
from the market and the implementation of City Council control led to the retrenchment 
of stall ownership. For the most part, the market stall ownership has remained constant 
since the change in 2008-2009. Under Badih, the market had much more fluid turn-over. 
Badih’s management allowed some people with questionable migration status to own 
stalls in the market providing they could avoid intermittent police patrols. However, in 
order to secure a vending location from the City Council, one must now prove legal status 
(Pardon 2011; Bakary 2011; Mamadou 2011). Thus, in one fell swoop, the market 
ownership was restricted by local government only to those with legal status. This 
increased the migrant vendors’ need for the approbation of the national body which 
administers legal status: the Department of Home Affairs.  
 Only the owners of the stalls must interact with local government offices in any 
significant way. This interaction is most often thesimple act of paying the R400 per 
 78
month lease fee to the City Council (Antonio 2011; Mamadou 2011; Bakary 2011; Shana 
2011). Almost no owners have given up their places in the markets since the departure of 
Badih Chaaban (Bakary 2011; Mamadou 2011; Pardon 2011). This is due partially to the 
lack of better options, but also to the increased fear that if one leaves the market, there is 
no way of returning (Pardon 2011). Under Chaaban, ow ership was at his pleasure. He 
was never known to evict anyone for anything other an non-payment of rent. He was 
known, however, to play favorites with awarding market space (Shana 2011; Antonio 
2011). An owner could leave the market on good terms with Chaaban and conceivably 
return sometime later and jump the line of “casual” workers waiting for an open spot. 
Also, vendors with capital could purchase a market space directly from another owner, as 
long as Chaaban approved the sale. For new owners to nter the market now, they must 
register on a very long waiting list at city hall and await an opening (Antonio 2011; 
Bakary 2011). Ownership in the market has remained almost exactly the same since the 
city council takeover and will likely remain unchanged for the foreseeable future (Pardon 
2011). Competition for vending space is now so high in Cape Town that casual vendors 
regularly try to sell art and souvenirs at busy intersections, while walking amongst idling 
cars. 
 As also mentioned in the “Market Dynamics” chapter, he rents in the markets 
have dropped dramatically, but profits have dropped even more (Antonio 2011; 
Mamadou 2011; Simon 2011). This means that the small portion of profits that went to 
assistants has dropped both in amount and proportion of net profits. Because the city 
reduced the number of stalls in Greenmarket Square by as much as a third, many souvenir 
vendors and assistants lost their jobs, flooding the market with available and desperate 
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laborers willing to work for less. Additionally, because the ownership cannot be changed 
by a Chaaban or any private entity, there is no longer any profit in leaving the market by 
selling one’s stall. That combined with the ironclad necessity of having fixed, 
documented legal status to own a stall now means that assistants find it impossible to find 
upward mobility in the market. It is at once a salvation and a dead end:  Pardon’s 
“Refugee Camp” (see: Chapter 9). 
 One possibly unintended consequence of this action has been a reduced police 
presence in the market (Edmund 2011; Antonio 2011). Police may understand somewhat 
mistakenly that there is less ability for undocumented workers to be in the market. Thus, 
those in my sample group have less interaction withpolice now, reducing one of the 
major types of interactions migrants have with state bodies. Shop assistants make up the 
majority of the population of the market and are less likely to have documents. Those 
assistants who have questionable status or knowingly are without proper documentation 
are able to work and breathe a little easier in the market because of the reduced police 
presence. However, that does not mean that the governance changes have lessened the 
need for assistance to gain legal status, nor has it really improved the quality of their lives 
(Matthew 2011; Thomas 2011). It remains only a matter of time before one gets caught 
by police without documentation. 
Me: Not everybody I talked to has a paper. Is it extremely dangerous? Just a matter of time? 
Matthew: Yeah I can say it’s a matter of time. Because you never know what time they [police] 
will come there. 
Azibo: Because sometimes other guys they get catched maybe not there in the market, sometimes 
in the street.  
Edmund: Coming home. 




VI. Going “Back Door” 
 That is not to say, though, that there are not ways to prolong the inevitable. Life in 
Cape Town, even “illegal” life, finds a way. One could argue that the delays and 
inefficiencies of the DHA create a market for identity heft crimes, forgery and other 
fraud (Mawadza 2008). For instance, Edmund explained to me how friends will 
sometimes borrow each others’ papers to get started in jobs that require them. Edmund 
has never paid anyone at Home Affairs for help with papers, but as he put it “You can 
buy them from someone else. Other guy just has to be careful” (2011).  
 Adele shared with me the story of how she originally got space in Greenmarket 
Square in the early 1990s when there were very few immigrants in the market. “I did not 
have work permit before. We had a lady from South Africa working for us. She came to 
our house looking for a job. So we say ‘no we can’t help you here, but we have a 
proposition for you” (2011). Adele hired her as an assistant and put the South African 
assistant down as the titular owner of the stall and used her identification papers. Adele 
and Edmund demonstrate just two of the many ways that a little creativity can go a long 
way in advancing one’s interests in South Africa, despite having no legal status to live or 
work there. This is often a key skill in negotiating life as a foreigner in South Africa, 
where, as mentioned in the previous chapter, wait times for Department of Home Affairs 
decisions and the receipt of proper documentation on refugee status can last for years.  
 
VII. Regional Differences in Corruption   
 Relationships with police are better in Cape Town than in places like 
Johannesburg (Bomani-b 2011; Robert-b 2011; Matthew-b 2011; Edmund-b 2011; 
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Gilbert 2011; Amos 2011). Once I began addressing this difference between Cape Town 
and other South African cities, I received a wealth of consistent explanations. Paul said, 
“It’s better here in Cape Town. Life is better here in Cape Town. But in Jo’burg, if you 
walk and you have no money, you have problem. When you go out you must have 
money. It was a slight mistake you make, when the police come they not let you go until 
you give them like a 50 rand or whatever” (Paul 2011). Referring to police extortion, 
Gabriel said, “In Cape Town, it is not all that much. But what I’m hearing, it is in 
Jo’burg. But Cape Town, it is a little bit different” (Gabriel 2011). Simon related that he 
had problems with police at least once in Cape Town, but couched that in the following: 
As I see here in Cape Town, police are good. Because they can’t stop you when you are 
not doing anything wrong. If they suspect, they cansearch you. When I’m going home, 
we pass through Jo’burg. In Jo’burg, even when you are walking, the policeman they see 
that one is a foreigner. They stop you. Then they search. Even when you have your valid 
passport, everything, they search again. Especially when they see money in the pocket. 
Like 1000, 2000, they say ‘where did you get that money?’ Even when you tell them, ‘I 
work. I’m working.’ They say ‘Ah no no .You are lying. You are a drug dealer.’ No 
matter how much you protest they keep accusing you being a drug dealer. So some they 
are starting small problem. When they see the phone, you show them the phone, they say, 
‘Where is the receipt?’ You say, ‘that phone, I gotit long time. How can I give the 
receipt?’ So they end up, they need money. All the tim . But here it’s like convenient in 
Cape Town. I can leave my paper at home. They catch me without a paper. They ask me, 
they going with me, there by Home Affairs and you put a finger [in the fingerprint 
scanner] (Simon 2011) 
 
 Simon’s account displays, only partly, the difficulties caused by carrying large 
amounts of currency, because normal banking tools are not easily accessible for refugees 
and other migrants. As Landau puts it, “some police officers have come to see foreigners 
as mobile ATMs” (Landau 2005, 1127). Robert related the following about police taking 
his property. 
Robert: Ah but here in Cape Town, no one ask me for the paper. But there in Jo’burg, 
they took me after my paper was just expired like a week. Then they take me. To release 
me I give them my phone. My own phone, the one I was using…Here in Cape Town, the 
police they don’t fight against papers…like there in Jo’burg, the way we are sitting here, 
maybe if they could pass maybe three or four of them, you give them twenty bucks…The 
police in Johannesburg is just about money. 
Me: How many times did you give money to the police? 
 82
Robert: Ah you can’t count. The only one I count is my phone because is not just a 
phone. It was a nice phone. But also one thing I complain, because she was a lady. 
Maybe if it was a man, it wouldn’t have been too much. Like for where I’m sitting. 
Me: It hurt more because a lady took your phone? 
Robert: Yeah (2011) 
 
 Matthew also claimed that he was stopped five times in Johannesburg and was 
extorted money on at least one occasion. He affirmed that the police there made life very 
hard for him. He is glad to be in Cape Town with its relatively less blatantly corrupt 
police force, and in his own words he echoed the following apt sentiment from Amos. 
“Here if you find a corrupt police he gonna ask you f r money. If you find a nice one 
even if you don’t have paper, he ain’t gonna ask you n thing.” Participants expressed 
great relief at no longer living in Johannesburg, if they had in fact spent time there. The 
police in Cape Town may not be as abusive as those in Johannesburg, but comparisons to 
Johannesburg’s levels of police corruption leave much to be desired. Migrants in Cape 
Town still know the power police have, the danger th y can present, and that being 
approached by a police officer is a terrifying game of chance. One never knows if they 
are meeting a police officer with scruples or not. Thus, the specter of police harassment is 
always present.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
 Police interaction has proven to be a negative exprience for immigrants in Cape 
Town’s public tourist markets. This finding is consistent with previous research into 
migrant experience, despite Cape Town’s somewhat improved situation. The overarching 
problem amongst South African police forces seems to be a combination of historical 
precedent and contemporary pressures. The police today are descended from the most 
effective and brutal state apparatus used by the Apartheid government to enforce its 
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policies of separation and repression (Borer 2003). Police under apartheid were despised 
by much of South Africa’s population. The many black police officers complicit in the 
Apartheid abuses found themselves derided and ostracized by local black populations 
(Borer 2003; Kynoch 2003).  
 Police in the post-Apartheid era have tried to heal some of these social rifts and 
win back public support, ironically, by continuing to take advantage of their power 
(Borer 2003; Landau 2005; Samara 2011). Police havetaken advantage of migrants’ 
unpopularity to boost their reputation and make money (Crush 2008; Landau 2005; 
Landau 2009). The post-Apartheid influx of immigrants to South Africa has contributed 
to an outpouring of public sentiment directed at removing immigrants from South African 
urban spaces. The xenophobic populace sees the polic  as a key mechanism in expelling 
the surplus of foreigners. Police can capitalize on the spatialized social condition of 
migrants, much like the spatialized conditions of blacks under Apartheid, and raise 
citizen support by doing it. Thus, little incentive has been created since Apartheid for 
police members to reform in a meaningful way, even in a relatively well-managed city 
like Cape Town.  
 Despite the tacit public and governmental support for police harassment of 
migrants, police have not managed to ingratiate themselves to the South African 
citizenry. The days when police took advantage of citizens utilizing pass laws and liquor 
restrictions have long gone, but the police’s reputation for dishonesty lives on (Lodge 
1998, Kynoch 2005). Police have also been known to harass locals, especially the poor or 
homeless who have little legal recourse (Saff 1996). Corruption and mismanagement 
(outside of migrant interactions) have caused citizens to react with dismay at the 
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predation, excess and immorality of South African police (Cock 2005; Moller 2005). 
Police may be despised even more now than under apartheid (Kynoch 2005). Regardless, 
South Africans across the board find the police inept or insufficient to the task of meeting 
the local levels of crime (Landau 2005; Cock 2005).  
 The response of the citizenry has been to hire private security firms en masse 
(Cock 2005; Samara 2011). Ironically, these security fi ms usually look no further than 
the legions of cheap, hard-working foreigners afoot t  staff their enterprise. As anyone 
can see walking down busier streets in Cape Town, the day-to-day security needs of the 
city are being met largely by francophone Congolese migrants. A few of the friends I 
made who occupied such positions had combat experienc  in the eastern Congo, Uganda 
and Rwanda. Some of these friendly men smilingly told me of the blood they had shed 
and the atrocities they had participated in during the wars of Central Africa. Yet, 
ironically, their services seem to add value by keeping Cape Town residents safer than 
the police do alone. Despite the expense, security guards in South Africa now far 
outnumber police officers. South Africans now also resort more often to gun ownership 
and vigilantism (Cock 2005), especially amongst those groups that are too poor to afford 
commoditized security.  
 Loren Landau points out that in attempting to meet its popular anti-foreigner 
mandate, South African government apparatuses oftenknowingly exceed their legal 
powers with impunity. After a string of corruption charges in the years just after 
democratization, the penalties for corrupt and abusive behavior toward immigrants have 
abated. An eighth of all policemen were charged with a crime in 1996, but from this 
purge, no sort of political will emerged to stop police corruption regarding migrants 
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(Adepoju 2003). This clearly contributes to the police force’s attitude toward personal 
enrichment via corrupt practice. South Africa’s creation of what Landau calls “zones of 
legal exception” conform to a larger global pattern whereby liberal governments 
compromise their foundational principles in order to combat unwanted immigration 
(Landau 2005). The trouble with this exception to the rule of law is that it also allows 
police to abuse its citizenry on the suspicion of conducting “anti-immigration” raids, 
much like authorities in the West increasingly step on civil liberties in the name of 
preventing terrorism. South Africa’s suspension of its “own laws with regard to non-
nationals has, in turn, generated a set of officially nd socially sanctioned practices that 
are undermining all urban residents' ability to exercise their civil and political rights” 
(Landau 2005, 1119). 
 Tacit acceptance of immigrant harassment allows police resources to be expended 
that cannot then be utilized to lessen crime. Policies of extra-legality drive migrants into 
shadow economies, lessening the state’s ability to ex ract tax revenue and also lessening 
migrants’ ability to hire local employees and boost employment. The extra-legal police 
treatment of foreigners poses a threat to the liberties of the citizenry. Yet, African 
migrants continue to be persecuted by the South African state, indeed “acting on behalf 
of its citizens” (Landau 2005, 1116). The social and political underpinnings of this 
“extra-legal exception” by which the State actually limits its prosperity and the reach of 
its sovereignty, can only be fully understood by understanding the larger scope of the 
relationship between migrants and South African society. In the next chapter I examine 
this issue in greater depth and examine the larger rol  of South African society in the 
lived daily experiences of African migrants in South Africa. 
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Chapter 6. Migrants and Society 
 
 
…That’s the thing about xenophobia my friend, it will never end.  
It’s a very complicated thing -- Paul 
 
I. Xenophobia in South Africa 
 The circumstances of migrant life in South Africa shape not only quotidian 
experience but collect themselves into numinous and intangible barriers that corral the 
accessibility and livability of South African space. Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
the relationships migrants have with South African society. Many South Africans harbor 
a severe dislike of foreigners, particularly Africans (Modi 2003; Crush & Pendleton 
2004). Scholars have found common stereotypes justifying this dislike. Immigrants, for 
instance, are purported to be violent, arrogant, and criminally bent (Adepoju 2003; 
Dodson and Oelofse 2002; McDonald 2002; Sinclair 1999). Immigrants are accused of 
taking precious few jobs in a country with near forty percent unemployment and dragging 
down service delivery and development (Crush 2000; Dodson and Oelofse 2002; Hansen 
et al. 2009; Landau 2006; Maharaj 2001; McDonald 2002; Solomon 2005; Steenkamp 
2009). The largely male immigrant populations are also ccused of “stealing” South 
African women (Dodson and Oelofse 2002). On a related note, many South Africans 
believe African migrants to be responsible for bringing diseases like HIV/AIDS to South 
Africa (Anderson 2006; Dodson and Oelofse 2002; McDonald 2002). In the opinion of 
most South Africans, immigrants number far too many d should all be deported 
(Anderson 2006; Crush 2008). Little distinction is made between legal and illegal 
resident foreigners (Anderson 2006; Dodson and Oelofs  2002; Shea 2008). Draconian 
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measures like pass laws that restrict geographic move ent based on identity factors, 
eerily reminiscent of Apartheid, are also strongly favored (Crush 2000; Crush 2008).  
 Anti-migrant sentiment, often referred to as “xenoph bia”, routinely becomes 
violent. In one example, in May 2008, a notable serie  of xenophobic attacks left over 60 
migrants dead and many more displaced. Many homes and tores were looted and 
burned. The most alarming aspect of these attacks was their rapid spread nationwide 
(Steenkamp 2009). Anti-foreigner sentiment has steadily grown in government and civil 
society since 1994, as have violent attacks (Crush 2008; Murray 2003). Unless vast 
measures are taken, which is extremely doubtful, large-scale xenophobic violence is 
likely to occur repeatedly in the future (Crush 2008). In fact, this hostility “towards 
foreigners has become one of the most significant features of post-apartheid South 
African society” (Sinclair 1999, 466). In sum, South Africans are one of the most 
prejudiced and antagonistic populations towards foreigners (Adepoju 2003; Crush 2008; 
Steenkamp 2009).  
 All migrants are aware of and must deal with the de p-seated hostility of South 
Africans (Shea 2008; Sinclair 1999). Migrants’ opportunities, unlike those of South 
Africans, are heavily affected by their diminished ability to interact safely with locals on 
a daily basis (McDonald 2002). In Shea’s dissertation’s findings (as in Warner & 
Finchilescu 2003 and this study), most respondents reported commonly experiencing 
verbal abuse (Shea 2008). Legal, illegal and refugee migrants all express similar 
treatment, as assailants make little or no distinctio  between them (Sinclair 1999). Before 
field work, I hypothesized that poor treatment, verbal and physical attacks, and all of the 
resulting fears and insecurities would likely play a large role in the development of 
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migrants’ survival strategies in South Africa. As understanding these survival strategies is 
a main focus of my study, I sought to address this issue in interviews, focus groups and 
casual conversation with African migrants.  
 Scholarly attention has usually been paid to South African xenophobia via South 
African perceptions and their contribution to the phenomenon. As Warner and 
Finchilescu aptly point out, “[T]here is comparatively little research on how foreigners, 
particularly refugees, experience this prejudice. The traditional lack of emphasis on the 
targets' perspective has resulted in a bias towards un erstanding the perpetrators rather 
than the targets of prejudice” (2003, 36). I believe that the traditional bent toward 
perpetrators ignores the relational and iterative processes that contribute to social 
phenomena. A focus on migrant perspectives and agency displays how targets of 
prejudicial abuse “manage aspects of their social wor d rather than how they are only 
manipulated by the prejudice of others” (Swim et al, 1998:38, quoted in Warner and 
Finchilescu 2003). In this project, therefore, I shift t e discussion of xenophobia to 
incorporate the lived experiences of migrants negotiating this obstacle to their survival. In 
doing so, I am better able to locate where and how migrants’ strategies shape social and 
material space within dialectical processes shaping South African (primarily urban) 
space.  
 
II. Migrants’ Experiences of Society 
 Participants conveyed a dizzying array of negative experiences with South 
African society. These experiences result largely from the considerable anti-foreigner 
sentiment present in South Africa. Migrants are certainly aware of this xenophobic 
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sentiment and shared a surprising number of reasoned arguments for why they thought it 
existed. Many participants had been in South Africa during the large-scale xenophobic 
manifestation of May, 2008. Their stories informed and confirmed my hypotheses. Yet, 
to a person, participants conveyed a sense of how te menacing presence of xenophobia 
remains deeply entrenched in their everyday lives as both fearful memory and continuing 
violence. For many participants, there is no real divide between the curses thrown at them 
on the train and the way they feel treated by the police or DHA (Department of Home 
Affairs) bureaucrats (Amos 2011). Many migrants experience these interactions as social 
interactions, even if they are largely based on state policies. This stems from a 
recognition that policy is inevitably based on similar social/historical foundations. I wish 
to clarify that though I have split the discussion of state and society into separate chapters 
for the sake of organization, I conclude, as do my participants, that the obstacles to 
survival of daily migrant life in South Africa are more connected and overlapping than 
not. Seemingly disparate obstacles of state and society are really interwoven threads 
stemming from the same sad tapestry of South African social and political culture.  
 When asked about relationships with South Africans, participants began by 
expressing that South Africans simply did not like foreigners (Amos 2011; Shana 2011; 
Andrew 2011; Ibrahim 2011). “I think they are bad if you jump their borders. Especially 
if you want to go out with their ladies. But they hate some foreigners, people from here. 
They hate some foreigners” (Blessing 2011). “People in South Africa don’t like you. 
They think you have lots of money or something” (Bakary 2011). “I tell you something, 
till now, because they’ve got legacy against the for igners. Especially of the Apartheid. 
Then they treat us in a xenophobic way” (Ibrahim 2011). For many immigrants, like 
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Blessing and Ibrahim, xenophobia is actually the largest problem for foreigners trying to 
make a living in South Africa. 
 When asked to compare Malawi to South Africa, Azibo said, “Yeah it’s more 
dangerous here. Because these people, they don’t like foreigners especially. The people 
from South Africa, they don’t like foreigners” (2011). Participants felt discriminated 
against at many levels of society (Gabriel 2011: Ibrahim 2011; Issa 2011). Warner and 
Finchilescu noted that “Participants felt that their efforts to make a life for themselves in 
South Africa were blocked. They attributed their difficulties to the fact that they are 
foreign, rather than to any other factor. Participants felt that being foreign was often an 
instant barrier to employment” (2003, 38). Many of my participants expressed such ideas, 
telling stories of their job searches and working experiences, from before working in the 
market (Adele 2011; Willie 2011; Paul 2011; Robert 2011). Canaan and Ibrahim for 
example were journalists in their home countries of Zimbabwe and Sudan respectively. 
Both felt that they would have had no problem finding work in journalism in South 
Africa if it were not for xenophobic discrimination (2011).  
 Migrants also encounter harassment and abuse from a variety of societal actors. 
Matthew, in explaining why he did not think that South Africa was a good place for 
foreigners, said, 
Because it’s like intimidation. Even like when it comes to the land lord. Like wherever I 
was staying, I was having problems with the landlords. It’s like the month is finished. 
You are paying like 500 rand plus electricity. Come onth end, you make the rent. They 
are still giving you problems. After two days they say, ‘No electricity is finished, you 
have to give us extra money for electricity!’ Maybe th y see you coming from work, you 
are carrying something. They are like ‘Why are you buying your own? You are supposed 
to buy something for us.’ These things. Yeah it’s hectic (2011). 
 
 In the working world of the market, street vendors experience even higher 
visibility than the average foreigner (Klotz 2000). This was one reason I originally chose 
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to study street vendors, as it stands to reason then that public vendors have valuable 
insights into the public manifestations of xenophobia, not only the interpersonal. 
Participants largely reported experiencing verbal att cks in the market on at least one or 
often many occasions. Canaan, perhaps because he is new to the market, felt safer in the 
market because of being around so many other foreigners. However, Antonio, a 
Greenmarket Square veteran, told it differently. “Even here in the market. Even those 
who we have working here, pushing the stuff. These people come to you and say, ‘Listen, 
these stuff will be only for us. You are stealing our jobs! But this is our stuff for money!’ 
Antonio would respond to them, “Nobody gave us money to start our business here!” 
which would do nothing to dissuade aggressors. “They say no, these one are ours!” 
(Antonio 2011). Thus, Antonio explains, they are targeted for theft because angry locals 
feel entitled to the goods in the market. Antonio said that, after foreigners stopped hiring 
locals, and began hiring only foreigners as pushers and assistants, and began renting 
storage space only from foreigners, the thefts diminished greatly. Though, sadly, theft 
from the stalls in the market still happens. Adele also mentioned how very few migrants 
in the market hire South African assistants anymore because they are known to pocket 
profits and merchandise while owners are away. “When you come ask about it, they are 
aggressive!” (Adele 2011).  
 Antonio’s wife Helena, like many others, gave examples of the public insults and 
unkind words that are thrown at migrants. “Some they call you names, ‘Go back to your 
country!” she laughed. “Yes, one day we gonna go back!” (2011). “Each and every day 
you can face it,” said Issa from Senegal. “You can be walking in the street, and 
sometimes you can see it – evil eyes. That can talk. Instead of like telling you straight 
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that like ‘I don’t like you. Go back to your country!’ you see like evil eyes that do that to 
you” (2011). Adele said that her first job in South Africa was cashiering at a SPAR 
supermarket. Despite how much she needed the employent, she left after two days 
because of the abuse she received from co-workers (2011). Blessing says that he has felt 
especially insulted and abused in restaurants and shops in Cape Town (2011). It seems 
not to have mattered to attackers that Issa, Adele, Helena and Blessing are all legal 
entrants and residents of South Africa. This supports the hypothesis that “Popular 
reactions rarely take into account the migrant's legal status. Even legal residents, 
including asylum seekers who have obtained the right to work, remain subject to attack” 
(Klotz 2000, 839).  
 
III. Naming as Norming 
 Amakwerekwere is one of the insults of choice that locals throw at foreigners. It is 
a Xhosa word technically meaning “foreigner.” It is a ort of onomatopoeia mimicking 
the sound of foreign speech. It is thus similar in etymology to the English word 
“barbarian,” and it carries the same highly pejorative connotations. As Warner and 
Finchilescu described it and its role in their study, “Many participants mentioned that 
speaking their own language, or being unable to speak a South African language, made it 
easy for South Africans to identify them as being foreign” (2003,38). “If they see you are 
foreigner,” one of their participants said, “you are “kwerekwere.” [They] give the name 
for all foreigners, "kwerekwere” (2003, 38). Paul, from my study, said, “They call us 
Kwerekwere. Just the name itself, it insults you. It’s like you are not one of them” (Paul 
2011). “I never saw this in my country when I was there,” Adele assured me. “We don’t 
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have the time. But here they will ask you even by the taxi. You can sit with someone. 
‘Are you amakwerekere?”  You can feel only bad, because they treat you like you are not 
from here (Adele 2011).  To understand the power that a word like amakwerekwere can 
have, I turn to Murray’s argument that naming is a kind of norming. “Names are an 
integral part of both a symbolic and material order that confers legitimacy on those with 
the power to affix labels to others, and, conversely, de-legitimates those burdened with 
bearing the stigma of “otherness” (2003, 447). Thus, those who harbor xenophobic fears 
utilize such appellations to designate and exclude foreigners from enjoying membership 
benefits of community and social services in South Africa, while simultaneously 
buttressing their own sense of entitlement. This style of norming also functions at a more 
violent level that derogatorily categorizes those se n as being at fault in bringing about an 
imminent destruction of South Africa. To the majority of migrants like Adele, the 
constant reminders of being a foreigner are incredibly shaming, hurtful and 
disenchanting. Hurtful insults, though very important to recognize, are clearly less 
frightening than the deeper ramifications of more int nse forms of norming.
 Migrants primarily fear the more violent expressions of these insults and thefts. 
Helena shared her horror at seeing on the news that three Zimbabweans were killed in 
their houses in Polokwane the night before I interviewed her. “They are violent,” Andrew 
said referring to South Africans. “Yeah that they are violent. They don’t have a second 
thought you see. They just do what comes up in their mind. Everybody says that. I am not 
the only one you have interviewed!” (2011). Robert r lated that he had been stabbed in 
Johannesburg, which prompted him to move to Cape Town. He showed me a long, 
jagged scar near his jugular. Robert was visiting his brother at a residence inhabited by 
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many foreigners. As he went to open the front door a man jumped out of the shadows and 
slashed at Robert’s neck with a broken beer bottle. As he lay on the ground bleeding 
profusely from the neck, the assailant left without taking anything from him. Crime in 
Johannesburg is nothing novel, and had the assailant taken Robert’s watch, cell phone or 
wallet, it would be easier to suspect it may have be n simple robbery, perhaps unrelated 
to the fact that Robert was apparently a foreigner.   
 Robert’s tale resonated with those of many other participants. “They [South 
Africans] come and steal and rob and kill you!” Bomani said. “Many many people. Not 
like myself, but many many people. Many people…They come, they beat them 
[foreigners], even they kill them.” Two of Bomani’s Malawian friends had been killed in 
the last year alone (2011). “Yeah,” Matthew echoed in his interview, “maybe if you are 
walking on the streets, like youngsters, like guys on the streets, they ask you maybe ‘Buy 
me cigarettes. Buy me beer,’ you see. If you say, ‘No. I don’t have money,’ maybe they 
will come. They will close on you. They will search you. Then they get the money. 
Whatever amount they get in your pocket they will take it.” Matthew had been robbed on 
the street but had also seen his house broken into and all his clothes and valuables stolen 
(2011). “Our brother in law, they kill him for one rand. They ask him one rand and he 
refuse. They say ‘We know you. You are selling the stuff, always passing here with the 
stuff. Give us one rand.’ And he says, ‘I don’t have.’ And they kill him. They take it out, 
all the money he was with. And we buried him here” (Adele 2011).  
Simon: One of our friends, some they cut him. They knife him. They stab him with the 
knife.  
Me: They killed him? 
Simon: Yeah he passed away there. He was going to buy like beef. He had R100 then the 
time he buy a beef, so he put it back, the change. So they didn’t ask him even the change. 
They stab him. Then they take it. So they kill him because of R47. And the other one, he 
used to do those paintings of animals (points to Bakary’s stand) He passed away. He’s 
from Zimbabwe. He passed away in 2005. I’m sure he was talking to the girls. So the 
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other guys, those Xhosa guys, they just say, ‘Ah, now he’s going to take our girls.’ Then 
they stab him. Fungai was his name (2011). 
 
 
IV. Locating the Source of Xenophobia 
 Jonathan Crush argues the importance of recognizing scale and local difference in 
any study, but in the particular case of xenophobia, there is strong evidence that 
xenophobia is a similar factor over space and a variety of social characteristics (2000). 
Thus, xenophobia is not the condition of a “lunatic fringe,” but the majority (Crush 2008, 
7). Specifically, he found the highest levels of xenophobia amongst the richest and 
poorest classes, Afrikaans, Xhosa, and Zulu speakers by language, and Cape Coloureds 
by race, with high levels also in blacks and whites (Crush 2008). This might surprise my 
participants who felt most at ease with Cape Coloureds. Studying this contradiction in 
findings might be a fruitful enterprise in the future. In the meantime, and more 
importantly, many scholars and my participants agree that the most violent acts have 
unanimously been attributed to poor blacks who apper to hold their views more 
vehemently than any other group (Steenkamp 2009; Warner nd Finchilescu 2003; Crush 
2000, 2008; McDonald 2002), though perhaps not as popularly if Crush is correct.  
 Participants indeed related that not all South Africans treated them the same. Of 
these, coloureds were mentioned as being the easiest to be around, and blacks the hardest, 
with whites somewhere in the middle (Shana 2011; Gilbert 2011; Simon 2011). Warner 
and Finchilescu’s (2003) study revealed this same ass rtion amongst their study group. In 
the focus group I facilitated with Malawian assistants, they unanimously asserted that the 
most dangerous form of xenophobia comes from black people. They clarified further that 
it comes from blacks all across South Africa, in their experience, not merely the Xhosas 
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who happen to be the largest African ethnic group in Cape Town. “Me I can tell you the 
nicest people I know are coloured people. They never talk of racist, saying ‘you are a 
foreigner and that’. Few of them, they are bad” (Amos 2011). Bakary from Senegal said 
that he thought all South African racial groups equally troublesome, yet he admitted 
preference for living near coloureds or whites rather t an blacks (2011). “Really, 
sometimes it is very bad, because South African people they don’t like other people. 
Most especially the black people” Pascal told me. “It’s a difficult to live with them” 
(2011). “Ah, to my side,” Simon said, “the nice peole are the coloureds…Some, they are 
good.” However, as Simon clarified, only educated coloureds are relatively kind to 
foreigners, and even more educated Xhosas can be too (2011). In their analyses of the 
phenomenon of xenophobia, many participants referenc d the issue of education, as I 
discuss later.  
 As an anecdotal, yet instructive, aside, one day I was approached by a coloured, 
middle-aged security guard who had seen me in the market consistently for some time. 
He cheerfully introduced himself as Kramer, and asked a bit about me and what I was 
doing in the market. I told him that I was from the United States and was working on a 
research project about migration in South Africa. I had seen this security guard around 
the market for weeks, and would continue to see him until I left. He could often be seen 
talking, laughing and animatedly joking with market workers. So when he opened his 
mouth I expected some sort of incisive social commentary on the ills of the South African 
penchant for xenophobia. “Ahh, there is a real big problem with the refugees,” he said, 
and I nodded expectantly. “They all need to go! Too many of them. They are swarming in 
this county and not being stopped.” 
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 I noticed the tone of his voice, the frustration, the use of words like “swarm” as if 
migrants were locusts eating up fields.  
 “Do you mean refugees or all migrants?”  
 “All of them. They are all refugees!” He swept hisarm in a wide arc over the 
market.   
 “So, what do you think should be done?” I asked.  
 “They are criminals! We should get rid of the lot of them. They take up jobs. 
They bring drugs into the country. We must stop them. But the government isn’t doing 
enough about it.”  
 This conversation struck me, because it was directly in line with what Crush had 
reported about coloured communities actually harboring a great deal of xenophobic 
sentiment, though they do not often express it violently, or in Kramer’s case, even 
directly to migrants. Kramer makes his wage protecting migrants, yet deeply holds 
xenophobic sentiment, which in the aggregate builds structural cultural barriers to 
migrant advancement and self-fulfillment. At the same time, migrants may never know it, 
because he jokes with them every day under a shade tree. If a jovial and kind man like 
Kramer who actually knows migrants personally could hold such beliefs, I wondered to 
myself, then how much more vehemently could they be held by the large number of 
South Africans, primarily blacks, with less experienc  of foreigners, few or no friends 
outside of their ethnic group or social circle -- peo le living in poverty with little to lose 
and no prospects for their own future? How dangerous could such people unwittingly be 
to migrants and to peace and justice in South Africa? 
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 When asked where anti-foreigner sentiment was felt or experienced most 
strongly, I received a number of responses. Foremost in the minds of migrants I talked 
with, were the “locations” or former townships, whic  are hotbeds of xenophobia. I 
devote the next chapter to this issue, so I will be bri f here. Apart from townships, 
migrants referenced feeling relatively safe in the City Bowl, though many told of 
negative experiences there too. The testimony of those like Ibrahim, Antonio and Issa, 
veterans who had perceived numerous dirty looks and been harassed or abused in the 
city, showed that the urban center of Cape Town was certainly not free of xenophobic 
expressions. “[E]ven if it is the town, they can do the same things here” (Issa 2011). 
“You feel it in any public place” (Ibrahim 2011). However, I noticed a clear pattern that 
most urban or peri-urban expression of anti-foreignr sentiment (excluding that in 
predominantly black townships) had been encountered while using public transport. “If I 
am on the train going from Khayelitsha to Cape Town, if you speak and you are a 
foreigner, they just look at you. Maybe they start speaking bad about you” (Oliver 2011). 
“But the moment you go there in the train, you speak your mother tongue, they gonna say 
“Hey amakwerekwere!” (Shana 2011).  
 “In a taxi…they try to treat you in a rude way, you got me? They don’t know you 
are educated. Bus driver always used to, because we don’t talk their language. Our accent 
also, when we talk, is different. You see? Because the English, they talk it in their own 
way. And also our features also a little bit different” (Ibrahim 2011).  
 Ibrahim is a case study all by himself. Of all participants, he has been in South 
Africa the longest, is one of two to have received citizenship, claims to have been the first 
migrant to be awarded a post-apartheid refugee status (somewhat convincingly I might 
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add), and he has had, by far, the most interaction w th the South African government 
apparatus, through a number of different offices. These interactions have left him certain 
that xenophobia infects South African society so thickly that it causes him to be 
mistreated both systemically and by individual burea crats. “I am a citizen, but there I 
go…for example I got to apply for a house. Now is 14 years. They didn’t give me a 
house. But some people they come from Transkei 5 years, 3 years, they give them. They 
didn’t give me a house. You feel the segregation.” Ibrahim here is referencing the South 
African government programs that ostensibly have endeavored to give every South 
African a house (see Ibrahim’s original application f r housing dated from 1997 in the 
appendices).  
I tell you, they don’t care about us, completely! I tell you, whenever I go to the 
government, when I want something normal, because you must have relationship with the 
government if you are a citizen, They will ask, ‘Where you from?’ Because your accent. I 
say ‘Why you ask me where I’m from? I come to you, this is my I.D. You see I am 
citizen!’ They ask you, ‘Where you from?’ and ‘How long you are here?’ You see this 
all. I tell you here in this country they never ever r spect foreigner! (Ibrahim 2011). 
 
 Many participants, if not all, were familiar with e term xenophobia, which is far 
more common parlance in South Africa than many other English-speaking countries. Yet, 
Ibrahim was one of the few who used it to reference the phenomenon of generally 
pervasive anti-foreigner sentiment. For most participants however, the word 
“xenophobia” elicits memories of the violent, large-scale anti-foreigner uprisings in mid-
2008. 
 
V. The “Big” Xenophobia  
 In May 2008, a riot erupted amongst poor black South Africans in Alexandra, a 
township just outside of Johannesburg. The riot rapidly turned into a bloody bout of anti-
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immigrant mob violence. Dozens of migrants were left d ad or wounded. If this were not 
bad enough, these mob attacks and riots spread like wildfire through Gauteng Province 
and then throughout the entire country in the coming days and weeks (Steenkamp 2009). 
In the end, dozens of African migrants, and South Africans thought to be migrants, had 
been stabbed, burned or beaten to death, with hundreds more wounded. Untold numbers 
saw possessions stolen or otherwise harmed. Cape Town’s migrant population was not 
spared. Most participants in my study were directly impacted at some level by the 
violence. Even for the few who escaped relatively unscathed, the event’s terrifyingly 
rapid spread and violent nature remain fixed in their imaginations of the landscape in 
which they live.  
 When riots erupted, Edmund ran from his home in Khayelitsha and slept outside 
of the police station in Milnerton for many days until it was somewhat safer to return. 
Edmund went back once to pick up his things and immediately moved to Delft, a 
township similar in poverty (and affordability) to Khayelitsha, but with more foreign 
population (2011). Pardon lives in a safer part of town, but he housed a group of friends 
during the crisis after a foreigner was killed in front of their shack. Bomani and Alex had 
all their possessions stolen from their homes. Theft was the most common abuse 
participants experienced (Paul 2011).  
 On the second day of the “big” xenophobia in May 2008, Ibrahim said that the 
home he lived in, in Woodstock, with his two children was robbed by many blacks. 
“They target me because I am a foreigner. Nobody can protect me, even the police. I 
went to the police. The police don’t care about me.” H  showed me the doctor’s report 
from after the attack which shows where he suffered physical damage from the beating he 
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took during the robbery. He lost everything he owned, including clothes, bedding, 
appliances, food, and his kids’ possessions. “When I asked the neighbors they said ‘Oh, 
we thought you were moving and some people they come here and take the stuff.” 
Ibrahim had a hard time buying his South African neighbor’s excuses for watching the 
attack and doing nothing. “You see? It’s just a conspiracy!” Ibrahim had to spend his 
little remaining money to buy clothes and food for his children. He was not able to pay 
his rent that month and was evicted. He received help from a government social worker 
who found a government facility to temporarily house and feed his children. Much to 
Ibrahim’s consternation, however, after he got back on his feet, the government refused 
to give his children back. Having been a mayor in Sudan, Ibrahim luckily had the 
bureaucratic savvy to parlay the situation to his advantage. He eventually got his children 
moved, at government expense, to Scalabrini House, an international NGO devoted to 
assisting immigrants. Ibrahim freely admits that they receive a better life there than he 
could provide them. “I take bad situation, xenophobia situation, you see? I am clever you 
see? I make South African government to pay for my children’s upbringing after they 
take them from me. Now I see them once or twice a week and take them for ice cream 
and help with their homework or something” (Ibrahim 2011b). 
 Participants’ usage of the word xenophobia to refer mostly to the events of May-
June 2008 does not meant that they do not recognize the wider phenomenon nor consider 
it contained in a distinct time period. Bomani tried to express it this way: 
[T]hat one was like, eh, what can I say, you know t like come out to the public to show 
people. But before, people had been killed. They had been robbed. They had been….that 
one was like for people to know now. Yeah this is the reality, before, and even now. 
Have you heard about the Somalians? In Milnerton? They robbed them about 200 houses. 
It was two weeks ago. They beat them. So yeah, it still happens. But that one was general, 




 To paraphrase Azibo’s words, the xenophobia is there, just dormant, like a 
volcano that grumbles and spurts each day, but is preparing to erupt once again. “But 
they just hide. They hide” (Azibo 2011). Emmanuel is still worried about such an 
eruption, “Because they can anytime do it again. See th se people, I don’t know what’s 
wrong with them upstairs.” Emmanuel believes that te lead-up to the World Cup 
relieved some of the economic pressures on local South Africans involved in the vast 
array of construction projects. Those projects are gone now and Emmanuel is rightly 
concerned that the post-World Cup employment situation for South Africans will be as 
bleak as before, possibly giving rise to new tensio ver old resource struggles. He 
understands some isiXhosa and is troubled by the things he hears on the train to and from 
town. “So, ahhh you can just think that they can maybe do it again. So here is maybe not 
stable, because anytime can be happening” (Emmanuel 2011).  
 Scholars widely agree with Bomani’s assessment that the outbursts of 2008 were 
only a small demonstration of widely held anger, which still seethes below the surface. 
Part of the reason, as Landau and Segatti point out, is that the xenophobic attacks of 2008 
failed to illicit a strong governmental response or to unseat many policy makers from 
their denial of xenophobia (2008). They cite then-president Thabo Mbeki’s claim that the 
events of May, 2008 were merely an isolated bout of criminal violence. Even the South 
African Human Rights Commission, the branch of government one could assume would 
be the first to take interest in xenophobia, was hesitant to make any sort of investigation 
into the 2008 riots. “There is no equality here. There is no equality. There is no human 
rights,” Ibrahim told me. “Even if you go to the Human Rights [Commission] -- I go 
more than four times -- you find Xhosa peoples. They don’t care about you or your case. 
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Even the Human Rights here, they got a office here. I go there four or five times. They 
don’t care! I tell you because is the reality” (2011). Despite the wide abody of scholarly 
evidence showing that xenophobia not only exists at a wide scale, but is also deeply 
entrenched in South African society, politicians and media outlets continue to ignore the 
issue, or worse, many continue to propagate factually b seless and inflammatory 
xenophobic ideas (Murray 2003; Danso & McDonald 2001).  
 I now turn to discuss the various strands of South African socio-political history 
that help to explain xenophobia. I pay particular attention to migrant perspectives, 
because they are widely underrepresented in scholarly wo k, especially those attempting 
to understand xenophobia and anti-immigrant political struggle. However helpful this is 
to building upon the literature regarding xenophobia, my main reason for doing so is to 
locate the primary factors that migrants perceive to be acting upon them through time and 
space. Understanding how migrants perceive the causal factors of such a daily obstacle to 
survival in South Africa is a necessary foundation  understanding the tactics migrants 
create and employ to manage their daily survival.  
 
VI. Migrant Explanations of Xenophobia  
 It was fascinating to me to see the array of explanatio s participants gave for the 
general phenomenon and specific eruptions of xenophobia. Proximal explanations 
included the classic accusations made by locals that foreigners take jobs, bring crime and 
steal South African women. Theories regarding the ultimate causes of xenophobia offered 
by participants were often profound critiques, and revolved around ideas of culturally 
ingrained violence, a lack of education for blacks and the resulting smaller world views, 
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and Apartheid abuses to black South Africans. In general, I found, as Warner and 
Finchilescu did, that “Participants felt bewildered by the hostility they experienced from 
black South Africans. They expected them to be empathetic as they had also experienced 
persecution and oppression” (2008). In a 2010 interview regarding African perceptions of 
South Africa, Makame Muhajir, a fellow PhD student at he University of Kansas hailing 
from Tanzania, related to me that many Africans feel not only bewildered but deeply hurt 
by South African xenophobia. “We gave refuge to their ANC leaders during the 
Apartheid. If it were not for our help, South Africa would not exist as a free and 
democratic society as it does today. We are brothers and sisters. And then they treat our 
people like this!” 
 Sadly, despite this history of remarkable African co tribution to the Apartheid 
struggle, South Africans seem more absorbed with the notion that immigrants are now 
taking their jobs (Azibo 2011; Blessing 2011; Abdou 2011; Touba 2011; Bakary 2011; 
Paul 2011; Andrew 2011). Bomani explained, “If you are from home and you start job 
here, they can see how you change and prosper…[T]o them, they feel bad inside. 
Because it’s their country, but you can overtake them. You can have things which they 
don’t have. Then they feel jealous inside” (2011). Andrew said, “So they get jealous and 
they say mean things and look for a way to fight with you…[T]hey cry foul that 
foreigners are coming too much in their country. They’re taking their jobs. But us we put 
it in this perspective: If foreigners, they come here, they take your job, ‘Why?’ you 
should ask yourself. ‘Why are they taking our jobs? Yeah I think they should ask 
themselves” (2011). Foreigners often answer questions l ke Andrew’s with accusations 
that South African blacks, in particular, are lazy. “Then they hate you for maybe for 
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success. Maybe they hate you for that. But look my brother, I am working in the rain.” 
Paul waved at the torrential downpour from which we were (rather unsuccessfully) taking 
shelter under a rickety café umbrella in Saint Georg ’s Mall. “You know they are there 
sleeping…They do not like to work like us. Because for igners, they like to work. So, 
because us we like to work, that’s why they hate us” (Paul 2011).  
 Numerous participants referenced that South Africans who are willing to take a 
job are supposedly notorious for working only a couple of days before quitting (Gilbert 
2011; Amos 2011; Paul 2011; Andrew 2011; Simon 2011). “So maybe you give him job 
today. He can work today, and tomorrow he don’t want to come” (Amos 2011). This 
affects hiring by foreign business owners, but also by local employers. “[Locals] get a 
little money and then drop off. So the white people here, if they need someone to work 
for them they use only foreigners. They know he needs to work. He needs money. South 
Africans they work only three days and then take their money” (Amos 2011). The well-
documented South African entrepreneurial preference for migrant workers is an ironic 
contributor to the widespread xenophobia.  
 Adele witnessed many South Africans being given preferential treatment in stall 
assignment in the old Greenmarket Square of the early 90’s. “The problem is they are 
lazy. They got a spot when they were giving them away. They don’t like to pay. Too 
much things for mahala. Even house” (Adele 2011). I asked Adele what m hala meant. 
She responded with the following critique: 
Mahala is for nothing. They like house for mahala, for nothing. They must build for them 
house by government. Which, that thing, we didn’t kow in our country. Government 
must give you house? No!. You must work! You must sweat to get money for buy your 
house. But for them they want something free, free, free, free, free! Which is not good  
for them, but is good for us because they are lazy (Adele 2011). 
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Adele’s message of hard work and personal responsibility resonate with numerous other 
accounts from participants. 
 Another common complaint is that foreigners take South African wives (Paul 
2011; Ibrahim; Touba 2011; Warner and Finchilescu 2003). “Then the women, they go to 
these foreigners, because they offer for them beers, money. Because they got children 
from [foreigners], they live nicely. But you see, [South Africans] are not working. Most 
of them they are dependent on women. In this country you see it a lot, even coloured and 
black, they depend on the woman” (Ibrahim 2011). Warner and Finchilescu’s participants 
added that South African women often find foreigners to be more kind and relationally 
faithful, as opposed to their view that South African husbands are adulterous and abusive 
(2003). This attention to “stealing women” is likely closely related to the notion that 
immigrants can be blamed for South Africa’s AIDS epid mic (Paul 2011).  
 South Africans are seen by migrants as problematically violent by nature (Andrew 
2011; Paul 2011). “Yeah that they are violent. They don’t have a second thought you see. 
They just do what comes up in their mind. Everybody sa s that. I am not the only one 
you have interviewed. Maybe you have interviewed many people” (Andrew 2011). The 
ultimate causes of these character defects, to which m grants pin South African social 
problems, revolves around the idea that locals are a problem because that they have been 
confined into small areas their whole lives without the ability to travel, not even 
domestically. Additionally, their worldview is supposedly small because of government 
propaganda and lacks in education (Andrew 2011; Samba 2011; Issa 2011; Paul 2011; 
Antonio 2011). “Maybe it is the way they teach them from when they was young. Like 
other people from other place, they are animals, or things like this” (Pascal 2011).  
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 As many participants noted, xenophobia of this magnitude is not produced only 
by the political need for a scapegoat, but is historically rooted. Lenri Shea hypothesizes 
that “The myth [of xenophobia] is born out of the struggle against Apartheid and the fact 
that the majority of South Africans were disenfranchised. Again, it is interesting that this 
also forms part of the culture of exclusion and the criteria of who belongs where” (2008, 
120). Crush (2001, 7) adds that “Apartheid systematically entrenched racial 
discrimination in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life,” and that, 
because of this history, “South Africa is still one of the most race-conscious countries in 
the world.” Steenkamp offers that “South Africans still ee themselves as apart from the 
rest of Africa, as exceptional, and therefore struggle to identify with other Africans” 
(2009, 443). Indeed, one of the saddest legacies of Apartheid is that it did not just 
separate white from black for decades, it separated South Africa from Africa (Schroeder 
2012). It is not uncommon to hear South Africans refer to a trip north as “Going up to 
‘Africa’”. This historical disjuncture is helpful in understanding the entrenched divisions 
that exist between peoples that are rather alike in ma y ways, ethnically, culturally or 
otherwise.  
I think the reason for it, the government they didn’t eliver for them. The ANC, after they 
come for 1994, they didn’t deliver for the people. They didn’t change their life. They just 
promised them housing, jobs and this. But then the people, the foreigners who come here, 
most of them they’ve got a business mind…Here people, especially the Xhosas and this, 
they don’t have experience. The time of apartheid, they don’t work, by the law. You can’t 
do any business. You can work as a laborer but you can’t do any business. The second 
thing is they think to sell in this [market] sometimes it is shameful. The white people, 
most of them, they have nice cars and houses. They want to be like them. They think, 
1994-95, most of them, they [blacks would] become very rich. They got a nice car, a nice 
house…But whatever. You can’t get it unless you have experience, the capital, unless 
you inherit money, all over the world…you can’t just government give you like that. 
Then they come and see the people who give them places here, most of them, they are 




 Ibrahim intelligently notes the spatial segregation of Apartheid planning. Through 
the creation and maintenance of townships and bantustans, the South African state 
successfully kept millions of blacks from meaningful participation in urban life, 
especially entrepreneurship (Ferguson 2008). Thus, when Apartheid spatial bans were 
lifted, immigrants filled the urban entrepreneurial v cuum with their social capital by 
way of small business savvy and networks of distribu ion (Dodson & Oelofse 2002). 
Participants like Ibrahim related a scaled, historical and systematic perspective of the 
plight of South African blacks that often put a sympathetic tone behind their plain 
criticisms. “Because the poverty predicament of South Africa, the plight of poverty in 
South Africa, it don’t resolved today. It can take years and years. And this animosity 
against foreigners will continue. It will continue” (Antonio 2011).  
The system is to blame. The problem here is that the system made it hard to go up. They 
live in the township and they see a foreigner driving a nice car. What would you think? 
It’s also the suffering. This thing is socio-economic also. So people have nothing to eat. 
Going to sleep hungry and they have to blame someone. So, it’s easy to blame 
foreigners…That’s the thing about xenophobia my friend, it will never end. It’s a very  
complicated thing (Paul 2011).  
 
Paul’s apt diagnosis contextualizes xenophobia primarily as a historically and 
economically enmeshed resource struggle. Antonio share  Paul’s dire predictions for the 
future. 
It all depends on the policies of the leaders of the country. If they are for humanity, in 
terms of considering that other people from Africa also their brothers and sisters, if they 
understand this, hopefully there might be in the future change in view. But then if it 
continues in status quo, as I see there is no improvement now. ‘Cause everything that I 
see, the laws against immigrants is getting tougher and tougher. So I don’t believe that in 
the future the situation will be better (Antonio 2011). 
  
 Migrant perspectives represented in this study rest fundamentally on the notion 
that South African’s perspectives of African migrants, especially those of poor blacks, 
have been wrought by decades of unfortunate, and morally deplorable, imposed 
circumstances. Migrants see that the historical injustices of colonialism and Apartheid 
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persist to affect them today, ironically via the formerly oppressed. “Racial victims 
frequently internalize the dominant definitions of themselves,” Moodley and Adams 
argue. “The more powerless and threatened group members feel, the greater their need to 
denigrate others below them…In this way, new identities of superiority are 
manufactured” (2000, 63). Moodley and Adams’ social psychological perspective is a 
distillation of migrant understandings of the deep-s ated needs that black South Africans 
are attempting to fill by denigrating migrants. As I discuss below, my participants 
understand xenophobia as just such an identity of superiority manufactured in response to 
racist and paternalistic social and spatial engineer g.  
 
VII. Creating the “Other African”   
 The Apartheid regime sought to control and reshape South Africa’s social, racial 
and ethnic identities. A democratizing South Africa has found itself in a vacuum of 
nationalism that has required new identities to fill in the considerable gaps that the 
Apartheid state interposed between ethnic and racial categories (Cornelissen & 
Horstmeier 2002). In the pursuit of South African unity, popular appeals to South African 
identity have played on Apartheid-era memes of racial superiority, South African 
exceptionalism and racial categorization. “Particularly striking in this growing 
xenophobia is the extent to which Africa remains the mental location of the threat. What 
apartheid defined as the 'black' threat, South Africans now generally apply to the 
continent as a whole, the amakwerekwere. 'Africa' remains a place outside its territorial 
boundaries, an area rife with crime and political instability” (Klotz 2000).   
The only point is that they are not used to being in touch with foreigners…[B]ecause in 
those apartheid times, the white people, they were travelling to other countries. They 
were telling them [blacks] ‘You aren’t in Africa.’ That’s why they are calling us 
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‘African’ here. They say ‘I’m going to Africa,’ as if South Africa is not part of Africa. 
You understand, to rule them, to separate them fromtheir own brothers and 
sisters…They are calling [us] ‘African’ men. They are calling ‘African’ to mean the same 
as foreigner…Now you know they closed to outside. They don’t talk. They don’t know 
what’s happening in other countries (Issa 2011). 
  
 Scholars have argued Issa’s point for many years now. Harris (2002) points to 
isolation hypotheses, like Klotz’s or Issa’s, as a key way of understanding the shock that 
international migration has caused South African society.  Thus, generally speaking, 
“African” was presented by Apartheid leader as not jus an “unknown”, but as the 
nearest, most chaotic, most unstable, and thus most dangerous form of outsider.  This 
historic isolation, combined with the ways that theApartheid state taught South Africans 
to view the “other African”, created a large ideological space in which resentment could 
ferment (Morris 1998; Harris 2002). As Harris (2002) aptly points out, the internal 
isolation that ethnic groups were subjected to under Apartheid fostered intolerance by 
eliminating many sites of rudimentary cultural contact. Not only does this help explain 
the intolerance South Africans of all stripes show t  foreigners, it helps to explain a key 
aspect of the failure of South African nationalism to prevent ethnic fracture and 
sectionalism amongst South Africans. In fact, this fractured nationalism only increases 
the need South Africans have to unite over hatred of the “other African”. 
 Some participants conveyed the particularly racial tone of the abuse they suffered. 
As in Warner and Finchilescu’s study (2003), participants related the racist abuse they 
received to the racial divides and tensions that still plague contemporary South Africa.  
Ibrahim: I tell you whatever, and in the future, if there is a naziist party, a new naziist 
party, anywhere in the world, it will be created in South Africa, not in Germany. The 
second, they will be here. This is what I predict. Because I know politics. I know 
Sociology. I know politics. You see, I predict the naziist they will start here. 
Me: Why here? 
Ibrahim : It happen here, because they are racist peoples. It has just become upside down.  
Me: How is it upside down? 
Ibrahim A: From the White they are racist against the black. From the black they are 
racist against the other [African] people. 
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Me: Meaning… 
Ibrahim: Racist against us because anything they want they just translate it in a 
xenophobic way (2011). 
  
 Paul from Malawi and Issa from Senegal both remarked in detail on the ironies of 
African nationalism and South African exceptionalism, yet from very different 
experiences. “Like South Africa and Zimbabwe. They are cousins. You find Shona here 
you find Shona there. You find Ndebele here you find Ndebele there” Issa stated (2011). 
“And also, this Africa. The way South Africa is with Malawi and what, it’s like the same 
country,” Paul also argued. “You know why? You go to Zimbabwe, you find the people 
from South Africa there. You go to Malawi, you find the people from South Africa. What 
I mean is that the chief there is also a chief here. It’s the same people. They just 
migrated.” Indeed, Paul and Issa accurately depict the human geography of Southern 
Africa and the complexities caused, not only by European drawn borders, but by the 
resulting ironic and meaningless divisions of culture groups based on Colonial desires or 
South African Nationalist Party “exceptionalist” pro aganda. Paul claims, as many 
scholars have, that during the “big” xenophobia, dozens of South Africans were killed 
and many more wounded or robbed, due to the difficulties in differentiating foreigner 
from citizen when judging only by appearance or language. Despite his assertion that 
xenophobia is not likely to go away because of engrai ed social contexts of resource 
struggle, Paul stated firmly, “Xenophobia will never work. It can’t work. That’s why it 
failed.”  
 Issa made a very interesting point about the position of Senegalese in the 
xenophobic landscape of South Africa. Despite the anti-foreigner animosity directed 
against the far more numerous immigrant populations like Zimbabweans, Issa argues that 
because of the cultural similarities with many South Africans, Zimbabweans have an 
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easier opportunity adjusting to South Africa and avoiding problems. For example, Issa 
argued, South African Members of Parliament can be seen spending time with a street 
kid, because it signals being of the common people. “They don’t show off.” On the other 
hand, Senegalese take the exact opposite approach culturally. In order to prevent others 
from pitying them, Senegalese refuse to hang their heads from hunger or worry, are 
scrupulously clean and usually wear bold colors and shiny accessories, no matter their 
financial situation. “And I tell you they can be like good looking but nothing in their 
pockets. But [South Africans] think these guys are very rich so they will start targeting 
them to take their money. So their lives gonna be in danger.” As Issa and many others 
cautioned, the key in avoiding xenophobic violence or abuse is to avoid letting locals feel 
“undermined.” More importantly however, as Issa points out, Senegalese are engaged in 
a small segment of trade, one which, as mentioned pr viously, local South Africans show 
little interest in. “The ones who are not educated are always thinking that other people are 
taking their jobs. But there is those who are not educated. But even those people don’t 
have a problem with the Senegalese people, you see? Because what they do and what the 
Senegalese people do are different” (Abdou 2011), as opposed to other nationalities that 
gravitate to the same sort of work South Africans want to do (Abdou 2011; Ahmadu 
2011; Touba 2011). Thus, despite their vast phenotypical and cultural differences from 
South Africans, they actually receive less negative att ntion as the “African Other”. 
These perspectives of the Senegalese participants, tha  they avoid problems because of 
the sectors of trade in which they involve themselves, add even more weight to the 
argument that xenophobia, though complex, may be easi st to predict when regarded 
fundamentally as a resource conflict.  
 113
VIII. Conclusion: “Through the Social, for the Social” 
 Xenophobia is an enduring pattern within the mosaic of migrancy in South Africa, 
during Apartheid and since. It is a window into understanding the present resource 
struggles afflicting the largely impoverished populace. It is a window that reflects the 
decades of Apartheid injustices perpetrated upon black South Africans who were 
systematically grouped and constrained within tightly controlled landscapes of ignorance, 
poverty and insult. Lastly, it is a window that looks out upon a troubling future landscape 
for the South African experiment. Xenophobia, like bureaucratic corruption and zones of 
extra-legal exception, not only actively corrodes the principles of liberality upon which a 
“new” South Africa must be founded, but more frighteningly gives view to the fact that 
these foundations may have been papier mâché from the start. 
 Constantly reminded that they are amakwerekwere, and thus unwelcome in South 
Africa, migrants are hesitant to identify with South Africans, let alone feel sorry for their 
plight. Yet, many migrants still take sympathy intellectually on South Africans, 
especially poor blacks, because they see the larger scope of historical disenfranchisement 
that has left them destitute. Migrants have also witnessed the false promises, corruption 
and mismanagement of political leaders in South Africa that have left the South African 
dream largely unfulfilled. Immigrants recognize that they provide an easy scapegoat for 
politicians, unemployed poor, and a number of other groups. “[T]he massive rate of 
unemployment, the unsympathetic nature of the authorities and the mass media, and the 
general lack of education combined with the years of i olation perhaps preclude the 
possibility of a more generous response to African foreigners at this stage in South 
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Africa's history” (Morris 1998, 1133). African migrants, though hurt, angry and longing 
for improvement, nevertheless realize this to be tru .  
 At the end of Apartheid, South Africans were not only allowed to interact more 
between cultures and ethnicities, but in some ways were obliged to for the sake of 
democracy. South Africa had been possessed since its inception by a small, powerful 
elite. The vast majority of its citizens had never b fore been confronted with the need to 
cooperate politically and overcome difference. “In searching for the Holy Grail of 
commonality, South Africans [were] seeking ways to define themselves as national 
beings, de-emphasizing the predominant ethnic classifications devised by the apartheid 
system” (Sinclair 1999, 469). Thus, xenophobia is partially the sad byproduct of a rather 
effective means of building nationality (Crush 2000). “South Africans have often 
appealed to nativist discourses in efforts to resolve these disputes in ways that deny rights 
of residence to those who cannot claim or demonstrate heir South African origins” 
(Landau 2005, 3). Xenophobia, in fact, “provides substance to a national identity 
(Schinkel 2009, 791). At the same time, however, South Africa has experienced 
increasing ethnic identification in the wake of Apartheid, largely due to resource scarcity 
of one sort or another (Shea 2008). The continuing need to shape national identity in the 
face of powerful ethnic identities will only aid the continuation of xenophobia.  
 The foundational and ultimate causes of xenophobia have much to do with 
historical isolation and complex place specifics. However, without the fierce 
contemporary competition over South Africa’s incredibly scarce resources, it is difficult 
to argue that xenophobia would be so commonplace or vociferous (Shea 2008; Landau 
2005). Because of the many ethnic, political, and religious fault lines, nationality was the 
 115
easiest rallying point to decide who should access r ources (Landau 2006; Modi 2003). 
This would explain why “It is among the poorest groups that the question of loyalty and 
belonging are asked most vehemently, and where the reprisals are likely to be the most 
violent” (Hansen et al. 2009, 194). The relationship between citizens and foreigners is 
most highly pressured by the common context of poverty (McDonald 2002). Dodson and 
Oelofse have argued that an important aspect of the context surrounding poverty conflict 
is that South Africans are usually migrants themselves to the urban areas that are the 
locus of conflict (Maharaj 2001; Sadouni 2009; Sinclair 2001), where each group of 
migrants is “competing to establish themselves in a new social, economic, and physical 
environment” (2002, 137).  
 Lastly, xenophobia is a large factor in the creation of the identities that migrants 
fashion for themselves. More than anything, Harris a gues, it is xenophobia, rather than 
distance from home, that makes Africans feel most freign, resulting in alienation from 
South African society (2002).  
This understanding of the impact of xenophobia on identity, together with the culture of 
violence that pervades ordinary South African life, suggests that xenophobia is not the 
pathology it is represented to be. Rather, it is a key component of the 'New South African' 
nation. To read xenophobia as a pathology is to contest traditional, normal 
understandings of psychopathology. It is not individually located and is not counter- 
normative, but rather operates through the social, for the social, serving to disguise 
relations of power and discursive contradictions (Harris 2002). 
  
My participants, along with most foreigners in South Africa, did not wish to assimilate to 
or even live in South Africa at all if they could help it.  
In this chapter, I have explored the distance migrants feel from the South African 
society surrounding them, largely due to xenophobia. In the next chapter, I examine the 
ramifications of this distance. I conclude that xenophobia in South Africa (and globally) 
will be an increasingly common feature of the migrant experience. It is then beneficial to 
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ask and ascertain how much increasing xenophobia might cause migrants to behave and 
think in new ways, perhaps in their decisions about how to operate in time and space. In 
this vein, I will complete my analysis of migrant relationships to South African society, 
by examining the strategies most commonly employed to avoid any negative impacts of 
South African xenophobia, and by examining the socio-spatial effects these strategies 
have.  
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Chapter 7. The Social and Spatial Effects of Xenophobia: 
Perceived Boundaries Made Material 
I. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I surmised that South African xenophobia impacts 
migrant perceptions of the accessibility and danger of South African space. Xenophobia 
significantly affects the lived daily experience of African migrancy in South Africa via 
universal experiences of “abusive treatment by police, exclusion from healthcare and 
education, xenophobic treatment by the South African public, and exclusion from livelihood 
opportunities” (Amisi and Ballard 2005, 3). In the last chapter, I examined the numinous, 
intangible boundaries that xenophobia places on migrants’ psyches and their perceptions 
of accessibility and safety. Moving ahead in this chapter, using the same migrant 
perspectives, I display how the numinous becomes tangible, i.e. how xenophobic 
sentiment, translated through migrants’ experiences and perceptions of it, is rendered by 
migrants into concrete and tangible social and spatial patterns. These patterns cast light 
upon migrants’ survival strategies and how these strategies impact South African space. 
Equally important, they actually reflect a reiteration of South Africans’ responses to their 
own matters of survival in the face of dynamic national change after years of 
marginalization and racial abuse.  
 Xenophobia, as I have argued, is often best understood as a resource conflict, but 
it cannot be considered so independent of context. It is not simply a sum of locals and 
foreigners fighting for a piece of the pie. South African xenophobia is the methods of 
disenfranchisement crystallized and distilled by centuries of colonial control mechanisms 
that have now been reinterpreted by contemporary voices and remobilized to specific 
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contemporary political issues. Xenophobia is not the result of resource struggle alone. It 
is the combination of political, societal, economic and, not least of all, psychological 
stresses, which target an at-risk foreign group.  Xenophobia is the socio-geographic 
cousin of territorial cleansing, genocide and domestic political sectionalism. Thus, it must 
be seen as a discursive strategy that is physically vio ent psychologically, politically and 
economically. In this way, migrants’ responses to xenophobia must also be seen as 
strategies of survival: psychological, political and economic. The purpose of this chapter 
is to examine, in the particular context of South African xenophobia, the tangible ways in 
which migrants defend themselves psychologically, politically and economically by 
mobilizing the resources and human capital at their disposal, in order to live another day 
and earn another dollar.  
 One could argue that the South African state and local government have created 
more direct obstacles to entrance into the country and its economy and thus migrant 
livelihood. Yet the dangers presented by xenophobia have inspired a larger host of 
survival strategies that migrants mobilize to prevent harm. For this reason, xenophobia 
seems to me to impact the day-to-day experience of migrancy in South Africa far more 
than the DHA or the police. In particular, it creats more distinctly spatial patterns in the 
human geography of mobility, recreation and habitation in Cape Town.  
 In order to parse out migrants’ strategies for avoiding negative experiences with 
South African society, I asked my participants how they would advise a classroom full of 
new African migrants to South Africa, if they were the teacher. They responded 
consistently with ideas about transport, recreation, s cial proximity and residence 
location. Transport is a troublesome requirement for h se migrants working in central 
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Cape Town. Only a few of my participants lived within walking distance and only two 
owned cars. The limited means of public transport leave people with two choices: mini-
van taxis and trains. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, transport is one of the most 
common settings for displays of xenophobia. “But there on train sometimes people they 
talk. Because me I don’t keep quiet” (Robert 2011). The need for traveling between home 
and work makes public transport an unavoidable risk.  
 Most participants also live some walking distance from their taxi van stop or their 
nearest train station. The greatest difficulty in taking public transport, participants 
warned, is the walk between stops and home. “Avoid the night” (Edmund 2011). 
Edmund’s three-word summary of his strategy for avoidance, though it sounds like the 
title of a bad horror movie, was unanimously voiced to be the wisest course. “You must 
really know your time to walk. Not just anytime. You can’t be free like [locals]. No. To 
walk in Khayelitsha at night is not safe” (Pascal 2011). Oliver echoed, “Yeah like in the 
location, the worst thing that can happen with a foreigner…don’t walk at night. Standard. 
You can be robbed. Even there in Khayelitsha, even daylight, if you are not like enough 
[in a large enough group], you can be robbed. Especially phones or money, at knife point. 
I have witnessed this many times! Even in front of my place” (Oliver 2011). If one must 
walk, safety is more likely in numbers. On this topic, Adele warned, “If they 
[hypothetical students] don’t know nothing about [South Africa]…to be safe, you must 
know where you are going and which place you are going and what for. Don’t go any 
place just because you want to go” (2011). 
 Social recreation was another problematic issue comm nly addressed by 
participants. Not surprisingly, the two favorite pastimes of the largely young and male 
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group in the market revolve around young women and partying. However, this lifestyle is 
simply not an option for most African migrants in South Africa who truly want a chance 
at success (Matthew 2011; Bomani 2011; Edmund 2011; Simon 2011; Andrew 2011). 
My Malawian focus group agreed unanimously that the key was to not get into partying 
and city life in the first place. On that note, one Malawian said, “And with women, there 
is never enough money!” This was very similar to a comment Mamadou had made to me 
in his interview about the expense of dating South African women. Undoubtedly, a large 
reason that participants avoid drinking and dating is the expense. Another is that the 
grueling hours that are expected of a market worker do not leave room for hangovers or 
fatigue. “The advice I can give them,” Matthew cautioned in our interview, “If they are 
living in the townships, they must stay away from the shebeens. You know those small 
taverns.” The reason he claimed, was not based primarily on cost or incompatibility with 
work life. “They must be home on time. If they knock off from work, they are going to 
townships, they must reach home earlier because the arli r you are home the safer you 
are. Going home late you are asking for trouble.” The problem with public drinking, for 
Matthew, is primarily the darkness after work hours, relating to the necessity of carefully 
timing one’s travel. Add alcohol onto the danger that inspired Edmund’s maxim above -- 
“avoid the night”—and it is even easier to understand the dangers at play. “Most of the 
youths who indulge in like too much booze. Booze is where you can get a problem. 
Maybe too much booze and I’m stumbling in the streets, people can attack me” (Matthew 
2011). Not only that, any migrant would agree, but great danger is presented by the 
inevitable group of locals, usually poor, who are also drinking at a bar or shebeen. The 
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only course then, regarding safety, work ethic and fi ances, is to avoid social recreation, 
alcohol, travel before dark and walking alone.  
 
II. Housing location  
 These preventative measures can do much to help, but still do not assure one’s 
safety. The best strategy, participants unanimously concluded, is to remove oneself from 
troublesome locales and situations whenever possible. The best way to do this is to avoid 
living in the “locations” all together (as former townships are often popularly called), or 
even passing time there. In the previous chapter, I explained the experiences migrants 
have had with xenophobic sentiment and its manifestation into insult and abuse. In this 
section, I examine the socio-spatial effects of xenophobia relating primarily to geographic 
decisions migrants make regarding housing location.  
  Migrants to Cape Town endure a great deal of hardship in their daily lives. 
Living conditions are often impoverished or spare at best. Migrants come to South Africa 
with the intention of making a better life for themselves and to help support their families 
back home. These goals necessitate great thrift. All participants displayed a staggering 
work ethic and show admirable durability under daily strain in pursuit of these goals. 
Indeed, if they did not, they could not work or compete in the souvenir trade to begin 
with. Likewise, participants showed a great willingness to endure hardship and 
substandard living conditions for many years if it meant a better life in the long run. 
Given these motivations, it follows that the long travel times, low-quality housing and 
even relatively high crime in townships would not stop most participants from living in 
the cheapest areas of greater Cape Town. However, despite the much greater expense 
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incurred by living closer to town in more affluent neighborhoods, nearly every participant 
displayed a frank aversion to this money-saving measure, running in direct contravention 
of the ostensible purpose of their life in South Africa. In this section, I hope to explain the 
reasons for this conundrum. 
  When I became aware of such spatial irregularities n the patterns of African 
migrant life in Cape Town, I inquired of participants which factors were the primary 
influences in their decisions regarding housing location. Themes of safety, housing cost, 
travel cost and travel time to the CBD were the deciding elements. In the course of 
probing this issue, it became abundantly clear to me from interview responses that safety 
was the driving factor, trumping even cost and convenience. Respondents felt certain that 
living in “locations” (term synonymous with impoverished former “townships” and their 
environs) put them at grave risk (Shana 2011; Bakary 2011; Issa 2011; Edmund 2011; 
Robert 2011). They identified the high criminality of the locations as a problem (Blessing 
2011; Edmund 2011; Adele 2011; Samba 2011). Additionally, participants related that it 
was their foreignness, specifically, that magnified the threat of abuse and made living in 
the locations untenable.   
 There are no guarantees of safety even outside of townships. “You can’t avoid 
[xenophobia] if it comes, but it’s better if you are in the city. In town it’s better,” Blessing 
said (2011). Florence believed that “[Living in a location] is cheap, but there is no 
security for foreigners” (2011). “[F]or their security, they must avoid being in the 
locations. If they want to live longer, they have to be out of that area. It’s best to live 
closer to town,” Antonio cautioned (2011). Being fierce adherents to Antonio’s brand of 
advice, nearly every participant lived outside of the ownships or aspired to do so. “All 
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the locations I do not go,” Bakary said flatly. Matthew, who lives in Nyanga, said the he 
would do anything to get out of the locations to a safer place like the City Bowl, but 
would happily settle for Maitland. Either way, his financial prospects do not bode well 
for such a move. He will continue to live in Nyanga with his wife and son for the 
foreseeable future.  
I hate that there, in the locations, the crime is too much. Here [in town] it is very safe. 
You can move any time. Even 1:00 am you can move...It’s better to live in town. I know 
it is expensive but it is the safest place to stay…Is it an option to stay in location? That 
one I wouldn’t advise. Because I have some friends, they who are working there, two of 
them, only two months I am working here, but two Zimbabweans they get stabbed you 
see (Canaan 2011). 
 
 Blessing, Simon and Simon’s father all live in a neighborhood within Cape 
Town’s city bowl called Tamboerskloof. I knew it to be an attractive neighborhood. It 
was next to Bo Kaap where I stayed, paying R3100 (roughly $350-400/mo) for a modest 
bedroom in a house. Thus, I was surprised to learn of their living in Tamboerskloof. 
Apart from Canaan, they were the only migrants who lived within the City Bowl. I asked 
Simon why they would go to the expense of living in a ice neighborhood like 
Tamboerskloof. He responded, “Yeah it’s better to pay more and I’m saving my life, than 
to go [to a location] and I pay cheap but it’s dangerous. It’s better to spend when you are 
safe” (2011). I then asked him if he thought that te xenophobia issue was the biggest 
reason that immigrants live in or nearer town, despit  it being more expensive. Blessing, 
who was not even being interviewed, chimed in with an emphatic “Yeah!” Simon 
followed “I live in the city because, ahhh, I can’t stay in location.” When asked to 
expound on that, he groaned and said “I…there is…it is very hard to stay there. In 
location there is too much locals. So some they just s pect everyday the foreigner there 
is money. So they can come any time and they rob” (Simon 2011).  
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 Robert made very little money as an assistant to Florence, about R1400/month, of 
which he spent about R200/month on marijuana, leaving only R1200 for other 
necessities. Thus, I was surprised when Robert told me that he lived in Goodwood, which 
as he put it with a laugh, “That one is only for the whites!” He pays more for the one 
room shack he lives in (which is attached behind a bigger building) than for a comparable 
place in Nyanga or Khayelitsha. “I get a good life there so can’t say it’s expensive 
comparably.” After rent, and essentials like ganja, Robert barely has money for food. 
Robert is one of the few assistants to be able to live outside of a location, Bomani, 
Thomas and Canaan being the other three. Thomas is somewhat subsidized by his boss, 
Pardon, because Pardon’s mother is also a surrogate mother to Thomas. Canaan was only 
able to stay near the Parliament building because he was staying with a friend while he 
got settled in Cape Town. Bomani is a younger man, but a grizzled veteran of South 
Africa all the same. He stated the following: 
Goodwood is better than Khayelitsha, because Khayelitsha is a location where there is a 
mixture of the local people. It’s a lot of people, like their home. It’s their home. In 
Goodwood there is a mixture of people, the coloureds, the Xhosa, and like us also. So 
like everyone is busy doing their own things. Because in location there, they look what 
you are doing you see. How do you change? How you change? They look at you. You 
see? At the end, they come and rob you. They see how you come here. They look at you. 
They see the stage you change, then they come and get you (Bomani 2011). 
 
 Bomani makes a clear case here for why he cannot tolera e living in the locations 
and thus chooses to pay higher rents. He feels that the minute he earns any money, it will 
become apparent to potential attackers. He is already, after all, going to be watched like a 
hawk by local gangsters because he is a foreigner, sp aking a foreign tongue. Most 
dangerously, he comes and goes from home just before and after business hours, clearly 
implying that he has a job. It is seemingly at cross purposes with migrants’ tated goals of 
financial improvement to spend more on housing, but here Bomani explains clearly how 
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saving money by living in a location can cost one a great deal more in the long run, either 
through common robbery, or even violence or death. Likewise, when you look at 
Robert’s personal history, his seemingly unsound decision (when viewed purely 
financially) also makes more sense. Recall that he had suffered the most violent attack of 
any of the participants in the market, when an assailant slashed his throat open with a 
broken bottle in Johannesburg. Despite the fact that Robert is an extreme example, he is 
in good company with the many other participants who live very close to the edge of their 
means in order to live in relative safety, even if it means reducing their ability to have 
basic comforts, save money or remit it home.  
 In a focus group with stall owners, I had the following exchange with Amos and 
Gilbert about some of the conclusions I was developing as I neared the end of my field 
work.  
Me: One of my other conclusions is that if there was no xenophobia, more foreigners 
would live in Khayelitsha and cheap places 
Gilbert: Yeah! Yeah! Yeah!  
Amos: Yeah. Yeah. 
Me: But they can’t live there because they get targeted. 
Amos: Yeah you get targeted all the time. They kill.  
Me: It seems like nobody is safe in Khayelitsha. 
Amos: Yeah even locals  
Me: But the foreigners are…  
Amos: Are the most! 
Me: …are in much more danger? 
Amos: Yeah! Yeah! 
Me: Because if I’m a Skolie [a tough, thug or gangster], I think I should go for the 
foreigner because they have money and fewer friends? 
Gilbert: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 
Amos: Yeah. Yeah. And when he don’t get money from you he just kill you. Search you, 
then he stab you.  
Me: I think that the conclusion I’ve made is that the danger of xenophobia pushes 
foreigners toward the city so they end up paying more f r rent. So it takes more of their 
money. 
Gilbert: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 
Amos: And the owner of the houses, of the building, they take advantage. They increase 
the rent, because they know you can’t go to location. You gonna stay in town. (Focus 
Group 2, 2011) 
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 Gilbert lives in Maitland and Amos in Woodstock. Amos used to stay in town, in 
the city bowl, but flats there were too expensive. The cheapest he found was R2400/mo 
and had only one room. He has a wife and two children, which would make that 
arrangement too difficult, he said. As I mentioned b fore, I myself had to pay R3100 just 
for a room in a house in Bo Kaap and had a similarly difficult housing search. Amos now 
pays R3000 for a two-bedroom place in Woodstock.   
 Thomas pointed out another reason that migrants like to live nearer to town, 
which in fairness has less to do with xenophobia. “Me, I’m in Woodstock. I’m around 
town, because I can’t stay in the location. With the business, I like to stay in town, 
because with my business you see. I must be here maybe around five or six [AM], or half 
five to do everything ok. So to stay in location is tough for me” (Thomas 2011). The cost 
in money and time of traveling between the more dangerous “locations” and the center of 
Cape Town is higher than the cost of traveling from closer neighborhoods like 
Goodwood. Robert, Bomani and Thomas, all living in safer neighborhoods, closer to the 
City Center, all save a few rand each day in travel costs. This certainly helps financially, 
even if it does not come close to making up for the higher rent they pay in Goodwood.  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the inevitable use of public transportation 
is a primary risk factor for experiencing South African xenophobia. Thus, migrants also 
like to live closer to town for reasons of transport that are indeed linked to xenophobia. 
“You get the problem at night in the locations” Edmund said. “You see, most South 
African boys like me, they don’t work. They just wait for someone when he’s coming 
from work. So to avoid that, keep safe, don’t walk t night. In town there is security, 
police. But in location…” (Edmund 2011). Edmund’s words echo a common theme in 
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participant responses relating to the dangers of the night, especially walking at night. If a 
migrant returns to a location at night and has to walk home from a taxi or train stop, they 
puts themselves in great danger. Consequently, as I witnessed every dayin the market, all 
migrants, especially those who lived farther away in more dangerous neighborhoods, 
were eager to pack up and leave as soon as possible. I was very aware of this 
phenomenon, because it made it almost impossible to g t an interview after closing time. 
 
III. Those Left Behind 
 Migrants fear townships so much that they move to safer places where they must 
spend a larger portion of their meager resources in rent. Here again, in another ironic 
stitch in the larger ironic patchwork of migrancy in South Africa, migrants fear 
xenophobic violence so much that they are willing to exchange the surplus money that is 
the very reason for their struggle in South Africa for safer living conditions. For most, it 
is not a choice. One merely pays the extra money as a cost of living in what is seen as the 
hateful human landscape of South Africa. However, for many migrants, their resources 
are so slim that they simply cannot pay to live anywhere but the locations. For my 
participants these included locations like Crossroads, Delft, Nyanga and Khayelitsha. The 
markets from which I drew my participants contrasted with the migrant population as a 
whole, which is relatively less employed than my study group. Therefore, in examining 
the poorest of my study group, we get a window intothe larger experience of migrants in 
Cape Town and South Africa.  
 
“Soldiers Survive...” –Robert 
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 For migrants who are stuck in the townships and wish to survive unmolested, they 
must follow all the rules discussed above. They must keep a low profile, avoid overt 
displays of wealth, travel only during the day, and not get involved with social drinking 
or crime. Yet for migrants in the townships, pressure  exist that forge additional survival 
strategies in the midst of harsh circumstances. As I found, these strategies can be 
divergent, though often based on similar principles.  
Me, I don’t like Khayelitsha…[T]here are other people also they are surviving there, but 
you must know how. It’s very hard. You see like Oliver there (pointing to him a few 
yards away), he is living there. He is always telling me the stories. One day there was 
other guys. They were living in a room of five person. The skolies come in the house and 
take everything. The shoes, the clothes, everything in the house. Because why? The area 
where they are going to stay, the place where they ar  going to live (Adele 2011). 
 
This is especially true for foreigners, Adele warns. No other provocation is needed. 
 Emmanuel lived in Crossroads, which borders Nyanga to the east, because rent 
and food are affordable for him there. He lives with a mix of Zimbabweans and South 
Africans. His landlord is a South African Xhosa. His neighborhood is predominantly 
South African. “Definitely not a good place to live as a foreigner,” he said. “Because 
dangerous!” he said when asked for more detail. “Because of the people that live there. 
You see those young guys, they can even rob you, you kn w. Yeah all of those things is 
what you are facing there. Skolies, gangsters. Some call it ‘skolies’ here…And only like 
where we live, like the buildings is not right. They build with those sheet metals. And 
you see now it’s cold! Yo!” (2011). He severely dislikes living in Crossroads and hopes 
to leave as soon as he can afford it. “It’s like maybe if I get near the town here. From 
Mutual [a train stop between Pinelands and Maitland], that is where the Central Business 
District (CBD) begins. From there it is the location. So if I can just get a place near to the 
CBD.” Emmanuel thought that would be a better locati n because he would not be at risk 
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of running into so many gangsters, he would be closer to town and would be able to get 
home more easily before dark (2011). 
 Oliver was indeed a fascinating case study, as Adele had indicated to me he 
would be. He had become so adept at navigating Khayelitsha and its dangers that he saw 
no benefit anymore in paying higher rents to be closer to the city. He would save on 
transport costs of time and money, but lose money ov rall. Oliver’s story intrigued me 
because he was the first participant to say that he voluntarily lives in a location. Yet, 
Oliver did not for one second act as if he were not terribly afraid of the dangers present 
for foreigners in the locations. I am certain he would agree that his fears are not mere 
emotional responses to stories or a few bad interactions with locals, but carefully crafted 
assessments of the social landscape in which he lives and breathes. Actually, his 
cultivation of such awareness is the foundation of the survival strategy that has left him 
not only unharmed, but a pillar of his largely Xhosa community.  
 Oliver said that he tries hard to keep a very low profile. He also advises other 
foreigners to avoid partying or playing loud music in their homes, so as not to draw 
attention from neighbors in locations (2011). He recommends innocence as best policy, in 
keeping with a common strategy amongst participants for avoiding all sorts of trouble in 
South Africa, including xenophobia (Mamadou 2011; Samba 2011; Bakary 2011; 
Antonio 2011). “The advice I can give is that don’t i volve yourself in illegal activities. 
No crime. If I’m staying in the locations, these locals, if they are fighting amongst 
themselves, they turn to me for advice.” He said. “Even if they are under attack, they 
shout my name. Oliver! Oliver!” Oliver tried to show that moral and legal living does not 
only serve to deflect attention from you, thus diminishing the chances of being targeted 
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for crime. He went a step further to claim that this “innocent” lifestyle helps to build 
positive relationships, not simply to prevent the negative. Indeed, what I term “social 
proximity” is the bedrock of the safest strategies for migrants in the locations. Paul, 
Brenda, and Oliver represent such social proximity, though in unique ways.  
It’s difficult, as I said before, because if you are a foreigner, you have to learn the culture. 
The people whom you are visiting. Know what they want. Know what they don’t want. 
Cause for example, I’m a foreigner. Number of occasions, some South Africans have 
asked me to look after their houses, sleeping in those houses (Oliver 2011). 
  
 Oliver seems to be fundamentally assimilationist in his strategy. His pattern was 
to ingratiate himself to South Africans around him using deep humility, respect, kindness 
and linguistic skill. The diminutive Oliver stands not more than five feet and four inches 
tall. He has a kind face and sweet smile. The Zimbabwean father of two teenaged kids 
seems very young at heart for his age and level of responsibility. His survival strategy 
reflects his personality and comportment. “Lower yourself and they will respect you” he 
advises.  
 Oliver is in some senses on the extreme end of this s rategy. “Yeah if you are a 
foreigner, first of all must study how the locals live, what they like, what they don’t like. 
Then you can see where you can fit. It will make your life a bit easier. That’s what helped 
me.” Oliver felt that migrants must conform to a South African society in order to be 
safe. “Don’t try to be ahead of them or be clever of them.” Oliver also lives in poverty, 
along with his neighbors in Khayelitsha. I suspected that his fear of standing out through 
success inhibits his drive to make money for his family as it is at odds with the high 
competition in the tourist trade.  
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 As an instructive side note, compare the assimilationist tendency of Oliver with 
Issa’s outlook. Issa, a relatively successful Senegalese, takes a different tack regarding 
“fitting in.” He advises African migrants, 
To know their own identity. Like if you know your own identity, amongst the people you 
are, you are gonna be like fortunate. Know your identity is like, never to paint yourself 
like a South African. You understand? Even if you are married and you have South 
African papers, stay in your mind like you are Senegal se. You are in other peoples’ 
country. And if you are in other peoples’ country, hey having their own culture. The first 
part is to respect the culture of the people. You can live your own culture, but respect the 
other peoples’ culture (Issa 2011). 
 
 Issa’s comments may seem reflective of the same ideal, but I see Issa’s outlook 
(so common to the Senegalese I spoke with) to be in ma y ways opposed to Oliver’s. Issa 
was a proponent of cultural respect but a fierce opponent of assimilation. He recommends 
actively holding to one’s roots and culture, the very thing that ostensibly makes migrants 
stand out and puts them at risk. “In South Africa these are marginal identities which 
function as ‘a source of empowerment and resistance’” (H therington 1998, 22). 
Senegalese migrants like Issa are well known to be standouts among African foreigners, 
proudly displaying marginal identities, yet report having little to no violent interactions 
with South Africans (Focus Group 3; Issa 2011; Mamadou 2011; Samba 2011). As Touba 
added “We don’t have a problem with [South Africans]. That’s true. Unless you go take 
them lady [or] you stay by them. Then you cause your own problem yourself” (2011). 
Senegalese work very hard to live comfortably, far away from black townships and 
therefore any real danger, Issa assured me. Indeed, ev ry Senegalese I interviewed lived 
in Maitland. Perhaps the bold clothing decision andfearlessness to stand out, though in 
some ways creating a target, also convey a confidence that makes up for their visibility 
and actually dissuades trouble makers. Referring to Congolese migrants in Paris, 
MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga argue that 
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In the face of xenophobic hostility, Congolese refug es respond with defiant pride in their 
culture – something they believe is not only valid but is actually better than their new 
cultural environment. Rather than accepting the denigration heaped on them, they reverse 
the hierarchy of inferiority, placing themselves at the apex. In effect, they create a 
‘society outside society, a world of their own’ whic  rejects ‘both the activities and the 
value system of mainstream society’ (2000: 7).  
 
 Brenda and Paul, like Oliver, also use social proximity to their benefit. Brenda is 
a stall owner from Swaziland. She might make enough money to live elsewhere but lives 
in Nyanga because she feels more comfortable there with South Africans. Brenda is a 
unique case also, because she is the only participant who shares an ethnicity that is 
officially recognized in South Africa. She speaks Swazi and Xhosa, easing her life in the 
township. People generally have no idea she is a foreigner. “People just think I am from 
Mpumalanga” she said with a grin (2011).  
 
“When they see you as part of themselves, they begin to understand” – Paul 
 
 Paul lives in Nyanga, because he cannot afford to live elsewhere. Yet, like Oliver, 
he has carved out a niche for himself there. He lives in a room attached to the house of a 
Xhosa family. He likes them very much. He credits them for keeping him safe during the 
“big” xenophobia in 2008. “That’s how I survive here. Everyone knows me there. If I just 
arrive there, even a small child will know me. ‘Paul! Paul!’” In response to my question 
about how to manage xenophobia in the locations, he responded,  
It’s hard. It’s hard. This is very hard. You can manage it. You can stay away from those 
kind of people. That’s what a lot of people do, you know. They stay in town, 
whatever…For me, the way, I see it, is to get close t  them, you know. To understand 
them, you know. To understand their suffering. To make them understand, you know…I 
make friends with them. And when they see you as part of themselves, they begin to 
understand, ‘No, These people are just the same as us’ (Paul 2011). 
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 Still, Paul has to navigate a landscape that may present danger around any corner. 
He, as much or more than any other participant, could convey to me the finer points of 
dealing with potential trouble from young township gangsters. Traveling in numbers is 
preferable, Paul says in agreement with Oliver and others. But that simply is not possible 
for Paul, who does not live with friends his age. H must travel alone to work each day, 
as well as go out alone to buy food and other necessiti . Some of his more creative 
techniques were not elicited by me, but by a charismatic Rasta from Malawi who came 
by Paul’s work place for a chat one day. During this conversation, they joked with me 
about the multiple times they had been robbed or attacked. Paul and the Rasta agreed on 
numerous finer points of strategy. For instance, Paul s id, it may seem counter-intuitive, 
but when you see a group of five or six young toughs walking toward you, the worst 
possible thing you can do is move out of their path, or God forbid, cross the street. Then, 
he said, potential criminals’ predatory instincts get excited. They will suspect you have 
something to protect that they probably ought to take off of your hands. One time, on a 
pay day, Paul was walking to the store to buy food with a good sum of money in his 
pocket. This very situation occurred, and without flinching or showing his fear, he barged 
seemingly without thought through the group of troublesome-looking potential assailants.  
 The stories that got Paul and the Rasta laughing te hardest were about playing 
off of the weaknesses of bully psychology -- that which preys on those perceived to be 
unable to fight back. They thought this mentality underlay much of the xenophobic 
violence in the locations. Paul’s favorite story of any robbery attempt happened when a 
skolie pulled a knife on him in a dark street in Nyanga. Without hesitation, Paul reached 
dramatically into the breast of his winter coat to pull out his gun. Of course, Paul did not 
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have a gun, but before that became apparent, the assailant was running headlong down 
the street for safety. Making friends with South Africans and building cultural 
understanding, either by choice or by necessity, has undoubtedly aided those who live in 
locations. No number of friends, however, is sufficient to protect someone if they do not 
share such street smarts or Paul’s knack for staying al ve in difficult circumstances.    
 
IV. Language 
 Participants conveyed that lacking facility with a local South African language or 
publicly using one of their own languages is the most effective way of drawing attention 
to oneself as being a foreigner (see also Warner and Finchilesu 2003). “For foreigners, if 
[locals] see that you don’t speak their language…you know that xenophobia you see. 
People they just hate the other people, the others coming here” said Canaan drawing this 
conclusion after only two months of experience. Those participants who lived in 
locations expressed that knowledge of Xhosa was crucial (Paul 2011; Pascal 2011; 
Brenda 2011; Pardon 2011; Oliver 2011). Pardon and Brenda had the easiest time 
adjusting linguistically to Cape Town. Brenda is fortunate to speak Swati as a mother 
tongue, which belongs to the Nguni branch of the Bantu language family along with 
Ndebele, Zulu and most importantly for Cape Town, Xhosa. “It is dangerous [to live in a 
township as a foreigner], especially when you don’t talk their language. They’ll know 
you are a foreigner” (Brenda 2011).  
 Pardon’s mother has been cross-border trading between Cape Town and 
Zimbabwe for thirty years, even during Apartheid, he claims. She got him into Pinelands 
High School where he studied for years. When he came to Cape Town to work for his 
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mother full time running their stall, he already had a group of South African friends, 
along with a command of English and Xhosa. For him, interactions with South Africans 
feel rather normal. He doubts his language skills make much difference in the 
cosmopolitan city center, but is certain they would be invaluable in the locations, where 
he feels fortunate not to live.  
 Thomas, in one of his many surprising statements, told me that he would like to 
live in Khayelitsha because he hears life is good there. But for the moment he would not 
move there, even if it was closer to town and his work. “You know, me, I can’t say it feel 
right. Because you know me I’ve got a problem of language. I cannot communicate one 
another with the citizens people. So to me, thinking that maybe it’s right to stay around 
the town and to learn their language. Then I’ll go to stay there” (2011). I doubt the sage 
Oliver would advise Thomas to make that move, but he would certainly agree with him 
about the importance of language skills in the locati ns. “If I am on the train going from 
Khayelitsha to Cape Town, if you speak and you are a foreigner, they just look at you, 
maybe they start speaking bad about you” (Oliver 2011). Oliver tries to only speak Xhosa 
on trains and in Khayelitsha.  
 
V. Exceptions to the rule? 
 Perhaps because of his social proximity to locals, O iver may be exposed to a 
fuller spectrum of South African personalities, and thus, has more hope than most that 
xenophobia can wane in the years and decades to come. Oliver told me two stories about 
South Africans actually protecting foreigners from attacks.  
I’ve said, there are some people who are very good. S uth Africans. Very helpful. And 
they don’t like to see foreigners being segregated. I see on the train, when people turned 
against their own…What happened was the foreigner got in the train, stood inside the 
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door. [A South African] guy started talking bad things about him, insulting. [The 
foreigner] didn’t answer, just keeping quiet. So when [the South African] started up, 
trying to manhandle him, that’s when all the people stood and said ‘You started a thing. 
This guy didn’t say anything bad to you! Why are you going to beat him?’ So they said, 
‘We are going to teach you a lesson. You must learn to espect other people!’ (Oliver 
2011). 
 
 These South Africans threatened to beat the man up if he persisted, and he quickly 
backed down. Oliver also told me about a similar event, on the train from Khayelitsha, 
when a man had started to shout insults and threaten a Sudanese friend of his. The 
Sudanese man kept quiet, but the South African persist d. He walked up to Oliver’s 
friend and began to unzip his trousers, about to urinate on him. Just then a South African 
school girl stepped in between them and shouted at the assailant. She kept shouting until 
she was shoved in to a wall. Then other passengers int vened to stop the altercation.
 A few migrants spoke in a way about xenophobia that s owed their appreciation 
that not all black South Africans were dangerous, or their hope that one day things might 
change. “People [in Nyanga] also marched to stop the xenophobia,” said Paul. Blessing 
said, “I think they say if they find that person who started that [xenophobia in May 2008], 
they sentence life in prison. Because all the old people who stay in the location, they are 
against that. If they catch you, they will beat you” (2011). Andrew, Edmund and Issa 
were among those who voiced the importance of the individual “hearts” of black South 
Africans in the dynamic of xenophobia. Issa was grabbed by a Xhosa man during the big 
xenophobia. Instead of being attacked he was hugged repeatedly as the man told Issa how 
stupid the attackers were and how much good he thought that foreigners brought to South 
Africa. “You are not going anywhere. You are my brother,” the man said. “Many people 
don’t want us to leave because we bring a lot” (Issa 2011). Edmund, no stranger to 
xenophobia himself, still thinks a portion of South Africans still like foreigners, some 
blacks included, because foreigners like to work. Migrants work, make money and are 
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able to pay rent and take up rooms. Generally, Edmund says, “foreigners are good for 
business” (2011), and some South Africans recognize and appreciate that.  
 One of the stories that I found the most remarkable came again from Issa. He told 
me about a time when two Xhosa teenagers came into the market carrying a drum. He 
recognized them as local street musicians, who played nd danced in the streets around 
Saint George’s Mall. They approached the stall across from Issa’s, owned by another 
Senegalese man named Mansour, where there were a number of drums for sale. They 
asked with trepidation if there was anyone who could fix their drum, the head of which 
had split. Mansour offered to fix the drum for them for free. As they waited, one of the 
boys sat next to Issa. 
He was young but intelligent. So he was asking himself a question out loud, telling 
himself, ‘I don’t know what we gonna do if these peo le were not around, because we do 
not know how even to fix a drum. We don’t know what a drum is.’ You know the djembe 
is something coming from West Africa. But though he was like thinking out loud, ‘Ok so 
my question is like what we gonna do if you guys leave? Because you are clever. You are 
intelligent. What you can do, we cannot do’ (Issa 2011). 
 
 Tales like those above give the impression that there are seeds of hope within the 
South African populace, even amongst poor black South Africans. Some migrants may 
harbor a secret hope for a new day when anti-foreigner sentiment will be held by a 
perhaps only a small minority and will no longer be a daily threat. In the meantime, 
however, almost no participants take a very sunny view of township life, despite the 
survival strategies available. Pascal, for instance, was married to a South African woman 
who passed away many years ago. He has lived in the locations longer than any other 
participant. I find his perspective to be noteworthy. He does not deny that having Xhosa 
friends is important for living in the locations. However, despite the fact that he has 
Xhosa friends, half Xhosa children, and he speaks Xhosa fluently, “[T]he others they 
don’t like you,” he said. “Because if they just see you, just maybe your accent, or the way 
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you’re talking or you know, they say ‘ah that is a foreigner!’ It’s really bad…You will 
find maybe they rob you all the time, rob your things. You can’t just walk free” (2011). 
No amount of friends or language skills has made Khayelitsha a nice place to live for 
Pascal.  
 
VI. Conclusion: “You can’t just walk free” 
 I conclude that the greatest material spatial impact of xenophobia on African 
immigrants to Cape Town is the incredibly high cost differential between living in the 
locations, like Khayelitsha and Nyanga, versus the city bowl of Cape Town or the 
relatively safer suburbs, like Maitland, Woodstock r Goodwood. The irony of this 
spatial impact is palpable. Africans migrate to South Africa primarily to make money. 
Most have few or no other career prospects in theirhome country. The sole hope they 
have for a secure future is to earn and save money in South Africa. Additionally, nearly 
every migrant is contributing, sometimes vitally, to the financial support of family at 
home. Such is the psycho-social impact of xenophobia, that despite these immense 
pressures to husband hard-won resources, migrants do not hesitate to pay much higher 
rents in order to increase their security, or at lest their sense of it.  
 Security is a large concern for South Africans of all stripes, let alone for 
foreigners. Truly, no amount of money spent on improved living conditions can ever 
fully prevent attacks. Nor can even the most strict and austere survival strategies fully 
prevent attacks. The impact of xenophobia on African immigrants and on their lived daily 
experiences of life and work in South Africa is clear y immense.  
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 The xenophobic dangers associated with mobility in Cape Town present the 
second largest spatial impact on daily life for African migrants. The pressure to return 
home before dark causes anxiety for workers who are not allowed to close down shop 
when they desire, but only when owners allow. For owners without assistants who can 
close for them, the pressure to travel before dark necessitates shutting down operations 
earlier in the day, limiting profitability. Owners also have to pay higher pushing rates if 
they are in a hurry, because pushers usually service a number of stalls who compete 
financially for priority.  
 Though most migrants have developed and utilized effective strategies to avoid 
bodily harm, theft and insult, they still endure daily stresses and fears for their safety. 
Doubtless, many of these survival strategies comproise the quality of life, exchanging 
the pleasures of freedom for the safety of living small and quiet lives. “The pathos and 
real-life tragedies of the ‘immigrant experience’ go beyond any Foucauldian symbolic 
violence associated with social dislocation and economic hardship. Tens of thousands of 
foreigners are constantly on the lookout against real threats that range from petty 
harassment and intimidation to unprovoked beatings, rape, and even murder” (Murray 
2003, 459). Murray’s statement accurately portrays the physical dangers ever-present in 
daily life of African migrants to South Africa. The related anxiety of constantly being on 
the lookout, in and of itself, must leave an indelibl  mark on daily experience and a strain 
on the human psyche. Who can quantify such daily a threat and its effects on human 
wellbeing? The threat of isolated xenophobic manifestations of violence is omnipresent 
in the African migrant’s experience of South African place and space. On top of this, 
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there lurks the more unsettling and very reasonable fear of more large-scale xenophobic 
manifestations in the future.  
 It would be an entirely fair question for a sensible person to ask why on earth 
migrants, such as my participants, would put themselve  through such anguish. In the 
following chapters I aim to address this issue, and hopefully answer this question. I 
attempt to do so by enlarging the scale of my analysis to the regional and global forces at 


















Chapter 8. Migrants and Home 
 
 
I. Locating the Migrant Life 
 Simon still owed $1200 USD in labola (bride-price) to his father-in-law. He had 
gotten a reduced rate because he had gotten his wife pregnant before they were ever 
betrothed, but it was still a considerable sum for Simon to pay back on top of his other 
responsibilities at home in Zimbabwe. You would notknow, though, that such a large set 
of responsibilities hung over the sarcastically jovial young man.  
 There was something that buoyed Simon’s spirits each d y. It is beyond my 
abilities to psycho-analyze Simon, but I have a suspicion it revolved around his phone. 
No one in the market was glued into technology more than Simon. He didn’t have what 
we would call a “smart phone” in America, but it had more capabilities than any other 
phone in the market save that of Bakary, which was comparable. When not attending to 
his stall, Simon was constantly perched against a traffic pylon at the edge of the square 
listening to Zimbabwean music or texting Zimbabwean friends.  
 While there are many ways of “doing migrancy,” Simon’s was indicative of what 
is seen by many as a new way, a “transnational” way. Transnationality has many 
definitions, but the definition that underlies them all is a simultaneous embeddedness of 
people or processes in more than one national space at a given time. It is an incredibly 
helpful tool for locating the physical movement butalso the nature and significance of 
migration in our current era.  
 The “transnational” turn in the study of migration began with attention to 
networks, and then extrapolated network theory to a macro-level (Castles and Miller 
2009). It is also partially a response to a trend whereby migrants find it increasingly hard 
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or unappealing to assimilate and must seek out new strategies of self-advancement 
(MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Schiller et al 1995). Transnational theory, 
being the cutting edge of migration theory, especially n Geography, is useful to my study 
as it situates it in the primary and patently spatial d scourse currently utilized by South 
African migration researchers. More importantly, however, the daily reliance on and 
responsibility to “home” in both the material and eph meral sense for the migrant 
livelihoods I studied is powerfully supportive of the most difficult notion within 
transnationality: differentiating it from the international.  
 One of the main dilemmas within transnationalism has been finding the dividing 
line between the Transnational and the merely international. For most researchers, this 
division is clear when migrants function in a way that is simultaneously embedded in two 
spaces. According to Nina Glick-Schiller et al., “Transmigrants are immigrants whose 
daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders 
and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one state” (1995, 
48). Clearly, for these authors, identity plays a large part in separating human agency 
from macro-level push pull factors.  
 Transnationalism also allows for migrant identities to be reconsidered apart from 
the assimilation theory. Crush and McDonald see ident ty in migrants as a hybrid: several 
identities that combine home and destination (Crush &McDonald 2002). Transnational 
linkages also connect migrants strongly to their families or home societies, and thus 
connect specific localities to specific localities (Horevitz 2009; MacGaffey & 
Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). Additionally, linkages that are more simultaneously “multi-
stranded” have a better claim to being transnational (Schiller et al 1995, 48). For Crush 
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and McDonald, “The occasional trip home, or the sporadic sending of remittances to 
family and friends, are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to justify the labeling of a 
new migration phenomenon” (Crush &McDonald 2002, 9). These stricter definitions 
make transnationalism more analytically useful as an explanatory theory. 
 Therefore, for transnationality and this project to be iteratively supportive in any 
meaningful way, migrants in Cape Town would have to be connected firmly in two 
places, simultaneously. These places need to be specific locations or sets of locations. 
And the connections ought to be consistent and active presences in migrants’ lives, both 
acting upon them and allowing them to act through them.  
 
II. Transnational Modalities 
 I argue that transnationality is best understood nt o  a single spectrum, with the 
international on one end and the ultimate form of simultaneous embeddedness on the 
other. Rather I think migrants’ lives in Cape Town ought to be understood in terms of 
transnational modalities that often overlap or feed into one another. For some researchers, 
Simon’s life was arguably the most transnational, at le st in the physical sense. It was 
very interesting that a man could live materially so much in Zimbabwe. His actions were 
physically sending the electronic signals to that other place. And he was listening to 
songs written, recorded and downloaded in that place. It would have been easy to 
conclude once again that technology has forever alted migration. Yet, in some ways, 
though it is new and therefore remarkable, the technology itself seems the least 
interesting part.  
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 Technology and its innate appeal has without a doubt played a part in the 
popularity of the theory. Technology has indeed played a role in the shifting nature and 
complexities of migration. The role of technology is v tal to understanding migration 
networks today (Sadouni 2009). While this is a worthy and useful field of study, our 
cultural obsession with gadgetry often diverts a weight of attention to it that is in some 
ways unjustified in light of the larger project of mapping human experience. Put another 
way, our geography cannot become an Apple commercial.  
 Transnational theory’s usefulness is not limited to helping scholars to understand 
how migration is new. In fact, it helps us understand more profoundly how migration has 
always been and always will be. For this reason, while it is a very important factor, 
technology cannot be the sole or even the principle vantage point from which to 
understand migration now in South Africa or elsewhere. Put another way, though 
Simon’s shiny phone was extremely important to him and therefore important to me as 
researcher, it was his connection to home that glued him to it.  
 
III. Is Transnationalism New? 
  Some criticize that the new phenomenon of transnatio l migration is only “new” 
because of technology. If it is really an age-old practice, does it merit a new term? 
Researchers like Crush and McDonald also question if technology is the deciding factor 
in the high intensity of exchanges and embeddedness that marks transnationalism (2002). 
Other geographers note what they perceive as redirections of transnational theory for its 
cultural or rhetorical potential (Koser 2003; Mercer et al. 2009), meaning that the issue is 
moot for those who seek to use the theory as a formof activism. “The idea of global civil 
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society has become emblematic of a progressive politics in global times” (Mercer et al. 
2009 145). This bent in much of the theory’s proponents presents a problem for the usage 
of the theory. “The insistence that transnational connections are inherently more 
progressive than local ones leads us to wonder if they are being fetishized” (Mercer et al. 
2009, 145). Mercer et al. present a valid concern that the ways that migrant networks are 
imagined often do not take into account the varied, historical and contextual nature of the 
relationships between home and diasporas, including the agency and power relations 
involved (Mercer et al. 2009).  
 I take Mercer’s et al. direction to heart as the cosmopolitanist trend in 
transnational literature is evident to me as well. While new forms of migrancy do interact 
in subversive way with nation-states, many authors treat transnationalism as a process of 
bypassing or even effectively dissolving the Nation-State. Authors sometimes note how 
transnational behaviors transcend the nation-state or r nder borders obsolete. In even the 
most extreme cases of transnationalism, we cannot say that it transcends the project of the 
nation state. As Lenri Shea put it, “Globalization does not mean a collapse of borders or 
geopolitical entities and therefore cannot separate the influence of…‘governmentality’ on 
mobile individuals” (2008, 106-107).  
 Though migrants may not always be conforming to the nation-state’s will, or may 
feel somewhat “deterritorialized” (Burman 2002), wemust recognize that the nation-state 
is a major part of the migration context (Willis et al. 2004; see also chapters 7 and 8 in 
this dissertation). It is also a character in the migration story, with a collective will as 
important as that of the individual migrants. Lenri Shea’s work has been especially 
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helpful to me as it gives credence to issues of ident ty, but also respects the role of space 
and place.  
  Thus, transnationalism may not be all that new, both in the more material and 
ephemeral senses. It does not render the nation-state null and it exists independent of the 
tools and technologies migrants use to perpetuate it. However, the theoretical principles 
have been newly bundled, and this assemblage has proven very fruitful despite its 
problematical usages. Transnationalism has encouraged scholars to ask better questions 
and form more nuanced understandings. The transnational outlook is invaluable to this 
study, especially regarding migrant’s relationships to home. 
 
IV. Centrality of “Home” 
 In my discussions with migrants in Cape Town, home was the primary factor in 
their imagination of their lives. Home was the beginning, the middle and the end, even 
though the middle consisted of them living abroad. In this middle, this second act, 
migrants did talk to me about communication, about culture, about art and music. They 
spoke of politics and many other kinds of embeddedness. But the particular sort of 
embeddedness that was primary in their speaking about their lives was financial, and 
those financial concerns were driven by family.  
 Transnational theory encourages scholars to engage in th  intangible elements of 
daily life. As geographers, this is at first a daunting task, to map the physical is hard 
enough. But to map desire? Want? This is not easy. But by following the thread of these 
unseen aspects of daily experience, I found a remarkably succinct pattern, in which 
migrants live in cycles relating to their home. This pattern not only helps to understand 
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some of the enduring puzzles of contemporary migration (like why do migrants routinely 
put themselves in the position to struggle under th state and xenophobia?) but gives us 
some glimpse into the future of migrancy in a globa context of widening inequality 
combined with increasing regional mobility.  
 In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss in broad strokes how home affects 
migrants and how migrants affect home. In the next chapter, to conclude the analytical 
body of this project, I will dig deeper into this dichotomy to reveal cycles of 
contemporary migration in Africa which show home and “away” not as separate 
polarities, but more like wickets on a cricket pitch, that is to say, intimately linked and 
co-dependent, with both healthy and unhealthy connotations of the term.  
 
V. Home is the Best 
 An important context for the dislocation of migrants from their home has been 
covered in the historical background. However, it bears repeating that global migration is 
widely related to poverty and wage differentials. Admitting the role that real economics 
plays in daily life for migrants in no way diminishes the importance of the less tangible 
aspects. The specific expressions of migration tendo differ considerably based on the 
cultural, linguistic and historical connections betw en nations. For my participants, 
however, the decision to move to South Africa ultimately rested in a combination of these 
contexts, but the perceived financial opportunity was the only consistent factor amongst 
migrants. 
 Even for those who left their homes due to political strife or the threat of 
assassination, the context of greater perceived financial opportunity in South Africa 
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played a strong role. In fact, all but a very few African migrants who participated in this 
study felt compelled to leave their homes solely for financial reasons (Paul 2011; Gilbert 
2011). 
 Issa claimed that his goal was to earn R100,000 and that he hoped to accomplish 
this goal in 2012. He was not close to the goal but as he says, “Everyday I wake up in my 
bed, I’m saying today is the right day to make likea lot of money” (2011). His hope is 
not only representative of the characteristically positive nature that so many Senegalese 
possess but of the expectant nature that participants generally displayed.  
 Usually the expectations were far lower than Issa’. Robert said, “I come here to 
get something and go back. I came here to survive” (2011). Emmanuel and Edmund, 
despite being only in their twenties, suddenly found themselves their head of their 
families with the death of their parents. Their siblings are somewhat dependent on them 
for small influxes of cash. Most often Edmund can be only a little help. It gives him a 
sense of success though to at least not be a burden on them. Emmanuel has a larger vision 
to someday buy and sell properties in Zimbabwe, thoug  for the moment he is no better 
off than Edmund and he showed no illusions as to the practicality of his goal. Daily life 
for him, as for Edmund, consisted of survival.  
 Bomani expressed a practical view of the pressures to stay in South Africa, 
despite and because of the largely dire circumstances. 
You know like we have to find somewhere to start. The problem with we African people, 
I can say we black people, that are different. Sometimes, you know, like your parents 
they can make a way for you. While you are still growing they can keep money in a little 
bank, you can go to school, after that you can have a job you see? You see there? But we, 
they only raise us up, then you have to find your own start. You have to dig to find your 
own things. That’s why you see like many people here, when they find their own things 
maybe after 40 years, maybe 50 years…maybe white people they can have when they are 
20 years. But for us that is why we come here, to find our start (2011). 
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 This curious connection to home seems to drive so much of the migrant 
experience. As Bomani indicated, it is for their future at home that most of the migrants 
had come to South Africa and the market. To understand his complex and somewhat 
ironic separation, I asked each participant to discus  their relationship to home. Despite 
the personal nature of some of the questions, thoughts and musing about home and 
migrants relationship to it were offered up liberally.  
 Put simply to begin with, ‘home is the best’. This comment came verbatim in at 
least half of my interviews, and in some form or another in the others. Not one participant 
indicated that they came to South Africa because they disliked their home. Instead, 
mitigating factors like famine, economic collapse, war or dictatorship had changed their 
home to make it less hospitable. A few seemed able to d al with the estrangement from 
home with equanimity, the self-styled “cosmopolitan” Samba being the best example. In 
general, even the Senegalese like Issa, Mamadou and Bakary were also less emotive 
about the separation from home and familiar surroundings. When the recorder was off, 
however, I found that those feelings were to some ext nt masks. There is undoubtedly a 
bravado and confidence that the Senegalese I spoke with utilized to cover feelings of 
heartache, or any other negative emotion for that mat er. Many like Samba enjoy travel, 
but even the stalwart Senegalese hurt and yearn for home. They also feel that ‘home is 
best’ not only because it is where they personally feel most comfortable, but because of a 
cultural pride displayed more than any other group in the market (Mamadou 2011; Issa 
2011; Bakary 2011; Samba 2011).  
 Most participants, however, were openly heartbroken over their distance from 
home. Migrants are in South Africa physically, but a key component of their psyche is 
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rooted in a different space. Participants routinely used the metaphor of a vital part of their 
anatomy being missing from their body (Pardon 2011; Robert 2011; Pascal 2011). “My 
body is here, but my heart is at home. My mind is in Kenya” (Amos 2011). “Home is the 
best. My heart is in Kenya” (Shana 2011). “You know where your family is, that’s where 
your heart will be. They are my primary concern” (Canaan 2011).   
 Ibrahim’s home, Khartoum, Sudan, has been so irrevocably changed and he has 
been in South Africa for so long. He admits that for him South Africa is more his home. 
Yet he states that the reason for this, despite all the fundamentalist policies restricting life 
in Sudan, is mostly that his loved ones are no longer in Sudan. Ibrahim’s unique situation 
helps to point out the role family plays in the coneptions of home and their significance. 
 “But you can’t say, that. Wherever you go, the place you were born, it is the best 
place for you” (2011). This is especially important to note when many popular theories 
attempt to explain migration in pure rational terms relating to wage differentials and other 
economic indicators.  
 When asked if they would go home if they had a choice, participants responded 
overwhelmingly, yes indeed. This begged the obvious question of why they were not 
home, then. What was preventing them from making that c oice? As Bomani put it, he 
had to come to South Africa if he ever wanted to have  prosperous life in Malawi. 
Participants responded similarly, in matter-of-fact terms that like Bomani, they simply 
felt they did not have a choice. No matter if participants came to South Africa to escape 
persecution or improve their finances, they unanimously felt that, now in South Africa, 
they were to acquire something that could not be gotten at home. Were they to go back, 
 151
they would have less than they imagined they would need to sustain them (Mamadou 
2011).  
 Most also have dependents and responsibilities at home. Robert regrets missing 
big family events, yet, as he explains “I missed the money first, before I miss the family. 
Like me if I go like this, they can just maybe be happy like two three days. Then be like 
we miss you whatever whatever. But if I stay there lik  four days then maybe they start to 
see the finance. I have nothing also you see” (2011).  
 
VI. Home as Emotional Strength  
 Though thoughts of home can cause heartache and feelings of estrangement, the 
maintenance of a connection to home can actually hep migrants achieve their goals. This 
manifests in a few ways, the most common of which are words of affirmation of home, 
the knowledge that home is well, the assurance of social integration back home and the 
mental and psychological anchor it provides.  
 The favored method of contacting home is the telephone and most migrants call 
home regularly. The younger migrants tended to call more frequently than older migrants. 
Age may not be the mitigating factor per se, but the fact that most of the migrants over 40 
came from Congo, Angola and Sudan, where their families were without phones, have 
fled home themselves or are more self-sufficient financially. In addition, most of the 
migrants from those countries had brought their spou es and children with them, as 
opposed to other African migrants, fleeing from economic troubles alone. Pascal from 
Kinshasa, for example, only calls home if there is a pressing concern or problem. Some 
of his family is in South Africa, and they have incomes. The others back home in the 
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DRC are sisters who are married, removing much of te feeling of responsibility for him 
to provide for and watch over them.  
 Isabelle can rarely reach her family, because they liv  so far away from telephone 
service. Last she heard, six months before we spoke, two of her nephews had died of 
malnutrition. This is incredibly sad news, but Isabelle does not regret finding out. Being 
engaged with tragedy or sadness at home can serve to maintain social and familial bonds 
as much as great happiness. Oliver and his family, for instance, share a constant state of 
despair at his absence, and yet they still maintain close ties, talking often. “Ah they are 
missing me a lot. Missing me a lot…Ah it pains me a lot”.  
 “Having that connection hurts?” I asked.  
 “Yeah it hurts ‘cause they are always asking, “when are you coming?”  
 Communication is a double edged sword for Oliver and family: the pain of 
distance mingled with the joy of connection. Despite the stress placed on the family 
because of this sadness, they remain closer than ever Oliver assured me. Going further, 
he mentioned “Sometimes I’m always on Facebook what’s ppening there. People being 
killed, some being abducted. Some sick. Every night I always open my Facebook” 
(2011). One of the only participants to mention social media, or even email for that 
matter, Oliver displays that being in touch with the ragedies experienced at home causes 
him great pain. Yet, his deeper desire for connection causes him to sign on to Facebook 
knowing what often lays in store. In the end, because Oliver gets on Facebook knowing 
the sadness he may encounter, he is purposefully using it as a tool to keep in touch with 
the tragedies of home as well as the joys. “I just like to know. It feels good to have 
information about home” (2011).  
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 In a less macabre sense, home does act as the activ  source of emotional support. 
Gabriel was the first to point out that home can be a source of emotional strength. He 
remains close to Uganda in his mind because it helps him to stay happy in South Africa. 
“My life is there, in Uganda. Here I can look for some money…Because you can’t put all 
your mind here…so we work very hard here, so we can go back there.” Referencing the 
power of communication, Gabriel said, “Whenever I call them I feel just as if I’m home. 
They can tell you this and this. You can make it [emotionally] like this” (2011). Simon 
seconded this notion of comfort provided by communication with home. “Yeah you 
know I remember when they ask me, how are you there? I say fine. And also when they 
say, fine, I’m happy” (2011).  
 Andrew said that he also takes encouragement from calling home, “to work hard 
and to simply take life as it comes” (2011). Robert said, “Maybe there is some issue there 
with family matters. I must ask, how is life and what goes on? Whatever.”  
 “Do you ever get ay help from home?” I asked.  
 “Yeah I need to get the help there. Even some advice it help” (2011).  
 These simple comforts related to calling home were obviously important to the 
participants in this project.  
 Mamadou referenced the financial safety he feels having large network of 
communicative family members, both in Senegal and abroad in other countries. Even 
though there are the inevitable freeloaders, he said, it was still better to have his financial 
life intermeshed with that of a larger pool of extend d family because of the safety net 
created by having multiple income streams. Blessing also referenced how keeping in 
contact with home helped him financially. He uses contacts in Zimbabwe to arrange 
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cheaper business supplies, particularly stones for carving that are harder to find in South 
Africa.   
 “I’m lucky because we are a Christian family,” Oliver said. “So whatever I tell 
them about what I encounter in South Africa, they tell me they will pray for me. They say 
don’t worry. Things will be ok. Praying fasting for me that maybe God will help you.” 
After I asked him what this support mean to him, he responded, “That encourages me, 
makes me even stronger. When by the time that I think I’m giving up, that makes me gain 
my strength.”  
 Shana calls home primarily to check on the health of ailing mother, but also “Just 
to ask how they feel. Because I miss them. Home is the Best” (2011). Issa calls home 
every couple of days. He says its not expensive, maybe 5 rand for 20 minutes. Issa, like 
many I spoke with, just needs to hear that all are well and there is peace in the home. 
“’Cause you know, if you are far away from your family and you cut the connections, 
you are nothing. It can be like a very bad influence on you. Each and every day if you 
remember where you are coming from, and where you have to go, you are gonna be 
courageous to work hard and fill those gaps let at home.” Issa’s comment points to the 
way that responsibilities at home can motivate one t  work harder for their family, but 
also point to a deeper logic he expressed later.  
 The cost of calling home, surprisingly to me, did not seem to be a problematic 
factor for even the poorest market workers who liked to call home frequently. In fact, 
younger migrants, despite having fewer dependents at home, tend to call home more 
often. I found that this was due to the fact that tey are more often alone in South Africa. 
Robert calls home and talks to his sister every day. Asked why, he responded “Ah home 
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is the best. I have my own mother. She is still alive. My family is there. Sometimes I feel 
just to talk with them.” He especially likes to chek in on his littlest sister who was a 
newborn when he left home. He is amazed when his mom tells him that she is running 
and talking and playing with friends. Canaan calls home twice a week to check on his 
family in Zimbabwe, “Just to find out how they are faring there…You know where your 
family is, that’s where your heart will be. You have to. Have to hear how they are 
feeling” (2011).  
 Edmund echoed this rationale in his interview when asked about the importance 
of calling home. “Yes exactly! You must know if something wrong there. You must 
know each and every time.” When I asked why, he explained “You know maybe there is 
a funeral there you must know. If someone is sick you must know. So that you can make 
things like to organize the money to send if someone is sick. Something like that. Must 
know what is happening there. See, home is home” (2011). In short, for Edmund, it was 
important to be a part of life at home as much as possible, because his family is there. 
Emmanuel said, “Me I just want to know if they are fine. Is there anything wrong? See to 
just know how is home, how is everything at home…’Cause I can say I’m the only big 
guy in my family. So I must be the one who must know everything you know. Like the 
big guy in the family must stand strong.”  
 Despite his absence and his small ability to remit finances, Emmanuel feels a need 
to lead his family from South Africa. For those like him, such as Edmund, Amos and 
Shana, Abdou and Mamadou and many more, their greatsense of responsibility or 
longing, though a burden, causes them to find great comfort and or satisfaction when all 
is well at home. Even when there are problems, having communication allows them to 
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take a proactive and self-affirming stance in resolving any situation. The combination of 
the ability to act across large distances combined with the emotional burden of that 
distance, though somewhat paradoxical, lies near the very heart of the migrant 
experience.  
 The comfort that comes with having information about home, as I said above, is 
proportionate to the sense of responsibility one feels at home. However, in another sense, 
it is not. This is one example where we must distingu sh between two modalities of 
transnationality: in this case, that of responsibility and simple longing for home, and that 
of social power and positionality via knowledge. To be a part of things at home, to 
maintain an active role in home community, migrants must remain tied in to the 
happenings, large and small. Furthermore, if they ar  to maintain their stake and wield 
their social power, they need information regarding the changing landscape in order to 
recognize when and where it is appropriate and profitable to act. 
 Even for those without dependents at home, the same desire to be a part of things 
at home was always present in our interviews and coversations. In one of these 
interviews, things were going along much the way others had. Azibo said, “Yeah. I’m 
used to hear[ing] some stories back home. Even I heard ‘Your friend is get married.’ Find 
out who passed away.” I probed the issue further with Azibo, as with others. “Why is it 
important to have that information?” I asked. “You have to know. You have to know. 
You have to understand. I’m not there but I have to kn w what’s going on there. You 
have to be like a part of there” (2011).  
 His words, more than any others up to this point led me to understand another 
facet of this connection to home. His words impacted me. You have to be like a part of 
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there, he had said, with a desperate urgency. I began to think back to all the conversations 
and interviews I had completed. I began to wonder whether or not there was a different 
aspect to this connection to home that I was not fully appreciating. When examining the 
older migrants who have children and dependents at home, I realized, it is easy to see 
their urgency to be a part of there primarily as the urgency to provide for those 
dependents. However, I began to wonder if, from the outside, this more obvious 
connection might mask other, perhaps deeper anxieties about staying connected to home.  
 Thus it was the younger migrants, those with few or no dependents at home, who 
showed me that migrants feel a great, almost desperate need to be a part of life at home 
that is separate from a) direct financial or familial responsibility; b) the emotional desire 
for information that all is well at home; and c) the desire to connect for emotional 
support. In the following section I examine the burdens that home represent, taking care 
to pay attention to the urgency to be a part of there.  
 
VII. Home as a Burden  
 Much scholarly attention is paid to the role of remittance in the home connection, 
and for ample, well-founded reasons. I went to South Africa expecting this and was not 
disappointed. Indeed, remittance is a huge factor in the migrant relationship to home that 
I encountered. Yet, what migrants referenced most often regarding home was actually the 
emotional boon derived by simply being informed andbeing in the loop on matters at 
home. This plays an important part in the psychological and emotional health and 
strength of African migrants in South Africa.  
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This is also driven from a need to maintain a secur social and family position in 
the future inevitable homecoming. For the majority of migrants I spoke with, the 
connection to home was not only a source of strength and connectedness, but was also a 
burden. As discussed previously, the mere dislocatin from home is a burden in and of 
itself. Home is a burden, by its very nature when we are separated. However home also 
burdens the migrant in a more active sense. The array of family and friends who count on 
migration remittances for their advancement or survival can place staggering pressure on 
migrants. The cultural expectation on migrants to give is both a product of traits common 
to African cultures and influenced by how migrants portray themselves to family at 
home. This burden has far-reaching impacts on the migrants’ relationships to home and 
the overall migration cycle. The first issue to note is that financial responsibilities to 
home have a deep impact on the financial well-being of migrants in South Africa.  
No if you send money there it’s just, the money gonna help them there to buy what they 
want. That is the way only to help. Like to give. Because you cant like keep keep keep. 
Even the Bible say, give and you will receive (Bomani 2011). 
 
Later Bomani added, 
 
Bomani: If you don’t send money home, you know the problem is like if you go back 
there, you know like eh we African people like the parents they rely they depend on the 
kids because most of the things are tough on them. So if you yourself don’t send home to 
them, you can feel it, you can feel guilty. My parents they raised me up, they send me to 
school. I can speak, I can think, I can know how to do things. So you, you can feel it 
yourself.  
Me: Social consequences? 
Bomani: If you go home its …you can feel it. Its not g od. You can find many people 
they are suffering there. That’s bad (2011). 
 
Clearly, there were associations with guilt regarding remittance, a guilt 
that often intermingled with sympathy. 
 
“ Yeah, you know. Back home we are struggling there. That’s why we use…most of the 
time you have to do. It’s a must. It’s like a must. Me and my brother [are] like the man 




 Robert is explicit that he came to South Africa for himself, to improve his own 
fortunes. “But I can’t not help my mom,” he states r ignedly. Emmanuel and Azibo are 
relatively young in the market, only in their early-mid twenties, yet due to the tragically 
low life expectancies in their homes of Zimbabwe and Malawi, they find themselves at 
least partial breadwinners for not only for their own siblings, but also cousins. As the 
younger generation in the market, they arrived after th  post-Apartheid influx of 
migrants, and also after the solidification of market stall ownership. Thus, they, and other 
assistants like them, are among the most financially burdened by the relationship to home 
and the least able to make money in the market. Despite this difficult position, most 
migrants view the market as a much better place to work on average than the other jobs 
available to migrants in South Africa. Thus, where Emmanuel and Azibo may represent 
the poorest element of the market, they most likely r present a relatively more financially 
viable class than the majority of African migrants in South Africa. 
 Because the Malawian assistants in the market repres nted that young, poor, male 
demographic of migrants in South Africa, I thought it would be beneficial to do a group 
interview focused on their struggles. When the topic of connection to home came around, 
it brought out much more emotion and group dynamism than any other topic by far.  
 A principal theme that emerged from our conversation was that of the unending 
needs at home and the ways this stresses migrant life (Kihato 2009). As my questions 
moved to the struggle to remit, Edmund explained, “It’s like I’m thinking if I have five 
thousand, I can go to Malawi. The time is coming. Then there is a funeral. I can take two 
thousand and send. It’s not five thousand now, it’s three thousand. You start again. After 
that you get another problem again” (2011). That this was a common struggle, all the 
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participants strongly agreed. Bomani added, “Yeah because here you can see, we are 
many. We are six guys here. Even if you ask them, indiv dually, one by one by one, this 
week, even yesterday, they had phone calls from home, people they are asking for 
money, for help. So I don’t think you can... you ask Thomas, he say my mom just phoned 
me yesterday ask me for money for food or whatever. Ask Edmund, he say, ah they ask 
for school fees. Ask Azibo, Ask Robert here, same story. Some of us here have got wives 
also” (2011). 
 
 In a separate interview, Mamadou from Senegal had t is to say on the subject: 
Me: …So you have two country problems? 
Mamadou: Two country problems, yes.  
Me: You are dealing with the problems of Senegal and SA 
Mamadou: Yes Double work….I didn’t plan to have…You know when you go out of 
your country. All the time, you go the state to work, you have all the time two problem. 
Like problem South Africa, problem home. Like when you go to Senegal now, you want 
to work that side, you just have one problem. Like you work the metal, you sell for your 
family. But like for example now if I have 500 Rand. Make sure that 500 you don’t have 
to send something. Because even your foot sometimes a problem for you. Because when 
you wake up any time, your mama can call you, your brother can call you, your sister can 
call you. “Problem happen here.” You have to send home, money. They don’t care you 
work or not. 
 
 I understood Mamadou’s reference to his foot to mean than even a part of your 
body that you love and need can cause problems.  
Me: So people at home ever help you? 
Mamadou: no. No more help. One direction all the time.  
 
 As the conversation progressed with the Malawian focus group began discussing 
frustrations they had with remittance, beyond the immediate financial strain. When I 
asked if some of their friends and family at home had become dependent on them 
financially, laughter circled the table. Yes, they r plied unanimously. Some able-bodied 
folks at home did not work or work as hard as they could because of remittances.  
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 In another group interview, Amos from Kenya spoke about the struggles he faced 
trying to manage how his remittances were utilized in this context of dependence. “You 
find your father is dependent on you, your sister, your brother, maybe your cousin, maybe 
your sister’s son, their daughter, they are dependent on you. So you have to keep on 
looking. “Did you go to school? Did you do this?” (2011).  
 He neatly reflected the Malawian group’s feelings about the frustration of 
knowing that some of your hard-earned money was going to people who did not fully 
appreciate their sacrifices. These frustrations are in addition to the responsibility migrants 
like Amos and Edmund feel to know what is needed at home. “So if you don’t ask, they 
can’t do it the way you want it to be done. And they n ed money from you. So you have 
to confirm, the money is ok or is not ok” (Amos 2011). 
 The pressures to remit not only take a toll on the finances of African migrants, but 
also on their energies since many of them must also oversee the money’s transmission, 
distribution and management. From hundreds of miles away, even with the benefit of 
technology, it is easy to sympathize with the trouble this must present. This all begged an 
interesting question to me. This line of questioning resulted in by far the most interesting 
aspect of this research project. Why, in the context of their own struggle with poverty, 
knowing that some of their remittance will be wasted due to ill use, kids playing hookey 
from school despite the fees, lazy relatives becoming dependent and entitled, why do they 
continue to give when reasonable sacrifice is met with plain irresponsibility that frustrates 
remitters?  
 When I asked the Malawian group what would happen if they stopped giving as 
much as they did, due to their own frustrations, Bomani cut me off. “It’s negative! ‘Why 
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he is not helping us?’” I asked, trying to clarify his point, if people at home would just 
think that they were holding out and being selfish. Again heads bobbed excitedly and 
loud assents were given.  
 I probed further, asking if they would be welcomed home if they did not remit to 
the satisfaction of key people at home. “No,” Bomani clarified. “The first time they 
welcome you to see what you’ve got. But the ship is sinking now. Now they start to 
remind you. ‘Do you remember when we were suffering a d you didn’t help us? Do you 
remember that time?’ You see? After that, they try to reject you” (2011). The sentiment 
around the table was that this was a valid point. Their families would welcome them 
home at first, even if they did not remit much, butthen would begin shaming them to 
extract the wealth they had supposedly accrued. Not only would this limit a returning 
migrant’s options at home, but limits their own justification for receiving future 
remittances from other family members abroad when ty are in need.  
 The Malawi group’s appraisal of family dynamics still eemed bleaker than I’d 
expected, so I continued probing to better understand. What spurred the next exchange 
was when I asked if part of the issue was that family at home had not seen their suffering.  
Bomani: You see. They don’t see our suffering.  
Matthew: Same like you know like black people have got such a mentality like you know 
we are all happy here, we are doing better. But maybe one of us got sick. He is in 
hospital. Most of the people stay away from him yousee?  
(Lots of Ahs and Yeahs!) 
Matthew: Because they know now you are useless you see?  
Robert: Let him suffer! 
Matthew: It’s like that you see. They do that in families.  
Robert: That’s big in Africa. That’s Africa. 
 
 They all laughed and nodded at Roberts comment. I expressed my surprise at this 
apparently widespread feeling that their families and friends would retreat from a 
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member in need. “When I think of Africa I think of communities helping each other. Is 
that wrong?” I asked.  
Thomas: In Africa we are helping one another. 
Azibo: When there is like a wedding, do like  
Bomani: Something to beauty! 
Azibo: When there is something like you are together 
Me: So people like to get together to contribute to something? 
Bomani: When there is like small problems, like you are together.  
Azibo: It’s like weddings, funerals….you can say, like, Africans they are together…. 
Bomani: Funerals, you know  
Azibo: That problem you see, is the way he says it. He says when they meet you home 
the first time they say ah you work for the family now. Not talking about for the 
community. Just for the family. The family now start to reject. By the time they see you 
have don’t have money…  
Bomani Chimes in and vociferously agrees. All murmur agreement. 
Azibo: …So when something happens,  
(Matthew and Bomani start joking about the issue) 
Azibo: Maybe someone passed away, they can think like, ah, they can see, they can come 
in a huge number, coming together, condolences, but they can say, ‘Ah, we are Africans 
together.’ But for the families, ah there is…God no (2011). 
 
 The Malawian assistants felt that their families and communities shared a spirit of 
community only when there was something like a funeral or a wedding. In daily 
happenstance, however, families are the active unit, a d if someone were even to get sick 
within a family, these young men expressed frustration that their own families might 
reject them for simply being sick and losing their financial value to the family. They 
explained a variety of ways in which their ilk can become ostracized by choice or by bad 
fortune. I found this shocking, yet, the more these young men explained about the role 
financial contribution plays in social standing, a grim logic began to appear. Either one 
contributes financially, or one has no or diminished status.  
 Whether you are sick, or are struggling with life in South Africa, you are expected 
to either contribute or suffer the consequences when going home. These Malawian men 
did not argue with the sentiment shared by many that there is a spiritual blessing derived 
from contributing to family needs at home. When they give, it is not always out of 
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frustration. Many even give in a spirit of thankfulness to and care for their families 
(Bomani; Matthew; Edmund 2011). However, in this group interview, these young men 
displayed the stick lurking behind the carrot in the relationship to home. Despite the 
myriad challenges migrants face in South Africa, in the end, despite amassing little if any 
wealth, they run the risk of alienating family at home if they cannot keep up with the 
financial demands. Fear of social and familial ostracization was the driving force of 
remittance, even in the context of lacking a stake in how the money was spent.  
 Yet, few people I interviewed felt assured that they would be able to return home 
with much if any wealth. The Malawians agreed that only one or two migrants out of ten 
would be able to return home with enough money to buy a vehicle, let alone start a 
business or buy a home. Why would young men and increasing numbers of women put 
themselves in this position? Why come to South Africa to risk life or health, endure so 
much suffering at the hands of the political establishment and the populace? Why come 
to earn so little, give so much, and still run the risk of losing ones position in their 
community and even their family?   
 
VIII. Conclusion: Home is the Future  
 Despite the fact that perceived financial opportunity is what drew migrants to 
South Africa, the pursuit of money takes on cultural connotations all its own. Even in 
cases where basic needs of food and shelter are met, such as in Malawi or Senegal, 
pressure is put on migrants to provide a better lif for their families, including shelter, 
education, medical care, or expensive religious and cultural rites. Despite the differing 
levels of distress in participants’ home countries, all conveyed a sadness that they must 
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leave home in order to have a better future. Home is qu te simply the best place to be for 
my participants and the place to which they are trying to return. 
 I choose to reiterate this, the same point from which I began this exploration, to 
make clear that migration is a cycle, whether or not that cycle is achieved physically 
(Potts 2011). Home is the best. Home is the past. Home is also present. Now I restate that 
home is the future. Migrants in South Africa have shown that they harbor a deep longing 
to return home. The pressures of life in South Africa significantly help migrants feel a 
constant desire to repatriate. No matter how long they may wish to hold on and hold out 
for that last (or first) windfall, the vast majority of migrants inevitably return from their 
time in South Africa, and most often with little to show for it.   
 Even the more situated migrants (I am thinking of C ngolese (DRC) like Adele, 
Theresa, Helene, Patrice and Pascal and the Kenyan Amos, who all have multiple 
children in school in South Africa) still intend to return home when their children have 
achieved South African educations. This means that repatriation is perhaps fifteen years 
off in some cases, but for these migrants it is not any less desirous. South African citizens 
like Pascal and Adele, do not wish to stay any longer than necessary, even though they 
have achieved what so many other immigrants have dreamt of: an immunity from the 
systemic harassment by South African immigration burea cracy.   
  For many migrants, the Senegalese in particular, remembering home was a willful 
act of focus and determination. Remembering home was a spiritual state cloaking one in 
protection from the ills of spiritual decay, but also from laziness and personal or financial 
mismanagement. “Each and every day if you remember wh e you are coming from. And 
where you have to go, you are gonna be courageous to work hard and fill those gaps let at 
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home” Issa explained, and expanded upon later; “Yeswe coming with our culture and 
our positive behavior. That’s what we are doing. We are traveling with the culture. Not 
travelling only with a suitcase but we are going with the culture. It’s what we are doing. 
Like, never get yourself influenced in another country, especially in a negative way. Like, 
sometime you can see other people from other countries following just their heart and 
mind blindly and find them partying outside, drinkig. Sometime they can find 
themselves in the police station” (Issa 2011). 
 But the most fundamental purpose of the connection to home, is for migrants to 
maintain a place for themselves in the fabric of home society and, more importantly, 
family. Migrants who are hard-pressed for money might otherwise shy away from 
picking up the phone to call home, knowing that communication opened up the 
opportunity for family and friends to ask for help financially. Many migrants, as the 
Malawian focus group exclaimed clearly, are afraid to express the difficulties they are 
having in South Africa and to ask family and friends for emotional support, as it would 
undermine their status. Yet, despite the one-sided bur en the migrants feel in their 
thankless relationship to home, not only do they continue to pick up the phone, they often 
drive the communication.  
 In this chapter, I have attempted to show that this conundrum is easily understood 
in the context of the very rational need to be a part of there. Greater than the fear of 
financial burden, or even the discomfort and feelings of loneliness that would come from 
missing the news of home, is the fear of social displacement. This fear creates urgency, 
which in many can develop into anxiety. Because migrants’ successes in South Africa 
create social currency as much or more powerful than actual money, migrants begin to 
 167
interact with home in specific ways that create specific patterns of expectation, fantasy 
and social movement. In the next chapter I use the above understanding as a foundation 
to explore cycles of migration in which participants in this project find themselves: from 





Chapter 9. Cultures of Exile 
  
I. Introduction 
 Little has been inquired of migrants about how remittance represents an obstacle 
to migrants’ achievement of significant personal goals. Burman states that “Money and 
goods sent to sites and people left behind are inextricable from a sense of responsibility, 
attachment, guilt, and reparations” (Burman 2002). Altruism and responsibility are listed 
amongst commonly held theories of remittance (Addison 2005), yet, little of the 
remittance literature is focused on this issue of responsibility and duty, or viewing 
remittances as a personal obstacle. The focus is usually put on their long-term utility for 
the migrant or the short term utility of the receiver. This begs the question, “When 
migrants suffer from low wages and difficult living conditions in their host communities, 
why do they remit resources that could improve their own quality of life at that moment” 
(Cliggett 2005, 35)? Even if we view remittance as a long term social or economic 
investment strategy, there is still an obstacle being created in the short term for the 
remitter.   
 
II. Stuck 
 Pardon waved a hand toward the market and declared, “This market is a refugee 
camp.” I thought at the time that he might have been b ing a bit dramatic. As I look back 
on those words, however, I begin to see the true significance of what he was saying.  It 
was not strictly a market space to which he was refer ing. When he waved his hand 
toward the market, he knew that it was not a camp. It was decidedly a commercial space, 
yet it also represented a sort of way station. He also waved his hands toward the 
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enterprise in the bigger picture. The market, for Pardon, meant the migrants in the market 
and the struggles that had brought them there. Mostimportantly, though, Pardon was 
describing the struggles that kept them there in the light of the widespread understanding 
that everyone in the market would rather be somewhere else.  
 Migration is changing, and not only in South Africa. Perhaps it is always in flux, 
but Pardon identified a way in which migration is currently changing, as witnessed within 
a single generation. His mother had been doing cross-b rder trade between Cape Town 
and Zimbabwe since the 1980s. Eventually, she began bringing Pardon along to help with 
her trade, and in the late 1990s, got him enrolled in a Cape Town high school. Pardon has 
many Xhosa friends, speaks the language fluently and felt more at home in Cape Town 
than any migrant I met, except perhaps Brenda from Swaziland. Yet, Pardon is also the 
first to tell you that something about the situation of migrants in Cape Town is rotten.  
 Pardon’s words have rung truer the more this project has evolved. In previous 
chapters I have discussed the roles of the state and xenophobia as barriers to migrant 
livelihood, and I have discussed some of the micro-ec nomic reasons that market life is 
stratified, inert, cyclical, and rooted in processes of history and geography at various 
scales of time and space. These understandings help on  see how respondents could refer 
to the market as a “trap”. There is another process at work that is firmly connected to 
“home” as family, as an imagined place, and as a point b th of provenance and future 
return.  
 As I have already described, this other axis is the migrants’ relationship to home, 
a particularly burdensome one at that. This relationship is as stratified, cyclical, and 
rooted in processes of history and geography as the market itself (Kihato 2009; Potts 
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2010). Migrants’ relationships to home alienate them from and bind them to home at the 
same time. These cycles rely on a complex of migrants, family, friends and historically 
rooted patterns. As I aim to point out in this chapter, the new aspects of the transnational 
nature of contemporary migration has created not only a ew class of migrant, but a new 
culture in communities that send them. And all involved, it seems, are trapped.  
 “I was thinking I would come here for two, three, four months working, but I see 
not. It’s different. I’m stuck now.”   
 How was he stuck? I inquired of Robert.  
 “Money. Maybe I get nice money, I go in time.” Robert sincerely wanted to go 
home and stay there, but how can he when, as he put it, he “can’t even buy a tomato 
there”? He didn’t have a specific figure in mind that would compel him to go home. 
 “Then how will you know it’s time to go home?” I inquired.  
 “Ah, you know. It’s just life. Like the way I leave Jo’burg.” If you recall from the 
chapter on xenophobia, Robert left Johannesburg becaus  someone slashed his neck open 
with a broken beer bottle. Robert lives pretty much day by day, his stoicism and resign 
perhaps aided by a regimen of THC.   
 Robert is not alone, however, not in his predicament or his attitude toward life. He 
took part in the Malawian focus group, but was largely silent there. The others were more 
vocal about the struggles they faced as migrants. For these migrants, it is nearly 
impossible to go home with a car or a business that could make life better back home, and 
as one participant aptly noted, even then “a car is not a future.”  
 Odds are that Robert and the rest will go home some day. Will members of his 
family welcome him? Will they celebrate him and hissacrifice? Will they be willing to 
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help him out financially when he gets sick or needs help with school fees for his future 
children? He doesn’t know what figure would support his future at home, what would 
maintain his dignity or the respect of others. But he does know that he can’t go home 
now, not if he cannot even buy a tomato. Perhaps his only hope is that after a certain 
period of time, the length of his term in South Africa becomes a sort of currency that he 
can use to leverage acceptance and support out of his family upon his return.  
African migrants in South Africa commonly send remittances to family and home 
community members. Many sources estimate that official remittances (sent through 
official channels like banks and wire services) now exceed development assistance to the 
developing world (Addison 2005; Mercer et al. 2009; Pendleton 2006; Tall 2005; Tilly 
2007). When unofficial remittances are included, these estimates more than double 
(Addison 2005). Unofficial remittances include the carriage of cash, goods and gifts 
(Landau 2006), or the sending of money via unofficial ourier agents, trusted friends or 
family members (Addison 2005; Adepoju 2003; Tilly 2007). For remittance recipients, 
remittances secure food levels, finance children’s ducation and support the elderly and 
impoverished (Mercer et al. 2009; Schreider 2000).  
 Migrants are more likely to remit cash or gifts when they plan on retuning home 
sometime in their future (Cliggett 2003; Schreider 2000). The high number of migrants in 
South Africa who plan on returning home indicates that this can be expected to play a 
part in long term migrant strategy. “[T]he exchange of ‘things’ creates, represents and 
reinforces social relationships” (Cliggett 2005, 38). Remittances can socially 
acknowledge friends and family at home, help keep one’s stake in their future 
inheritance, or simply accumulate to build the one’s wealth in their home country 
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(Addison 2005; (Schreider 2000). Also educating children, if not seen as a duty, can 
translate into a long term strategy where children ca  get higher paying jobs to support 
the parent in old age (Schreider 2000). No matter why immigrants choose to remit, it is 
clear that state control regimes affect how they choose to do so. “Denied access to almost 
all formal banking services, poor immigrants must either stash cash in their residences or 
carry it on their bodies” (Landau 2009, 203). Transferring money outside of official 
channels reduces transfer costs, but is inherently risk , though not necessarily riskier 
(Addison 2005). 
 However, as Pardon notes, leaving the market to pursue bigger things or cash in 
on his goodwill at home is tricky. “But now here I feel like if I don’t pull up my mind and 
say I will come out of here, then I wont come out of here. It will be like some like for 
you; you wont be surprised if you come in 5 or 6 years and it’s the same people you meet 
here. They’ll be still here” (2011). He later went on to say, “There are some people who 
are coming from war like the Congolese. They don’t have a choice. They have kids here 
and they stay. But for most people this place is temporary. It’s supposed to be 
temporary.”  
 Indeed, Pardon saw as I did that the Congolese had a tendency to put down roots, 
primarily because their children were in South Africa. “But if I calculate from 2005, 
when I start ‘til now, that is six years I’ve been here. I feel like I stay more here than the 
more I go home. Because if I go home, maybe I go once or twice a year. And I won’t go 
long because of finances. Because there, maybe the small money I have, it can finish so 
quickly. I have to bring also stock to here. So most life I’m here. So it’s like for me, I’m 
not happy here.” 
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 When asked if he had accrued anything for himself in his time in the market, he 
responded, “Like for the past time I’ve been here, you know, what I can only say is I’ve 
managed to help my mother to build a house. That’s the only thing I can say I’ve done. 
Which it doesn’t bring income to me. It just brings shelter to me and my other siblings.” 
 Certainly this is a great accomplishment, even if he only played a part in the 
building of the home. “I wish I could get that income,” he continued. “This was the big 
idea when I come here. Maybe if I came here, if I work hard, I get income, I go see what 
I can do at home. But the way its going, its like if I don’t pull out from here, Ill end up 
stuck here and not even going back.”  
 Pardon went on to explain, however, that if he left the market, someone who was 
more desperate than him to be in the market would swoop in and his spot. Then he went 
on, if a plan to start out in Durban, for example, did not pan out, he would have to come 
back to the market as an assistant. If he lost his market spot, he said, he might have a 
white beard before he got it back. 
 Pardon’s example is extremely useful as an exclamation mark on my argument 
that South Africa’s migrant spaces are incredibly restrictive, via the state, society, the 
legal framework imposed by the city council, the context of poverty and even by the new 
migration cycles driven by expectation at home. Pardon has no dependents, an energetic 
and largely self-sufficient mother at home, ownership of a successful market stall with an 
ideal location, a command of local customs and langu ge and even a social circle that 
consist as much of South Africans as Zimbabweans. So, if he feels trapped in the cycle of 
contemporary migration, then it affirms the validity of the feelings of thousands of others 
with or without his advantages (Kihato 2009).  
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III. Remittance Dependence 
 Andrew had been in South Africa only a year, but you would not believe it from 
the amount of space he managed. Andrew was 21 and new e trant into a large-scale 
family operation. We met for his interview in a large retail space on Long Street devoted 
to African souvenir crafts. His uncle owned or leased the whole building and sublet space 
to the dozens of other operations. Andrew provided an interesting vantage point as he, 
like Pardon, came to South Africa on someone else’s coat tails with subsequent 
privileges. In this regard, he voiced a great sense of r sponsibility to home.  
 I asked him what the best way to help home was.  
 “They best way to help is not giving them money you see.” 
 I never heard it put so succinctly during my time in South Africa, yet, the 
statement summed up so much of what had been expressed by other participants. I asked 
him if he could elaborate. 
 “If my father is old enough, he can run his own business you see. You can go 
home, open him a shop, something like that. Because if you giving money you gonna 
give him money today, tomorrow it’s finished. He still needing money, you see. So the 
best thing I think is opening something he can do.”  
 When I asked if he had any immediate plans to do that, he replied no. But he was 
remitting periodically to his family. He saw the trap, saw that he was in it with both feet, 
but maintained a dream of opening a business some day for his family back home, the 
“income” Pardon spoke of.  
 That the trap existed was clear from talking to participants. That this sort of 
cognitive dissonance was so remarkably common, however, indicated that the trap may 
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be far larger than a market space, or an economic role, but may have engulfed an entire 
mode of thinking, an entire lifeway.  
 As Andrew said and scholars have noted, this whole mess might be improved if 
migrants were not pressured one way or another to remit so much of their finances. That 
way they could accrue capital for further investment that would largely end up 
developing their home countries in meaningful ways. The best way in the long term to 
actually help those at home, Andrew said, would be to not give them money.  
 Yet, this is not possible in the social context of c ntemporary transnational 
migration. Put another way, Andrew knows it is not really his choice. It is not possible 
because the social forces that drive the entire process are largely at home. These forces 
have decided that no, thank you very much, we will take the school fees or the food or the 
convenience of a microwave oven over the possible payoff of a functioning business at 
some undetermined point in the future. And when one day, the young people who have 
benefited from Andrew’s remittances have no place to work as adults. The process then 
will repeat itself for another generation. 
 Later in my group interviews, as themes began to take shape, I took the 
opportunity to test my hypotheses with the groups. After weeks of listening and trying 
not to lead the witness, I now took the opportunity to get their reactions to my 
perceptions. Regarding this issue, they all agreed that there was an irony at work in their 
existence. They had ultimately come to South Africa to build something back home, but 
their connection to home was actively preventing that.  
 
Me: So its like in the game of being an immigrant, Home Affairs wants some money, 
xenophobia pushes you into higher rent, so you lose more. Your mom is like “ah I have 
to go to the doctor,” or “oh there was a funeral, oh school fees yadda yadda yadda” 
Gilbert: Yeah yeah yeah! 
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Amos: All they way you get a problem.  
Me: And then you-- 
Amos: You have small money 
Gilbert: and you see the problem, maybe…you can get sick also. 
Amos: And you can’t work. 
Me: Or you get robbed also. Or it’s winter 
Gilbert: Yeah you see. 
Amos: Winter is making and losing. That’s what we do.
 
 To the group of Malawian assistants, I made the bold assertion, “I think that if 
you came here, even with all the challenges, you could actually make enough money to 
go home.”  
 This was greeted with “Yeahs” and hoots and “Ahhs” of assent.  
 “Quick Quick!” Bomani said.  
 “And if the six of you did that and went home to build a business in Malawi, you 
could improve the actual economy –  
 “Of the country!” Thomas interjected. This received the same chorus of assent. 
 “But that problem doesn’t get solved,” I went on, “because the money goes to 
rice, beans, t-shirts – 
 “School fees!” Bomani interrupted, along with other shouts of, “Yeah, School 
fees!” 
 When I asked about the idea of exile, the first time I had mentioned it to any 
participants, they agreed without reservation. Put simply, no one wanted to be in South 






IV. The Fantasy Cycle   
 A cycle of expectations is created when young children are repeatedly taught that 
when a person grows up, especially men, but increasingly women too, they move away to 
another country. They become relatively wealthy andprovide for the family. One day 
that child grows up to become the migrant provider th mselves (Kihato 2009). As 
mentioned earlier, because of the consumer use of remittance, the dire economic 
circumstances have gone unimproved. Once abroad, they find that the life of a migrant is 
incredibly taxing, in some ways more than life at home (Kihato 2009). They feel boxed in 
by the anti-immigrant sentiment of the country they are in, by linguistic difficulties 
sometimes, by hostile government apparatus, by the pull of easy money via crime, by the 
pull of attractive yet costly socialization, but perhaps most of all, by the constant volume 
of need and expectation at home.  
 Few migrants, if any, enjoy this position. Almost all would prefer to have never 
come, or to at least return home as soon as possible. Yet they stay, and more than that, 
they portray a façade to home when they enjoy the mantle of the wealthy paternal or 
avuncular figure, leader of the family. Yes they call home to simply connect with their 
loved ones, but also to make sure that monies remitt d are allotted to their satisfaction, 
that they are apprised of developments in family and community politics and that they 
maintain a position of seniority for their eventual return. There is little room in this for a 
conversation about meaningful development, about saying no to sending money for a 
microwave or a funeral so that the next generation can have opportunity for careers at 
home.  
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 That is not to say that meaningful development has not or cannot happen. The 
vehicle for this is often a “Home Association” whereby communities or migrant groups 
gather to reassess their priorities and build a community consensus to be stakeholders in a 
better future, at the cost of forgoing immediate usof remittances for consumables. But 
the fact that Home Associations like this have proven necessary, not just in Africa, but in 
Latin America and Asia too, points to the validity of the notion that without them, 
communities that routinely send migrants will only perpetuate the cycles of inequality 
that caused them to send migrants in the first place.  
 The fantasy loop begins, perhaps directly, via a prent telling a child that one day 
they will grow up and go away to help provide for their family and make something of 
themselves. The loop begins more powerfully, however, when the child is not simply 
commanded, but intrinsically motivated to become a migrant. How is this possible, when 
the reality of migrant life can be so incredibly grim, as described in this and previous 
chapters?  
 Interviews portrayed to me that migrants rarely are ble to return home with any 
meaningful capital to invest in a home, a business or even in something as simple as a 
car. During focus group 1 with the Malawian assistants, I began to ask more pointed 
questions about the likelihood of success in South Africa. The previous excerpt showed 
many of the reasons why migrants find it incredibly difficult to make financial gains in 
South Africa. Put simply, family pressure to remit depletes resources.  
 These more pointed questions revealed that these migrants felt that perhaps only 2 
in 10 migrants go home with anything substantial, with 8 returning home as destitute as 
the day they left. Pardon said that he thinks the number is more like 1 in 100, and I 
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believe that is much closer to the mark.  Because of the obvious shame that can 
accompany this inglorious return that the vast majority f migrants are destined for, 
migrants often find ways to communicate to their families back home that they were 
successful. This can be as simple as having nicer clothes than when they left, a nice 
watch, a nice phone, i.e. tangible items that requir  little financial upkeep yet 
communicate to other social actors the hallmarks of success that so many in their country 
can never hope to attain. And yet this pressure to “look the part” is a way that migrants 
divert their own resources into material goods. If, as Edmund said, a car is not a future, 
then what sort of future is a watch or a Manchester United jersey in regards to meaningful 
self-advancement or development? If migrants feel doomed to fail in their dream of 
bringing back a better life via wealth, they can at le st transport home a social standing.  
  
You know, what we do as people, if I came here, I tnd to call home, I lie to someone. 
‘Hey I’m here in South Africa, it’s a nice place. I have a nice job. I have a lot of money.’ 
You see? There’s no one who likes to tolerate failure. So if you go home and you don’t 
want to be a failure. Like me if I say I want to go to America right now, I don’t want to 
go then I call home and say, ‘Hey I’m stuck here.’ Already there’s a bunch of people who 
are waiting for me! When I go, they are like, ‘Hey, here at least there is hope in the 
family. The family will bloom into a better life’ (Pardon 2011).  
 
Like the way were sitting right now. They just say ‘I got big brother in South Africa. 
He’s working there.’ They think you always you have money. They think like that. In 
Africa it’s always like that. When you move from home, all the people they just think, 
when you come you arrive and you are the king. You are the king. They see you come, 
and they think anything you have in the world you can do (Mamadou 2011). 
  
 Even migrants who know how hard the life is can fall into imagining that a 
different migration destination might still be the answer to their dreams.  
 
Like for me I stay here for three years. Maybe I go home. I bring something. When they 
see ‘Ah! Its easy! I can go there. I can get something easy.’ For us here in South Africa 
we see someone [return] from America, he bring something, he bring money, we think 
‘Ah! It’s better to go maybe to America!” But when you go there and reach there you see 
and you realize, “Oh it’s not.” (Azibo 2011).  
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 Though destitute, migrants return home with as much of a façade of success as 
they can possibly muster. The small minority that retu n with the façade, the merit badge, 
and the trappings of success (that can manifest as gifts for family and friends, a car, a 
home or even a business) give enough substance to th culture-wide fantasy that many 
pretenders are able to draft in their wake by showing even less overt evidence of success.  
 
Bomani: Like if for example, Edmund, he can be the first one to leave. By the time he go 
back he can have a car, he can have money. And me I can see what he have. I can think 
‘Ah maybe there is something there.’ I can follow him. The time I come back, maybe  
Matthew: Oh oh oh! (in agreement) 
Bomani: These guys are doing better now! It’s like a competition back at home.  
Azibo: We copy one another. 
Matthew: You see in our country we have fewer opportunities. You see to have a better 
life you must get a good solid concrete education. 
 
 In addition, all throughout the migrant’s tenure in South Africa (and any other 
destination to be sure), they are remitting, perhaps paying a child’s school fees, for a 
grandfather’s funeral, for a wedding, a labola, a doctor’s visit or even gifts of appliances, 
clothing or other luxuries. Thus, children grow up seeing the migration veterans receive 
higher social standing in their communities for their y ars of service and their real or 
perceived wealth. They see that the migrant far from h me (whom they may never have 
actually met yet) is a blessed guardian angel. And perhaps they think they might like to 
have a car or a phone or shoes like him. No one else ha  a car, only him, because he went 
to Italy, or Saudi Arabia, or France or South Africa.  
 At a very young age, then, children can resolve that getting away from homes like 
Malawi will be worth any cost due to the high potential reward.  
 
Me: So people call home and tell that things are better than they are? 
Pardon: Yeah that is why they have to come here and visit me from time to time. But they 
don’t know what I’m going through mentally, how hard it is for me. 
Me: So you sometimes exaggerate your success to give your family hope? 
Pardon: For people, for most people, you tend to do that. But sometimes you do it, not 
knowing you are doing it. Like not let’s say I can t lk to my friend. “What are you doing 
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in South Africa?” I have a business. His mental wilbe like something big. ‘He is driving 
Mercedes, he has flock of workers.’ He’s like ‘Ah can I come there!’ (2011). 
 
 The fantasy loop becomes readily apparent for most igrants after some time in 
South Africa. The first time one must suffer a robbery, racial insult or the pain of hunger, 
the fantasy fades until the hard truth is revealed. “You have to get trapped! You come, 
you don’t have money to go back. So what can you do, you have to work” (Amos 2011). 
Yet migrants, once aware of it, find it difficult to shake it completely. It is such an 
ingrained portion of their worldview regarding financial opportunity that it tends to live 
on in different forms. Though tempered by the reality, migrant hopes and dreams manage 
to thrive.  
 Once in Cape Town, in the market, migrants feel doubly trapped. In a sense the 
blessing of a small income becomes a nuisance. It amplifies the fear of risk, as all know 
how easily they could lose out on having any income if they were to take the risk of 
changing career tracks (Pardon 2011). Yet, the pay for assistants and increasing numbers 
of owners is too low as to allow them to actually build something of substance for their 
future, such as property at home or a business. And even if they did make enough to 
possibly acquire the capital over years of work to go home and develop something of 
lasting permanence, bringing income and commerce to their entire community, this 
dream is most often nickel and dimed away by the needs of those at home, funds given at 
great personal cost by migrants for fear of social ostracization if they do not give what is 
requested. It is a trap and, increasingly, a firmly entrenched cycle.  
 It is exactly as Mamadou pointed out: migrants leave home to become links in a 
chain, equally drawn in by the fantasy portrayed by previous migrants and pushed by the 
absurdly high expectations of immediate reward for their families. For the individual 
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migrant, it is a doomed enterprise from the start. For the communities they serve, it is a 
means of getting quick infusions of cash for special occasions, school fees, small luxuries 
like appliances and sometimes to maintain food security. Yet, the remittance trap rarely 
lets individuals build a truly better future for themselves, nor lets sending communities 
make lasting commercial developments.  
 
V. Conclusion: Cultures of Exile 
 The fantasy loop, the pressures families and decision makers place on children as 
future migrants and the context of domestic poverty all combine to create a culture of 
exile. I saw this theme emerge bit by bit as I engaged my participants in discussion about 
their relationships to their respective homes. As I neared the end of field work, I began to 
distinctly sense that my participants had been groomed, from childhood, for a life of 
migrancy, for exclusion from the comforts of home at the benefit of the community or the 
family.  
 
I saw these attitudes in statements like the following.  
 
Thomas: To my point its unfair. Because as usually as a citizen…you learn and you 
educated by your country. As a citizen you’re supposed not to have to go to another 
country. Because even you country, is country is crying for you to apply your knowledge 
so your country can be going somewhere. It’s better to stay in your home.  
Bomani: But if there is nothing in your home, … 
Azibo and Matthew: How can you stay? 
Bomani: How can you stay?  --goes on about how white peoples parents invest for them 
and start a base for them, as he does, but black peoples parents don’t do that. SO you 
have to make your own way and start your own foundation.  
Azibo: And then if you get some peanuts, you have to share.  
Bomani: And if you get some small peanuts, you have to share (2011). 
 
Me: Is the image of a leader, a man who takes care of his family? Is that image now 
slowly becoming the man who goes to another country? 
Matthew: Yeah exactly. It’s the man who goes to another country. The one who takes 
care of the family at home. 
Azibo: than even the one who is there.  
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Matthew: Because even if I’ve got some body who’s got money, who’s working there, 
but the family’s got a problem, maybe approaches him and he say ok you know what I’m 
gonna tell them to ..why can’t you call your brother in South Africa. He’s got a lot more 
money than me. You see? Ok I will help you with the p one. Call him and he will send 
you money. 
Bomani: Even when they are earning the same amount in a month 
Matthew: They don’t know that we are suffering here.  
Bomani: The same amount! But if there is a problem, they will call here.  
Matthew: Yeah yeah. What is going on. That is because you out of the country. 
Thomas: And they expect that maybe you are getting something. 
Mathew: Yeah yeah.  
Bomani: That’s the situation (2011). 
 
 The Malawian group felt strongly that they were to some extent forced to come to 
South Africa, forced to remit and were being taken advantage of because of the image of 
the wealthy migrant. For them and almost every one els I spoke with about this idea of 
exile, when parted from the connotation of exile as punishment per se, felt that it 
accurately described their situation. They were being brought up in societies that value 
the work of the migrant over that of the homebound businessperson or otherwise hard 
worker. Then those migrants are taken advantage of once abroad. 
 One of my very first interviews was with Paul, a Mlawian also, who considered 
himself a refugee, yet found this interesting considering that he came from a peaceful 
country, with plentiful food. However, as he put it, “You can’t choose to be a refugee.” 
This comment stuck with me. Despite how he saw himself as lacking the hallmarks of the 
stereotypical refugee, war, famine etc., he knew he as one, simply because he felt 
powerless, that he lacked choice in the matter of leaving his home.  
 Whereas many refugees, such as Ibrahim or Antonio, fled for fear of political 
persecution, or like Theresa or Adele, for fear of living in a war ravaged community, Paul 
saw plainly that he was a refugee too for fear of living with no social standing at home 
and with no hope of anything better than what his parents had. Unlike other types of 
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refugees, migrants are exiled not by dictators, roving militias or by famine, but by their 
owned loved ones.  
The Senegalese “Problem” 
 Just as I became certain that the concept of exile was the pinnacle of what I had 
come to understand of migrant life, both in the Market but in South Africa, and possibly 
larger scales, I had a very problematic lunchtime focus group with some Senegalese 
gentlemen. There were new faces, some who had been hesitant before to be interviewed 
individually. Issa, Mamadou and Bakary were there. Abdou came for a bit and ate with 
the same speed he talked. I knew Abdou from two years previously. On a pre-dissertation 
research trip in 2009, I bought a drum from him at the National Arts Festival in 
Grahamstown, off in Eastern Cape. It was my interactions with migrants like him in that 
market that spawned the central questions of my dissertation. How fitting that he showed 
up for one of my final interviews. “First thing before you eat here, you have to make sure 
that the people behind eat already. Whatever happens to them will happen to you here. 
You have to think about them first. First thing is them. Second thing is us. This is the 
reason we are all here” (Abdou, 2011). 
 All affirmed that this was the case. I nodded inwardly, as this lined up with the 
pattern for the rest of the migrants. Next they shared a consensus that they came here 
primarily to make money to provide for their family. Still, despite their family-first focus, 
which was no new theme in my interviews, Abdou mentioned that he had earned enough 
to buy a functional bakery back home. He had done what few others in the market ever 
would: brought tangible development to his home.  
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 “But not only,” Touba chimed in for the first time. “Others, no, they don’t have 
nothing. They are like me. I haven’t got cents there. If I don’t make money here, [my 
family] are not eating. Different story. Maybe [Abdou] have idea before he come. But 
some of us, more of us come with no idea. Come here make money and send home. 
Nothing else.” So, Abdou was still a bit of an anomaly, even for the generally more 
successful Senegalese. 
 I asked then, if they would rather live in Senegal, to which Abdou answered,  
 
People leave Senegal to go to countries where they have hope. Where they have hope, 
there is money. Today if he goes to Malawi, Swaziland, you won’t see Senegalese there. 
That is why many are in South Africa, because there is money here. You can make the 
money, send it back home and make the family to be stable. Senegal is a country of 12 
million now, but we can say we have 6 million outside. 85% of the people form Senegal 
their income comes from outside (2011). 
 
 All agreed that, like the emerging migrant cultures in other Sub-Saharan African 
countries, manliness was measured in provision, and migrant provision most of all. When 
I asked if families expect their sons to go overseas, B kary answered that not all children 
in Senegal get groomed the same way. Those who showno aptitude for commerce do not 
get the same educational and capital investment in them as those who do. As Bakary told 
it, the weak are weeded out of the ranks and only the most intelligent and ambitious are 
selected. It was another piece in the puzzle of whythe Senegalese seemed more 
successful in the market. The style of dress and the bravado were part of a cultural 
display, but they were also the results and partial causes of real success.  
 Intellectual Issa remained behind when the others left. He had thus far failed to 
get more than a word or two in edgewise with Abdou. When I asked him about the 
success Senegalese seemed to have in the market, he r sponded, “The Senegalese come 
with more capital.” 
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 This I had heard also from Bakary and Mamadou. Senegalese families send their 
young men to countries like South Africa, France and the United States, they had 
explained. There is no place near Senegal geographic lly that holds hope for strong 
commercial success, so they must travel by plane which costs much more. The entry 
costs to migrant life in Cape Town for the Senegalese are simply higher. Thus, by 
elimination, those who arrive in New York, Paris or Cape Town are amongst the best 
supported migrants to be found, with families at home that are financially more stable 
than average. This capital allows them to start busines  with bigger-ticket items like 
masks, drums, silver and leather goods. 
 In addition to the capital, it is clear that they exhibit superior salesmanship over 
others in the market. Most sales pitches amount to something close to begging or, 
conversely, sitting idly by their stand. I had myself witnessed a German couple purchase 
a wooden mask from Issa in my first interview with him. They showed interest. Then he 
excused himself from our conversation and calmly began asking them what sort of mask 
interested them. He respectfully answered their questions with as much information as he 
could, sometimes referencing pictures for comparison n a large “coffee table” style 
reference book. He presented his products knowledgably, but without desperation or even 
a hard sell. It was very similar to Abdou’s style I ncountered first in Grahamstown. He 
showed me some beats on the djembe and helped me find a drum with the pitch I liked 
the best.  
 In the end, the Germans handed over the equivalent of $150 US. Issa pocketed the 
money and sat back down with me, as if he had not just made in five minutes what many 
in the market made in a week. This sales style seem to emanate in part from a 
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confidence in the quality of their products, but more so from a lack of anxiety over the 
outcome. While the psychology behind this confidence is beyond my expertise, its 
comparative efficacy is immediately apparent to the lay person. As Issa explained, it was 
partly a result of a history of success and a kind of relaxed fatalism linked to spiritual 
faith.  
 Surely, the honest, erudite and outwardly humble Issa would help translate their 
confident demeanors and feelings in a way that would display that the Senegalese people 
felt exiled deep down. He did not. Amongst other things, I asked him if exile described 
the Senegalese experience. He replied, “I don’t like the word for myself, because I am 
coming here not because I have to, but because I want to find opportunity.”  
 I asked him if that didn’t make him awfully sad tha  he could not live at home and 
have opportunity. He agreed that, yes, it was very sad. Still, he resisted the idea of exile. 
Leaving was his choice. Given the more successful nat re of the Senegalese market trade, 
it should not have come as such a shock to me that Iss  resisted the idea of exile. At the 
time however, it did. I thought Issa would see the larger-scale injustices that drive 
migration and cause such heartache in African communities. When I had hinted at it 
before, the rest of the group had affirmed that they did leave their country for 
opportunity, and that yes they would prefer to be home, but they also had failed to display 
to me the depth of sadness and powerlessness that I was sure would tie up my thesis with 
a neat little bow. Issa’s people, the Murids, are a s ct of Sufi Islam practiced primarily in 
Senegal. He and many of the other Senegalese in themarket are from Touba, an inland 
city that is actually the hearth of Muridism. This sect particularly drew artisans and 
agriculturalists into its fold, upon its ascension n the mid 19th century, who utilized their 
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place as producers for the French Colonial hegemony and thereby long ago locating 
themselves in a global economy (Diouf 2000).  
 Despite his assertion that the idea of exile did not describe his personal feelings, 
Issa was not opposed to idea of exile regarding other Africans. For Issa, being a migrant 
involved a special ambition. Then again, he realized, that was a very common trait for 
Senegalese people and not necessarily for other cultures. In the end, Issa’s point was that 
for Senegalese people, migration was more about the going rather than the leaving. 
Senegalese leave home with far more assurance that they can work hard and achieve their 
goals, so the exercise feels more determined. The fact remains, however, that for a young 
man to pursue his future, he has to leave home, and the entrapping cycles of remittance 
affect the Senegalese too, perhaps, though, to a lesser xtent due to the heavy community 
organization.  
 The Senegalese “problem” turned out not to be a problem at all. In the time since 
these conversations, I have come to think that the Senegalese have accepted the cycle of 
migrancy at a deep cultural level. It has no more the connotation of exile than a Roman 
Legionnaire felt going off to war to seek plunder and fortune. Stoller in fact points to the 
centuries-long history of West African people’s leveraging a willingness to be mobile as 
a capitalist ploy (2009). The Senegalese state uses its domestic policy and foreign 
diplomacy to foster these migration linkages and cycles (2003). The Senegalese have 
internalized the need to leave home for financial wellbeing to the point that it is no longer 
questioned. For reasons whose full depths would be a wonderful topic of study for 
another project, the Senegalese have accepted the lifeway of cyclical migration and 
instead of fighting it or decrying it, merely endeavored to be the best at it. Instead of 
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contradicting the notion that contemporary migration depends on cultures of exile, the 
Senegalese migration project may actually provide a template for how to predict the 
future of the impact of migration and remittance on African societies, culture and 
families. It all begs the question: Are the Senegalse only the beginning? 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 
I. Mobility Is Not Success 
The historical and contemporary cycles of migrancy i  Africa intersect with 
cycles of xenophobia and racism in South Africa to make the migrant life there 
untenable, and the dream of self-advancement elusiv. These cycles are firmly 
entrenched in their own historical backgrounds but also in their relation to one another. 
This relationship between migration cycles and anti-immigration sentiment is remarkably 
strong elsewhere in the world too. Few migration cotexts lack a historically-rooted 
racism or xenophobia. Though these stories differ around the globe in places like Russia, 
Canada and Italy, human mobility is indeed being leveraged far-and-wide by the global 
South.  
 The theme of mobility is one of the core modes of understanding basic human 
adaptation strategies from prehistory to today and will continue to be so. Technology has 
increased the possibilities for markets and other institutions to move faster and farther, 
for people to travel, for cross-pollination of ideas. These are all good things, generally 
speaking, and when we use terms like mobility, we can get an exciting sense of 
improvement and collective empowerment. However, what we must keep in mind is that 
the lack of need for mobility was hailed for generations as a sign of working institutions, 
stability, the fruit of healthy civilization. Likewise, having to move elsewhere, having to 
rely on a high degree of mobility ought to signal that a very large element of global 
society plainly is not functioning.  
Today who has this ability? As labor suffers in nations affected by neoliberal 
reforms, economically attractive locations tend to seal their borders to outsiders or bar 
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their participation within them. Those with capital and political connections are able to 
cross borders nearly effortlessly. Those in the labor class, as Africans in South Africa 
have found, are seldom able to reach their destinations easily, or maintain a presence 
there long enough to benefit from entry into the target job market.   
The Senegalese problem, as I first saw it, is no problem for the notion that young 
men and increasing numbers of women are functionally exi ed from their homes by lack 
of opportunity, but also by social pressures and reshaping cultural imaginations of rites of 
passage and markers of status. The Senegalese I encountered in the market did vary in 
personality and worldview in some respects. They also were remarkably unified in the 
worldview that refused to see migration as an unfortunate event. The exile has become so 
deeply rooted in the Senegalese men I interviewed and spent time with, they have finally 
accepted this necessity of migration unquestioningly. Issa was aware of regional 
inequality, has read Franz Fanon and certainly misses home, but when asked if it 
wouldn’t be a better life for Senegal to be a place wh re young men didn’t have to leave 
for their income and social standing, Issa responded th  same way as if I had asked if it 
would not be a better world if we just didn’t have earthquakes or wild fires or 
mosquitoes.  
Home is best. Migrants would by and large much prefer to be home rather than 
being in the role of migrant. Inequality and historical injustice, whose consequences are 
not soon to improve, are the principle culprits in creating the schism between home and 
migrant. A culture of exile does exist, but the Senegalese case asks how long this rubric 
for understanding will be eclipsed by the notion that the culture of exile has simply 
become “culture.” Exile’s eerie connotations of injustice and punishment may fade into 
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the background as newer, more pressing challenges come to exert discomfort on 
migrants.  
After returning from fieldwork, I had the opportunity to participate in a 
symposium entitled “Cultures of Exile” relating to issues of African migrancy. This was 
my last confirmation that this idea, though novel to me at the time of field work, fitted 
well both into the scholarly conversation in which I am involved, and as a rubric for 
understanding the human experience of migrancy in Africa. The concept of cultures of 
exile serves as a helpful theoretical frame for understanding the contemporary changing 
nature of migration in Africa, as long as the motive for the exile is seen in its proper 
historical and place context. However, after cultures of exile become the norm, what does 
this mean for the migrant identity and the collective migrant future? 
  
II. The Tides that Bind 
Roughly a year after I conducted this fieldwork, I visited the mouth of the 
Klamath River in northern California. The mountain water flows in a wide band directly 
into the crashing and tumultuous Pacific. The contest b tween fresh and salt water halts 
river particles that are then deposited right along the front line of the battle. Over 
centuries or millennia perhaps, this created a sandb r. The directionally alternating winds 
continue today to drive more silt and detritus from the shorelines up onto a fifty-foot high 
berm. This berm is a hundred to two hundred yards wi e and chokes the half-mile wide 
mouth of the mighty Klamath down to a small channel, maybe 80 feet wide.  
I think back to that sand berm and I see on the one side in the pounding waves the 
constant global campaign for capitalist expansion. I see neoliberal policies and 
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neoconservative anti-immigrant sentiment. When I look to the Klamath, being drawn 
down by invisible yet unfaltering forces, to crash headlong into the Pacific, I see ten 
thousand small communities in the Global South, so destitute that local industry cannot 
support the imagined futures of its sons and daughters. I see families willing to fracture in 
order to find a better future, and I see young people enamored with the fantasy of 
emigration. And on this windswept sand bar I see Edmund and Bomani. I see Mamadou 
and Adele, I see Ibrahim, and whether he would like it or not, I see Issa. But when I pull 
back my gaze, I see a whole variety of people, all over the world, from every religion and 
race and nation. I see Africans, Europeans, even increasing numbers of Europeans and 
North Americans. 
One thing that always drew me to understanding migration was the impact it has 
had on the events of history – and what a foundation l effect! – but as I see this berm 
gathering before my eyes, I am beginning to feel that ransnational migration in 2011 was 
not and is not only a finite event nor an age that will come and pass. Migration has 
attained a sort of collective critical mass that will cause it to be more than a trend or a 
phase that we describe in temporal terms. It is a hallmark of the human condition for a 
wide swath of the globe. The condition of the nation-state and neoliberal economics and 
the vast need of the Global South are at war. Yes, this is an event and a fair one for study, 
but this war is leaving orphans at the periphery.  
What I have come to conclude in this analysis is not what I expected: to simply 
sum up the ways that migration is a process that is changing and fascinating. What I have 
come to conclude as the main thrust of my findings, is that migrants’ particular lifeways 
are incredibly unique and are accruing into a social class distinct from the poverty of the 
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global south that sent them and the wealth and power f the north that drew them. The 
tides that bind them are surging more every day. 
 
III. The Migrant Class  
This group we call migrants are not just people on the move. In fact, one of the 
chief struggles of the migrant class is that they live with some of the strictest bonds and 
barriers on their life regarding space and society. Though we think of them as travellers, 
they are actually some of the most immobile people n arth today. Their lack of 
citizenship and familiarity with locals denies them ven non-spatial, social mobility. 
Migrants are actively barred from political and social life in their country of work and 
residence, yet they often perform key economic functio s as part of their subaltern status. 
When we see that the migrant class, apart from having a unique identity, has a unique 
function, both for the countries that send and receiv , we can argue that the Migrant class 
is also a Migrant caste.  
Most people have heard of the untouchable dalits of India and the highly regarded 
Brahmins, but there are dozens of social castes in India and the majority of them have not 
only a connotation of ranking, but of position or industry. Migrants are very similar in 
this way. While I haven’t seen research pointing this caste/class framework toward 
migration elsewhere such as Africa, I do see scholars of Chinese labor using the terms to 
help define and understand the great dependence China has on its domestic labor 
migration.  
As China makes neoliberal reforms under the umbrella of authoritarianism, it uses 
its directive ability to point the market where it wills. One way it has done this is by 
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adhering to decades old administrative delineations between urban workers (zhigong) and 
rural-to-urban migrant workers (nongmin gong) (Chunguang 2006; Tang and Yang 
2008). Though these migrants spend most of their lives living and working in eastern 
cities, they are still branded by society and government as rural peasants, forever barring 
them from many benefits and protections that zhigong maintain and denying full 
participation in urban life (Davies and Ramia 2008). Occasionally migrants can become 
zhigong, but usually only by marriage or the possession of specialized skills (Tang and 
Yang 2008). The divide is about as hard to cross as gaining citizenship in a new country. 
Nongmin gong children, when they accompany migrant workers, are even segregated into 
migrant schools (Lu and Zhou 2013).  
This hukou system, as it is called, goes back to the 50s and 60s, when a Stalinist 
model of rural/urban segregation was imposed in China (Tang and Yang 2008). The full 
history and description of hukou is complex and beyond the scope of my comments here.
What is important to note now, however, is that the nature of migration places pressure 
on elites, bureaucracies, and receiving communities, even in some cases of domestic 
migration. These bodies often respond in the tradition of authoritarian regimes, like 
apartheid South Africa, to bureaucratically reify extant or perceived social boundaries in 
order (ostensibly) to better manipulate the economy and society as a whole (Cooke 2007; 
Tang and Yang 2008). Furthermore, migrant lifeways throughout the world impact 
sending families and home communities in ways that alter their behavior and interactions 
as well (Qin 2010). What my study’s participants must struggle with daily is highly 
reflective of the experiences of hundreds of millions of international and even some 
domestic migrants today. As I stated at the beginning of this conclusion, the specific 
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circumstances of these struggles are varied and complex, but the relationship between 
migration cycles and cycles of xenophobia is firmly entrenched, leaving migrants to pile 
up in the interstices.  
The term “caste” often brings with it a racial conntation. A caste as we have 
come to know it in the Indian example, certainly does, and it also comes with the notion 
of exclusion. One is limited to his or her caste station, but others are also prevented from 
gaining inclusion into that caste. I must admit, the same cannot be said for the sort of 
economic caste that migrants represent worldwide. Though, one could argue that many 
migrants are pressured to migrate because of the residual effects of colonial regimes that 
were often unjust regarding matters of race and ethnici y. Regardless, as scholars around 
the world have noted, even though the primary force upon the migrant identity is the 
search for prosperity, all along they way they find resistance and obstacles regarding their 
race and outsider status as perceived by the social “host” environment. So while one is 
not limited from becoming a migrant on racial terms, they will find that much of their 
opportunity is lessened because of their “race”. This xenophobic bent is one of the forces 
of resistance that actively reject the migrant and prevent identities from seeping into one 
another via assimilation. This forces migrants to operate as an economic caste, one that is 
neither able nor willing in most cases to take on any other identity.  
 Transnational theory I predict will have to accommodate this change in viewpoint. 
As a model, it often is used to link the migrant to home in a symbiotic relationship 
whereby one agent of a family or community seeks out the collective will in another 
country. But as we can see, this model is insufficient for understanding the migrant 
identity in light of the ways they are actively barred from participation in family and 
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home community. Transnational theory has answered conclusively that, yes, actors can 
act across any amount of distance, and by paying attention to these linkages we can better 
understand the migrant life and its role in society at large today. But what transnational 
theory must balance that with now is the vast gulf that families and home communities 
intentionally or otherwise erect in order to make th cost of remitting poorly or returning 
home empty-handed quite high. Home communities use a number of economic and social 
means to threaten the future of a migrant: guilt, spiritual judgment, shame, and rejection 
from emotional and financial security pools just to name a few.   
Again, this raises new questions for transnational theories of migration and their 
ability to work as a framework for understanding the migrant class, questions that could 
be policy-focused, theoretical, ethnographic, or institutional. There is still much to learn 
about the migrant identity and the full impact of the emerging class both on its 
constituents and the realms of power it borders. Understanding the nature of the migrant 
class may enable scholars to make predictive models based on comparisons with other 
emerging classes and castes or with migration contexts in distinct places, South Africa 
and China for instance. These predictive models could help activists and scholars both 
put forward concrete solutions to issues of social justice and policy. 
The Migrant class cuts across a variety of ethnic, economic and cultural groups 
and divisions. The pressures to migrate have been shaped both by structure and injustice, 
but have also been accepted, reinterpreted and mobilized with intent by the members of 
the class themselves. It is both imposed and expressed. The social boundaries to 
migrancy are thick. If migrants constitute a class or even a caste, this raises numerous 
new questions, theoretical and practical, even perhaps activist and policy-driven. I leave 
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these questions for other projects or other scholars. I end my discussion here with the 
claim that the migrant class exists and that its boundaries will, for the present time, only 














Name Origin Est. Age Inteview? Foc. Group? Stall Owner? 
Bakary Senegal 35 Y Y – 3 Y 
Mamadou Senegal 35 Y Y – 3 Y 
Samba Senegal 35 Y N Y 
Issa Senegal 35 Y Y – 3 Y 
Abdou Senegal 40 N Y – 3 Y 
Touba Senegal 25 N Y – 3 N 
Greenshirt Senegal 40 N Y – 3 N 
Ibrahim Sudan 60 Y N Y 
Antonio Angola 50 Y N Co w/ wife 
Helene 
Helene DRC 50 Y N Co 
Adele DRC 50 Y N Y 
Patrice DRC 40 Y N Y 
Therese DRC 50 Y N Y 
Pascal Congo 45 Y N Y 
Brenda Swaziland 65 Y N Y 
Angel Uganda 55 Y N Rented 
Andrew Kenya 22 Y N Manager 
Amos Kenya 40 N Y – 2 Co w/ Wife 
Shana Kenya 40 Y N Y 
Gilbert Malawi 40 N Y – 2 Y 
Paul Malawi 27 Y N N 
Bomani Malawi 30 Y Y – 1 N 
Matthew Malawi 30 Y Y – 1 N 
Thomas Malawi 20 Y Y – 1 N 
Azibo Malawi 25 Y Y – 1 N 
Edmund Malawi 25 Y Y – 1 N 
Robert Zimbabwe 25 Y Y – 1 N 
Emmanuel Zimbabwe 25 Y N N 
Pardon Zimbabwe 26 Y N Manager 
Simon  Zimbabwe 30 Y N Co w/ Father 
Blessing Zimbabwe 35 Y N Co w/ Simon’s 
father, his uncle 
Canaan Zimbabwe 30 Y N N 
Louisa Zimbabwe 20 Y* N N 
Rebecca Zimbabwe 40 Y* N Y 
Oliver Zimbabwe 35 Y N N 
      





Regarding Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 
          I wish to note here that I chose not to answer my original hypotheses in their 
bulleted format. To do so would have forced participant voices into neat compartments, 
whereas I set out to collect a more nuanced understanding of migrant life in South Africa. 
I leave the questions and hypotheses section “as is”, because these hypotheses and 
research questions were the best paths of inquiry I had formed before fieldwork. I feel it 
is important to transparently state the intentions I had upon arrival in Cape Town.  
          For instance, as my research progressed, I began to see that my respondents felt far 
more compelled to talk about the social order around remittance than the mechanisms of 
transporting it. My methods were designed to let this sort of shift to happen, with the use 
of open-ended questions and focus groups to allow and encourage migrants to direct the 
conversation along with me. In short, this is why te final dissertation organized around 







            It may be useful for other scholars to kn w how I organized my interviews. The 
following is the list of questions I asked of my participants. I allowed the conversation to 
flow to their interests, to see what I could glean without directing it. This often allowed 
me to gain the answers to these questions without having to ask them, as participants 
talked about their lives. While every interview was unique and followed a different order, 
I made sure to get the migrant’s perspectives on the following. 
1. Why/under what circumstances did you come to South Africa? (Encouraged them to 
talk about their personal history, family, career.) 
2. Can you tell me about your experience obtaining a “status”? 
    2b. Asked about their interactions with DHA 
    2c. Asked about their experience with police. 
3. Can you tell me about your experiences with South Africans? 
    3b. Encouraged them to elaborate on their experiences (pos or neg) with examples. 
    3c. Asked them about how their experiences affected their decisions and behavior 
4. Can you tell me about your relationship to home? 
    4b. Asked how often and by what means they communicated with home and for what 
reasons 
    4c. Asked what they received, if anything, from home 
    4d. Asked about what they sent to their friends and relations at home.  
    4e. Elicited as much detail as participants seemed comfortable giving about what or 
how much money they sent to whom and how often.  
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5. If you were teaching a class of new migrants howto survive and succeed in South 
Africa, what are the three things you would tell them? 
 
Other questions that became more common after the first few interviews 
How do you feel about your future in South Africa? 
Would you recommend migrating to South Africa to pel  back home? 
If you went home right now, would you be well received by friends and family? What 
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